State Ex Rel Barnes v. Indus. Comm of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2006)

2006 Ohio 3082
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 13, 2006
DocketNo. 05AP-298.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2006 Ohio 3082 (State Ex Rel Barnes v. Indus. Comm of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel Barnes v. Indus. Comm of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-13-2006), 2006 Ohio 3082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Jeffrey Barnes, seeks a writ of mandamus that directs respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order that denied him temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation, effective April 20, 2004, and that directs the commission to award TTD compensation, effective April 20, 2004. In the alternative, relator's complaint seeks a writ of mandamus that directs the commission to vacate its order denying TTD compensation, effective April 20, 2004, and that directs the commission to conduct a new hearing concerning relator's entitlement to TTD compensation. The commission previously found that relator's industrial injury had reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI") as of July 22, 2002.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate of this court. The magistrate examined the evidence and issued a decision wherein he made findings of fact and conclusions of law. (Attached as Appendix A.) In his decision, the magistrate concluded that relator could not show that the commission abused its discretion by denying TTD compensation, and the magistrate recommended denial of relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

{¶ 3} Relator has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. In his objections, relator asserts:

The Magistrate Erred by Concluding That the Challenged Orders of Respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio, Constituted the Only Evidence of What Arguments Relator, Jeffrey Barnes, Made Administratively in Seeking a New Period of Temporary Total Disability Following a Surgical Procedure and a Flare-Up of His Allowed Conditions.

{¶ 4} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, relator must show (1) a clear legal right to the relief requested; (2) respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act sought; and (3) relator has no plain and adequate remedy at law. State ex rel.Fain v. Summit Cty. Adult Probation Dept. (1995),71 Ohio St.3d 658, citing State ex. Howard v. Ferreri (1994),70 Ohio St.3d 587, 589.

{¶ 5} "`[D]etermination of disputed factual situations is within the final jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission, and subject to correction by action in mandamus only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.'" State ex rel. Morris v. Indus. Comm.of Ohio (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 38, 39, quoting State ex rel.Haines v. Indus. Comm. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 15, 16; State exrel. Posey v. Indus. Comm. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 298, 299. An abuse of discretion occurs "where there is no evidence upon which the commission could have based its factual conclusion." Stateex rel. Morris, supra, at 39, citing State ex rel. Posey, supra; State ex rel. Questor Corp. Indus. Comm. (1982),70 Ohio St.2d 240, 241, citing State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm. (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165. "`Where a commission order is adequately explained and based on some evidence, evidence that may be persuasively contradicted by other evidence of record, the order will not be disturbed as manifesting an abuse of discretion.'" State ex rel. Avalon Precision Casting Co. v.Indus. Comm., 109 Ohio St.3d 237, 2006-Ohio-2287, at ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm. (1997),78 Ohio St.3d 579, 584.

{¶ 6} Here, relator asserts that the magistrate erred by concluding that the commission's orders constituted the only evidence of relator's arguments before the commission in support of his application for TTD compensation. In his decision, the magistrate stated:

[R]elator argues that the commission abused its discretion by failing to address two theories that relator puts forth in support of reinstatement of TTD compensation. The first theory is that the PLDD procedure itself, performed on November 4, 2003, constitutes a new and changed circumstance. The second theory claims that relator experienced a flare-up or worsening of his condition in April 2004 when he fell and sought emergency room treatment.

(Magistrate's Decision, at 12.)

{¶ 7} The magistrate further stated:

A review of the DHO's order of September 10, 2004 and the SHO's order of November 4, 2004, that affirmed the DHO's order, discloses, as relator points out, that the commission did not address the two theories that relator posits here. However, that does not automatically indicate that the commission abused its discretion in failing to adjudicate those two theories.

Here, relator does not actually claim that he presented those two theories at the administrative proceedings. He simply claims that the commission failed to address those theories. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record indicating that relator presented those two theories to the commission for adjudication.

The orders of the DHO and SHO themselves are the only evidence in the record as to what relator actually argued administratively.

(Magistrate's Decision, at 13.)

{¶ 8} Relator asserts, among other things, that the magistrate's finding is factually inaccurate. According to relator, C-84 forms in the record reference (1) an IDET annuloplasty that relator underwent in November 2003; (2) a requested post-IDET physical medicine program; and (3) a postoperative visit after IDET treatment. Relator also cites to correspondence between Dr. Dixon and Dr. May wherein a recurrence of back pain is noted.

{¶ 9} Notwithstanding relator's objections, although evidence in the record may be supportive of relator's theories if these theories were indeed presented to the commission, there is no evidence in this record that relator actually advanced these theories before the commission. Copies of documents in the stipulated evidence that mention a recurrence of a condition and medical intervention are not necessarily probative as to whether relator actually advanced theories before the commission. Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the magistrate erred when he concluded in this case that "[t]he orders of the DHO and SHO themselves are the only evidence in the record as to what relator actually argued administratively." (Magistrate's Decision, at 13.) See, e.g., State ex rel. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v.Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 139, 142 (stating that "[t]he commission speaks only through its final actions, i.e., its orders" and "[c]onsistent with this tenet, evidentiary review is limited to the evidence and reasoning identified in the order").

{¶ 10} Therefore, absent any evidence in the record that relator actually advanced relator's theories before the commission, we conclude that the magistrate did not err in his conclusion of law.

{¶ 11}

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Related

State ex rel. Barnes v. Industrial Commission
114 Ohio St. 3d 444 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2007)
State ex rel. Barnes v. Indus. Comm.
852 N.E.2d 183 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 3082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-barnes-v-indus-comm-of-ohio-unpublished-decision-ohioctapp-2006.