State ex rel. Arnold v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.

2014 Ohio 1957
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 8, 2014
Docket13AP-355
StatusPublished

This text of 2014 Ohio 1957 (State ex rel. Arnold v. Bur. of Workers' Comp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Arnold v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014 Ohio 1957 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Arnold v. Bur. of Workers' Comp., 2014-Ohio-1957.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Brenda Arnold, :

Relator, : No. 13AP-355 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Bureau of Workers' Compensation : and Industrial Commission of Ohio, : Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 8, 2014

Regas & Haag, Ltd., and John S. Regas, for relator.

Mann & Carducci Co., LPA, Jay Hurlbert, and Robert Mann, Special Counsel for respondent Bureau of Workers' Compensation.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Eric J. Tarbox, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

BROWN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Brenda Arnold ("claimant"), has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order that denied permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and to enter an order granting said compensation. {¶ 2} This matter was referred to a court-appointed magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued the No. 13AP-355 2

appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommended that this court deny claimant's request for a writ of mandamus. Claimant has filed objections to the magistrate's decision. {¶ 3} In her objections, claimant reiterates the arguments she presented to the magistrate. Claimant argues in her first objection that the magistrate erred when she found that the staff hearing officer ("SHO") appropriately analyzed the additional restrictions set forth by Dr. Naomi Waldbaum. Specifically, claimant asserts that the SHO completely failed to address how the additional restrictions set forth by Dr. Waldbaum would affect her ability to perform light and sedentary work. We disagree. Although we agree that the commission must review a doctor's report and make certain that any physical restriction indicated by a doctor corresponds with the ability to perform at the exertional level indicated by the doctor, as we held in State ex rel. O'Brien v. Cincinnati, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 07AP-825, 2008-Ohio-2841, claimant fails to cite any authority for the proposition that the commission must make a specific finding or explicitly indicate it performed an analysis regarding such in its order. The magistrate found that Dr. Waldbaum's additional restrictions were not inconsistent with the definitions of sedentary and light work. Given there was no conflict between Dr. Waldbaum's report and the definitions of sedentary and light work, it was proper for the magistrate to conclude Dr. Waldbaum's report provided some evidence to support the SHO's decision. Therefore, we overrule claimant's first objection. {¶ 4} Claimant argues in her second objection that the magistrate erred when she found that the additional restrictions set forth by Dr. Waldbaum are consistent with the ability to perform light and sedentary work. Claimant argues that both work levels, according to their regulatory definitions, require an individual to exert a certain amount of force and include some element of pushing and pulling, while Dr. Waldbaum indicated that claimant could not push or pull or perform repetitive movements with her hands, wrists, and fingers. {¶ 5} However, the magistrate concluded that the commission did not err because claimant could perform some level of light and sedentary work. With regard to sedentary work, the magistrate found that there are sedentary jobs that do not require any repetitive hand/wrist/finger movements or pushing and pulling with upper extremities; thus, No. 13AP-355 3

claimant can perform those jobs. With regard to light work, the magistrate found that there are jobs that fit within Dr. Waldbaum's additional restrictions because light work can include jobs that would be otherwise sedentary but that require walking or standing to a significant degree; thus, because claimant can perform some sedentary jobs and she had no walking or standing restrictions, there are also light jobs she can perform. {¶ 6} Although claimant complains that it is difficult to understand how the magistrate could find that Dr. Waldbaum's restrictions would not significantly compromise or completely erode an individual's ability to do light and sedentary work, the magistrate did not make such a finding. Undoubtedly, the restrictions listed by Dr. Waldbaum would significantly affect one's work abilities. What the magistrate found was that, despite these significant restrictions, there still exist jobs within the limitations of the definitions for light and sedentary work. Furthermore, despite claimant's contention that both sedentary and light work necessarily require pushing and pulling, claimant provides no authority to support such conclusion. For these reasons, we must overrule claimant's second objection. {¶ 7} Claimant argues in her third objection that the magistrate erred when she found that Dr. Waldbaum's restrictions are specific and not ambiguous or vague. The magistrate distinguished State ex rel. Seitaridis v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP- 494, 2011-Ohio-3593, by finding the doctor's restrictions in Seitaridis were ambiguous, while Dr. Waldbaum's restrictions were specific. Claimant contends that Dr. Waldbaum's use of "repetitive" was likewise vague because the definitions of light and sedentary work refer to "occasional" and "frequent," so it is unclear whether Dr. Waldbaum meant "repetitive" to be occasional, frequent or constant. However, such a distinction is not relevant in this case. Whether Dr. Waldbaum meant "repetitive" to include repetitive movements at all three frequencies does not alter the magistrate's finding that jobs existed that did not require any repetitive hand/wrist/finger movements or pushing and pulling with upper extremities. Therefore, this argument is without merit. {¶ 8} Claimant also argues that the facts in Seitaridis are identical to those in the present case, and Seitaridis stands for the proposition that it is legal error for an SHO to fail to analyze how upper extremity limitations would limit an individual's ability to perform light work activity. We disagree with claimant's contention. Although we stated No. 13AP-355 4

in Seitaridis at ¶ 16 that "the magistrate erred in not addressing the fact that the SHO failed to analyze how or if upper extremity limitations would limit relator's ability to perform light-work activity," the error was caused by the fact that the doctor's statement "restrictions limited with use of right upper extremity" was vague, and we did not know whether the "restrictions" referred to meant those outlined in the regulatory definitions of sedentary and light work. Id. at ¶ 6. The word "restrictions" was important because the commission must base its decision on the specific restrictions imposed by the physician in the body of the report rather than merely the exertional category identified by the doctor. Seitaridis at ¶ 14, citing State ex. rel. Howard v. Millennium Inorganic Chemicals, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-637, 2004-Ohio-6603. Unable to determine whether "restrictions," as used by the doctor in Seitaridis, referred to the restrictions included in the regulatory definitions of sedentary and light work, we found the magistrate erred by not addressing the SHO's failure to analyze how or if upper extremity limitations would limit the claimant's ability to perform light work activity. {¶ 9} However, the same vagueness problem is not present here. In the current matter, Dr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Ex Rel. O'Brien v. Cincinnati, Inc., 07ap-825 (6-12-2008)
2008 Ohio 2841 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2008)
State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle
451 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
State ex rel. Stephenson v. Industrial Commission
509 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1987)
State ex rel. Noll v. Industrial Commission
567 N.E.2d 245 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1991)
State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm
626 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Domjancic v. Industrial Commission
635 N.E.2d 372 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Libecap v. Industrial Commission
699 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2014 Ohio 1957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-arnold-v-bur-of-workers-comp-ohioctapp-2014.