State ex rel. Brown v. Wauford

2011 Ohio 2858, 949 N.E.2d 999, 129 Ohio St. 3d 17

• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Decided: June 16, 2011
• Docket: 2011-0137 and 2011-0138
• Status: Published

Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgments of the courts of appeals dismissing the complaints of appellant, Frank C. Brown, a child-support obligor, for writs of mandamus to compel appellees, Hancock County Department of Job and Family Services Director Judith A. Wauford and Seneca County Department of Job and Family Services Director Kathy Oliver, to provide access to and copies of certain child-support records under R.C. 3125.16, Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12-1-20.1, the United States Constitution, and other provisions. Because these appeals raise similar issues, we consolidate them for purposes of decision.

Frank C. Brown Jr., pro se. Mark C. Miller, Hancock County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Judith A. Wauford. Derek W. DeVine, Seneca County Prosecuting Attorney, and David J. Claus, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Kathy Oliver.

{¶ 2} As the courts of appeals correctly concluded, Brown having previously unsuccessfully raised these claims in both counties by motions filed in juvenile courts and appeal, see, e.g., In re Brown, Seneca C.P. No. 20720086, and Hageman v. Brown, Hancock App. Nos. 5-09-20 and 5-09-21, 2009-Ohio-5432, 2009 WL 3259110, res judicata bars all subsequent actions, including Brown’s mandamus claims, based upon any claim arising out of the transactions or occurrences that were the subject matter of the previous actions. See State ex rel. Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 104 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-6406, 819 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 22. “Mandamus is not a substitute for an unsuccessful appeal.” State ex rel. Marshall v. Glavas, 98 Ohio St.3d 297, 2003-Ohio-857, 784 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 6. 1

Judgments affirmed.

O’Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.

1 . We deny the motion by Oliver in case No. 2011-0138 for an order striking Brown’s merit brief and for an order dismissing his appeal. Although we agree that Brown’s brief does not comply with some of the mechanical requirements of S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.4(A), “[i]n order to promote justice, the court exercises a certain liberality in enforcing a strict attention to its rules, especially as to mere technical infractions.” Drake v. Bucher (1966), 5 Ohio St.2d 37, 40, 34 O.O.2d 53, 213 N.E.2d 182; State ex rel. Morgan v. New Lexington, 112 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-6365, 857 N.E.2d 1208, ¶ 22. This is consistent with “the fundamental tenet of judicial review in Ohio * * * that courts should decide cases on them merits.” State ex rel. Becker v. Eastlake (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 502, 505, 756 N.E.2d 1228.