State Ex Rel. Bell v. Pierce

247 P. 812, 118 Or. 533, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 116
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJune 25, 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 247 P. 812 (State Ex Rel. Bell v. Pierce) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Bell v. Pierce, 247 P. 812, 118 Or. 533, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 116 (Or. 1926).

Opinion

CO SHOW, J.

The amendment to our state Constitution designated Article XI-c is broad and includes every person who served in the army, navy or marine service of the United States between the dates therein named. There are no discriminations, distinctions or restrictions as to the branch or department of service.

*536 The S. A. T. C. was organized by authority of an act of the Congress entitled “An Act to Authorize the President to Increase Temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States,” approved May 18, 1917, and the amendatory act approved August 31, 1918 (40 Stats, at Large, Chap. 166). Section 3 of the last-named act provides:

“That all male persons between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, both inclusive, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President * * .”

Section 4 prescribes that all persons so registered shall be liable to service in the army, navy or marine corps, and shall be allotted to the army, navy and marine corps under regulations to be prescribed by the President.

Section 7 prescribes:

“That the Secretary of War is authorized to assign to educational institutions, for special training, soldiers who enter the military service under the provisions of this Act in such numbers and under such regulations as he may prescribe; and is authorized to contract with such educational institutions for the subsistence, quarters, and military and academic instruction of such soldiers.”

The regulations prescribed under said act among others are as follows:

“Under the authority conferred by sections 1, 2, 8 and 9 of the act of Congress ‘authorizing the President to increase temporarily the Military Establishment of the United States,’ approved May 18, 1917, the President directs that for the period of the existing emergency there shall be raised and maintained by voluntary induction and draft a ‘Students’ Army Training Corps.’ Units of this corps will be authorized by the Secretary of War at educational *537 institutions that meet the requirements laid down in special regulations.”

“The object of establishing units of the Students Army Training Corps is to utilize effectively the plant, equipment, and organization of the colleges for selecting and training officers, candidates and technical experts for service in the existing emergency.”

“Eligibility to the Students’ Army Training Corps is limited to registrants under the selective-service regulations who are physically fit to perform full or limited military duty and who have had at least grammar-school education or its equivalent.”

“Upon admission to the Students’ Army Training-Corps a registrant becomes a soldier in the army of the United States. As such he is subject to military law and to military discipline at all times.”

“Members of the Students’ Army Training Corps will be placed upon active-duty status immediately upon their induction.”

“The method of voluntary induction into the Students’ Army Training Corps is prescribed in the Selective Service Regulations and instructions issuing from the office of the Provost Marshal General.”

“The Students’ Army Training Corps is a corps of the United States Army.”

Students’ Army Training Corps Regulations, 1918, pars. 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 13, 22 and 23.

No argument is required to convince one that petitioner is embraced within the language of said Article XI-c. He was “inducted” and “served honorably in active duty in the army, * * of the United States between the sixth day of April, 1917, and the eleventh day of November, 1918.” He was a “resident of the State of Oregon” and has been “honorably discharged from said service.” His status in the army was quite similar to the enlisted soldier under training in the regularly established army *538 camps. Modern warfare is not waged entirely with ordinary implements of warfare. Chemicals, gases, electricity and all other devices which the ingenuity of man has enabled him to utilize are now employed as means of defense and destruction. All the arts and sciences were employed in the late World War to contribute to defend and to destroy effectively. The fact that petitioner was being prepared at a college instead of in an ordinary military camp did not make him less a soldier, or his service less active.

“Article 51-c, however, in itself, and by its own terms, enumerated all of the qualifications which an applicant must possess to entitle him to the' right to elect whether to receive a bonus or a loan, possessing which, he was entitled to exercise such right.”

“We think the rule sustained by all the authorities is, that where a constitutional provision creates a right and prescribes the qualifications which must be possessed to entitle one to enjoy such right, the legislature can neither add to nor subtract from the qualifications thus prescribed in determining who are entitled to the enjoyment of such right.” Moore v. Olcott et al., 105 Or. 269, 271, 275 (209 Pac. 298).

The status of a soldier in the army of the United States is fixed by the laws enacted by the Congress and the regulations thereunder. The Students’ Army Training Corps was created by the act of May 18, 1917, and acts amendatory thereto, and the status of the men inducted into said corps fixed by the constituted authority. Article XI-c was adopted in the light of said acts and regulations.

The sufficiency of the alternative writ is challenged by the defendants. They assert that the writ does not show that the petitioner was inducted in a Students’ Army Training Corps at a college qualified, under the law and regulations of the United States, *539 to perform the required service. It is the law of this state that the writ must be sufficient in itself to show what is claimed, and the facts upon which the claim is made: Shively v. Pennoyer, 27 Or. 33 (39 Pac. 396).

The alternative writ alleges among other facts that the petitioner ‘ ‘ served honorably in active duty in the United States Army between the sixth day of April, 1917, and the eleventh day of November, 1918; * * was duly enlisted in said service after the third day of June, 1915, to-wit: On the eighteenth day of October, 1918; that the relator was honorably discharged and separated from said army and service on, to-wit: the seventeenth day of December, 1918.” These are sufficient statements of fact to meet the requirements of the statute: Or. L., § 616.

The learned Attorney General states in his brief for the defendants:

“As we view it the real question involved is: Did the framers of Article XI-c and those who voted in favor of its adoption intend that students in the Students’ Army Training Corps should be eligible to receive money from the World War Veterans’ State Aid Fund, upon the same terms as those persons who had served honorably in active duty in the army of the United States?”

We opine that the writ and return fairly present that question.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
247 P. 812, 118 Or. 533, 1926 Ore. LEXIS 116, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-bell-v-pierce-or-1926.