State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Greenville Building & Saving Ass'n

29 Ohio St. 92
CourtOhio Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1876
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 29 Ohio St. 92 (State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Greenville Building & Saving Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Greenville Building & Saving Ass'n, 29 Ohio St. 92 (Ohio 1876).

Opinion

Gilmore, J.

The information herein is filed by the attorney-general on his own relation, in the name of the state, under section 9 of the attorney-general act (1 S. & C. 89).

It is not charged in terms that the defendant has done or committed acts which amount to a surrender or forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges, and franchises; nor is a judgment of ouster from all its corporate lights, privileges, and franchises expressly demanded. The general charge is, that'the defendant has in the past, and does now, unlawfully assume and usurp certain franchises and privileges [95]*95not conferred upon it by law, and has and does exceed the powers conferred upon it by law.

Under this general charge there are several specifications <of matters particularly complained of, and separate pleas have been filed to each specification. By these our in-, •quiries will be guided, and, they will be considered and disposed of in their order.

The first specification is that the corporation (defendant) •unlawfully allows certain of its members to hold in their ■own right, respectively, more than twenty shares of its •stock. The plea to this specification is (1), a denial of the fact; and (2) a disclaimer of the right to allow to its memtbers the privilege named.

The inhibition in this respect is found in the second proviso of the 2d section of the act under which the defendant is incorporated (S. & S. 194, 195), and is as follows : “ No person shall hold more than twenty shares in any such association in his own right.” This provision is nowhere expressly or impliedly qualified in this or any other act relating to the subject. j

This issue of fact is found for the state upon the testimony of the secretary of the association, who says from April, 1872, to March, 1875, Erank McWhinney was the •owner in his own right of twenty-four shares of stock that •stood in his own name on the books of the association. It appears that a portion of this stock was obtained ~by McWhinney in connection with the purchase of certain real estate from another member of the association, who had taken a loan on the stock, and secured it by mortgage on the premises purchased, and that the stock was transferred to him by the mortgagor in performance •of a part of the contract of purchase. It is assumed in .argument that the fact of acquiring the additional stock in connection with the purchase of real estate, rendered the stock transaction unobjectionable, or at least excusable. This is a mistake. The corporation had nothing to do -with the real estate contract between its members, and .could not control it. It could, however, have controlled the [96]*96transfer of stock upon its books, and should have refused to allow any member to acquire and hold in his own right stock in excess of the number of shares limited by law.

It also further appears from the testimony of the secretary that the “ I. O. O. Eellows,” which means, as we understand it, a lodge of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows, is the owner of thirty shares of stock in its own right, upon which it has taken a loan for the full sum of $6,000, less the premium paid. This, as to the excess over-twenty shares, is clearly illegal and unauthorized.

This issue of fact being found for the state, and it further appearing that in the latter instance the defendant is still offending, its disclaimer in this respect will not be heeded.

The second specification charges that the corporation has used and does now unlawfully use its moneys and funds (1) in buying orders and bonds and in discounting notes, mortgage securities, and commercial paper; (2) in doing a general banking business with its funds; and (3) that it had been and is now loaning its funds to persons other than its members and depositors, and discounting notes, orders, and securities for such other persons.

The plea to this specification is (1) a denial that it has exercised banking privileges ; (2) a disclaimer of the right to do so ; and (3) “ that the loans made by it and the bonds, etc., purchased have been merely temporary investments of surplus money ; and that it has long since ceased to make any such loans, purchases, or discounts, or any such investments.”

This plea does not deny that the defendant had been unlawfully using its funds as charged in this specification, except the allegations as to its having been doing a general banking business ; and it is evasive in this, that, while it says that it has “ long since ceased to make any such loans, purchases, or discounts,” it does not disclaim the right and authority to do so. The only issue, therefore, that is made on this specification, is upon the charge of doing a general banking business." Upon the testimony this issue is found for the defendant.

[97]*97It is shown that the great bulk of its money has been used in making loans to members upon their stock in the manner contemplated by the law-under which the association is organized; and the unauthorized acts mentioned belovV are not of such a character as to render it obnoxious-to the charge of doing a general banking business.

The matters charged as unlawful, in the first and third subdivisions of this specification, may be considered and disposed of together. The testimony shows that the corporation, in the past, has been loaning its money to members, depositors, and persons other than members or depositors, upon their promissory notes, at the uniform rate of twelve percent, interest per annum; and also in buying and discounting orders, bonds, and promissory notes, at the same-usurious rates of interest, from members and depositors, and persons other than members or depositors; and also-that it still is so dealing with its members and depositors;but not with persons other than members or depositors.

The first section of the law (S. & S. 194) declares the purpose of associations incorporated under it to be the-“raising of money to be loaned among the members, and depositors of such corporation, for use in buying lots or houses, or in building or repairing houses, or other purposes.” The declared purposes here are plain and unmistakable; and this association, by the provisions of its constitution and1 by-laws, has, upon paper, kept itself strictly within the-purposes declared, without attempting to bring into action any óf the latent powers that may repose in the phrase,, “ or other purposes,” with which the enumeration closes.

There is no countenance to be given to the idea that associations incorporated under the act above referred to can be used by capitalists as instrumentalities for obtaining more than the legal rate of interest on their money by depositing it with the association, and having it used in modes foreign to the declared purposes of their organization.

The first proviso of the second section of the act is not [98]*98an authority to take interest in excess of the legal rate, opon loans of money to members or depositors, where there is no competition for precedence in the loans — of which more will be said in considering the fourth specification. Nor is it an authority to purchase or discount commercial paper at usurious rates of interest; but only this — that the dues, fines, and fremiums paid by members and depositors upon loans taken on their stock, in addition to the legal rate of interest on such loans, shall not make the loans so taken usurious.

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29 Ohio St. 92, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-attorney-general-v-greenville-building-saving-assn-ohio-1876.