State, ex rel. Board of Health v. Lederer

52 N.J. Eq. 675
New Jersey Court of Chancery·Decided May 15, 1894·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

Bird, V. O.

The business of the defendants, which the complainants seek to restrain, is what is commonly calledYat-rendering. It is carried on in the township of North Brunswick, in the county of Somerset, and within a short, distance of the line dividing the said county from the county of Middlesex. There are only three or four houses within a few hundred feet of the establish[676] ment in the county of Somerset, and two or three several hundred feet further away, while there are a great many dwelling-houses occupied as such in the county of Middlesex and in the city of New Brunswick within a few hundred feet of the. place where this business is carried on.

It is insisted that the board of health of the township of North Brunswick has no authority to proceed against the defendants for any nuisance hazardous to public health, in case it appears that the threatened mischief is only likely to affect the inhabitants residing in the said county of Middlesex. This is put upon the ground that jurisdiction is statutory and is limited to the township which creates the board of health. It is true that its jurisdiction is so limited. The board of health of any township can only proceed to abate a nuisance existing or carried on within its own boundaries. But to my mind it is very clear that, whenever the public health is threatened by such a nuisance, whether those who comprise the public live upon one side of an imaginary line or another, the board of health in the township where such nuisance is located has committed to it the duty of removing the nuisance or of asking the aid of the court-to that end.

But in this particular case the judgment of the court is not dependent upon any such question of jurisdiction, for the half dozen or more dwelling-houses within the township of North; Brunswick are sufficiently within the reach of the mischief, not only to claim but to demand the attention of the public authorities. Whether they'be many or few, no higher obligation can rest upon the court than to protect them in their health in case it be ascertained that it is in danger.

It is also strenuously urged that the defendants have had possession of the premises complained of for at least twenty-eight years, and for all that period of time have been carrying on the tanning of hides and rendering of fat, and are consequently entitled to the protection of the court, notwithstanding the hazard to public health may be ever so great. Courts will be very slow to yield to such a proposition. An acknowledgment of the principle claimed would practically give to the defendants [677] and others dominion over a very much larger extent of territory than it would be actually necessary for them to own in order to nonduct their business, provided they had occupied the premises beyond the prescribed statutory period which prohibits actions to be brought by individuals. In the case of Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray 473, the court said: “Carrying on an offensive trade for twenty years, in a place remote from buildings and public roads, does not entitle the owner to continue it in the same place after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the occupants of and travelers upon which it is a nuisance.” People v. White Lead Worles, 9 L. R. A. 722; People v. Cunningham, 1 Den. 524; Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 668; Mills v. Hall & Richards, 9 Wend. 315; Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. St. 257; Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill 575; Wood Nuis. § 18; Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wend. 446; Bloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179.

But since the public is interested, I think the maxim, “Nullum tempus occurrit regi,” announced and maintained in Cross v. The Mayor, &c., 3 C. E. Gr. 311, should control the case before me.

In addition to this, very high authority has said: “ In such cases, prescription, whatever the length of time, has no application. Every day’s continuance is a new offence, and it is no justification that the party complaining came voluntarily within its reach. Pure air and the comfortable enjoyment of property are as much rights belonging to it as the right of possession and occupancy.” Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, supra; Wells v. New Haven and Northampton Co., 151 Mass. 46; Sloggy v. Dilworth, supra; in note to Chicago and Eastern Railway Co. v. Loeb, see principles in harmony with this view, 59 Am. Rep. 353, 854; Hargraves v. Kimberly, 58 Am. Rep. 130, notes.

It was likewise very earnestly insisted that the'persons affected by the odors emitted from this establishment were in feeble condition of health by nature, or of abnormal physical characteristics ; in other words, possessed of some idiosyncrasy which cast them beyond the protection of all laws of a general nature, or which are enacted for the public welfare. I think that the utmost use which can be made of this argument is in reference [678] to persons who are peculiarly sensitive to odors or sounds, and which affect them seriously and in a radically different manner from which the great mass of individuals are affected, it being quite difficult, if not impossible, for the law to provide adequate safeguards against all the imaginary ills which arise in the minds of the eccentric, or those of morbid habits or tastes. But this condition of mind or body must be established by clear proof. It cannot possibly have reference to that large class in every community that are less robust, or are more feeble in body, or less capable of resisting deleterious influences from without, than many, or it may be a majority, of their neighbors. All citizens are presumed to enjoy a normal condition of mind and body until the contrary is clearly shown. My attention was directed to Westcott v. Middleton, 16 Stew. Eq. 478, which was Sustained in the court of errors and appeals. See S. C., 17 Stew. Eq. 297. Westcott sought to restrain Middleton from conducting the business of an undertaker on the premises of the latter, which adjoined the residence of the former. The proofs showed that Westcott had a dislike amounting almost to a horror, of everything pertaining to the burial of the dead. I can discover nothing in that case which is so similar to the one under consideration as to influence me.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

State, ex rel. Board of Health v. Lederer, 52 N.J. Eq. 675 (N.J. Ct. App. 1894).

52 N.J. Eq. 675 (State, ex rel. Board of Health v. Lederer) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Protokowicz v. Lesofski
174 A.2d 385 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1961)
STATE EX REL. BD. OF HEALTH v. Sommers Rendering Co.
169 A.2d 165 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1961)
State v. Annett
62 A.2d 224 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1948)
Benton v. Kernan
6 A.2d 195 (New Jersey Court of Chancery, 1939)