State Ex Rel. Chamberlin v. Tyler

130 So. 721, 100 Fla. 1112
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedNovember 1, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 130 So. 721 (State Ex Rel. Chamberlin v. Tyler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Chamberlin v. Tyler, 130 So. 721, 100 Fla. 1112 (Fla. 1930).

Opinion

Strum, J.,

In an original proceeding in this Court instituted on October 28, 1930, relator seeks a writ of mandamus commanding the County Commissioners of Volusia County to print the name of the relator upon the official ballot to be used in the General Election to be held on November 4, 1930, as the nominee of the Eepublican Party for the office of member of the Board of Public Instruction for District Number Three of Volusia County.

The facts pertinent to this controversy are that the Eepublican Party held a primary election pursuant to law in June, 1930, in which primary there was no candidate *1114 for nomination to the office aforesaid. Relator now seeks to become the party nominee by virtue of the subsequent action of the Republican Executive Committee on September 15, 1930, purporting to designate her the party nominee pursuant to Section 14 of Chapter 13761, Acts of 1929, to fill a supposed “vacancy in nomination” as contemplated by that statute.

Relator contends that a “vacancy in nomination” within the meaning of that statute occurs when a political party had no candidate for nomination in the party primary, and for that reason made no nomination, as is the case here.

Respondents contend that there can be no “vacancy in a nomination” as contemplated by that statute unless a nominee- has been selected in the primary who has since become incapacitated or disqualified. For that reason respondents refuse to print relator’s name upon the general election ballot notwithstanding the action of the Republican Executive Committee designating relator the Republican party nominee for said office, and the certification of such nomination to the Board of County Commissioners.

Section 356, Comp. Gen. Laws of Florida, as amended by Section 1 of Chapter 13761, Acts of 1929, provides:

“Any political party which, in either of the two general elections next preceding a primary, polled more than 30% of the entire vote cast in the State for its candidates for presidential electors, or any other officer voted for throughout the State, is hereby declared to be a political party within the meaning of this Article, and shall nominate its candidates for all elective offices to be voted for in the next ensuing general election, under the provisions of this Article, and not otherwise.”

*1115 Other sections of the Article provide for the holding of primary elections, the certification of the persons selected thereat as nominees of the several political parties, and the printing upon the ensuing general election ballot of the names of those so chosen as party nominees for the several offices involved.

Until Chapter 13761 was passed in 1929, no definite method was provided by which a political party embraced within the definition and requirements of Section 356, Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927, as amended, could supply a party nominee for a general election, when the nominee chosen in the preceding primary died, removed his residence, became insane, or otherwise lost his status as such nominee prior to the,general election at which he would have been the party candidate. (Political parties not falling within the statutory definition aforesaid may, of course, designate nominees by other means.)

Section 14 of said Chapter 13761 was designed to remedy the deficiency just mentioned by providing a method by which a substituted party nominee could be supplied when the primary nominee was no longer available. In part, that section provides:

“In the event of death, resignation or removal of any person nominated for office in a primary election, between such primary election and the ensuing general election, or if for any cause there is a vacancy in any nomination, and no method is otherwise provided herein for filling such vacancy, then and in that event the procedure shall be the same as is hereinbefore provided for the nomination of candidates in case no candidate receives a majority of the votes cast in the primary election and all such nominations shall have the same force and effect and shall entitle the nomi *1116 nees to all the rights and privileges that would accrue to them as if they had been nominated in the regular primary election.”

Relator relies upon that clause of the statute just quoted which provides ‘ ‘ or if for ‘ any cause ’ there is a vacancy in any nomination” such nomination may be filled as in cases where no candidate receives a majority vote in which event the executive committee of the party designates the nominee.

It is admitted by the relator that the Republican Party is a “political party” within the meaning of See. 356, Comp. Gen. Laws, 1927, as amended by Chapter 13761, supra, and therefore within the mandatory requirements of the Article relating to primary elections.

The first requirement of the primary law is that all political parties, as defined by the statute, shall nominate candidates for all elective offices under the provisions of that law. “and not otherwise”. This requirement is mandatory upon all parties which fall within its terms.

If this Court'should adopt the construction of Sec. 14 of Chap. 13761 contended for by relator, the effect would be to provide optional methods of selecting party nominees. There would then be at least two methods under the primary law of making original selections of party nominees, first by popular vote of the party at a primary election; second by the designation of such nominee by the party executive committee when the party elects to hold no primary or when no candidate for nomination offers himself in the primary. Under relator’s construction, the failure of any political party to make party nominations by a primary election would create .“vacancies” as to all nominations, which might then be filled by the party executive committee and the object of the mandatory primary election law could thus be readily defeated. The *1117 holding of primary elections 'would- become an idle act, since those political parties which did not choose to hold such elections might nevertheless designate party nominees.

The general purpose of the Legislature in enacting mandatory primary laws was to preclude the making of nominations by convention, party committees and the like, and to require that the people themselves, by their direct votes, should name party nominees. The only vacancies contemplated by Sec. 14 of Chap. 13761, supra, to be filled by executive committees, are such as may occur after the people themselves have made nominations, and vacancies therein have oecured by death, resignation, or other incapacity. Which might perhaps include forfeiture to be determined by resolution of the proper executive committee on proper and sufficient cause shown.

The statutory provision now before us should not be interpreted so as to allow a political party to ignore the mandatory requirement to nominate candidates by primaries, and to substitute some other method of selecting original party nominees.

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Bluebook (online)
130 So. 721, 100 Fla. 1112, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-chamberlin-v-tyler-fla-1930.