State ex rel. Boynton v. Buchanan

51 P.2d 5, 142 Kan. 515, 1935 Kan. LEXIS 12
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedNovember 9, 1935
DocketNo. 32,200
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 51 P.2d 5 (State ex rel. Boynton v. Buchanan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Boynton v. Buchanan, 51 P.2d 5, 142 Kan. 515, 1935 Kan. LEXIS 12 (kan 1935).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Smith, J.:

This is an original action in quo warranto to oust the defendant from the office of city commissioner. The defend[516]*516ant was suspended from office shortly after the action was begun. A commissioner was appointed to hear and determine the issues. This commissioner found the facts in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff has moved for judgment of ouster notwithstanding the report of the commissioner.

In actions where this court has appointed a commissioner to hear-evidence and determine issues of fact, it is the duty of the court to examine the whole record and reach its own conclusion as to the facts. (See State, ex rel., v. Duncan, 134 Kan. 85, 4 P. 2d 443.) In that respect this action differs from one that is tried in district court and appealed on a question of fact. With that rule in mind we have examined this record.

The first cause of action in the petition charges defendant with using his influence and vote in awarding a contract for the paving of a street in the city and with receiving $365 from the contractor in payment therefor. The contractor, one Fry, was a witness for the state. He testified he was .a friend of defendant and helped him get into office; that shortly after his term started defendant asked him how he could make some extra money. He testified that after the petition for the paving in question was circulated there was a conference at his house at which it was agreed that the profit on the binder used in paving the street was to be split three ways, that is, between defendant, the witness Fry and one Ashford, the city engineer. He testified further that the contract was awarded to him; that his profit on the binder was about $1,100; that he drew a check for $726 and some odd cents from the bank payable to a man in Kansas City; that he cashed the check and paid defendant $365 and paid Ashford $360. On cross-examination he testified that he had not been promised any immunity for testifying and that he had fallen out with defendant about the award of another contract for paving which was not awarded to him.

Ashford was the next-witness for the state. He was city engineer. It was his duty to prepare the plans and estimates for paving and to supervise the construction. He testified that he did not remember going to Fry’s house before the contract was let, but after it was let Fry called him up; he went down to his house; and that defendant and his wife came there; witness, defendant and Fry all went upstairs to Fry’s office. At this point the testimony of this witness becomes confused. He was asked to state the conversation that occurred there among the three. He answered that he did not [517]*517think he could do that. Counsel for the state then started to cross-examine him with reference to a statement he had signed. Over the objection of defendant this was permitted. He then claimed immunity and whs advised if he claimed immunity and then was forced to testify he could not be prosecuted on account of anything about which he should testify. The net result was he testified that Fry agreed that if he would take the place of Fry’s brother Dick while he was in the hospital Fry would pay him one third of the profit on the binder. Witness testified that Fry might have said that he would divide the profit three ways. Witness testified that Fry said he was going to give him a third and was going to give defendant a third, but he would not say that defendant was there when Fry said this. Witness testified that he swore to the following affidavit:

“Charles H. Ashford, being first duly sworn, upon his oath says: That I am a resident of Iola, Allen county, Kansas; that. I am, at the present time, and have been during all of the times referred to in this affidavit, the duly appointed and qualified city engineer of the city of Iola, Kan.; that as a part of my duties as city engineer I prepare the plans and specifications in connection with the construction and reconstruction of the paving on the streets of said city; that in May, 1933, and prior to the letting of the contract to R. D. Fry, or the Iola Construction Company, which is one and the same, for the resurfacing of Chestnut street between the north line of Madison to the south line of Monroe, J. D. Buchanan, R. D. Fry and myself met down at the Iola Button Factory in the afternoon and agreed that we would meet down at R. D. Fry’s house at 7:30 that evening to determine the amount of profit in the job and the amount that would be paid to J. D. Buchanan and myself as a pay-off for giving our assistance in obtaining the contract for the Iola Construction Company.”

He testified that the affidavit was true except that the time of the meeting at Fry’s house was after the contract was let instead of before. He testified that the job did not hold up very well because gravel rather than crushed rock was used in the binder. The gravel was cheaper. He further testified that he received $360 from Fry. On cross-examination he testified that he told the county attorney the date in the affidavit was wrong, but the county attorney did not change it. He testified that the only thing discussed while defendant was present was whether gravel or crushed rock would be used in the binder. Reluctantly and after being asked three or four times Ashford finally testified that he was not sure, but to the best of his recollection defendant was gone when Fry told him he was going to give him a third. On redirect examination he repeated that [518]*518he told the county attorney that the affidavit should have stated the meeting at Fry’s house took place after the contract was let rather than before; and that what Fry was doing at the meeting was figuring the difference in the cost between gravel and crushed rock and that it was not unusual for a contractor to figure the cost of materials after the contract had been let. On recross-examination he testified that át the time of the county attorney’s inquisition he was promised immunity and was told if he did not come clean it would be too bad, but no strong-arm methods were used. In response to questions by the commissioner he testified that he received the money from Fry for working for his brother; and defendant never told him anything about receiving money from Fry; that at the meeting in Fry’s home Fry did not figure any costs; that he had prepared the estimates for the job; and that he had talked to defendant about it first. In redirect examination he testified that he told defendant what he had put in the statement to the attorney general and what defendant told him could not be repeated in the presence of ladies; and that defendant told him he was a fine fellow to be telling what was not true.

Jesse C. Benson testified that he was cashier of the bank; that July 7, 1933, the account of Fry showed a check drawn payable to Wm. R. Martin for $726.50; that he kept books for Fry and that at the time of writing the check Fry mentioned that he needed the money with which to pay for some equipment.

Mr. Hobart, the mayor of the city, testified that when the resurfacing of the street in question was first brought up it was turned down because some property owners on the street in question were in arrears in taxes; that after defendant became finance commissioner he stated that people were ringing his telephone off the .wall asking about it, but that no one called him, and that defendant took office in April, 1933, and defendant and Bartlett voted to have the street resurfaced in May.

For the defense, Mr.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
51 P.2d 5, 142 Kan. 515, 1935 Kan. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-boynton-v-buchanan-kan-1935.