State ex rel. Agustin v. Tepe

2013 Ohio 5600
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 19, 2013
Docket12AP-972
StatusPublished

This text of 2013 Ohio 5600 (State ex rel. Agustin v. Tepe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Agustin v. Tepe, 2013 Ohio 5600 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Agustin v. Tepe, 2013-Ohio-5600.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. : Milton Estuardo Ramos Agustin, : Relator, : v. No. 12AP-972 : Gregory H. & Mark A. Tepe, (REGULAR CALENDAR) Tepe Environmental Services, LTD., : and Industrial Commission of Ohio, : Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on December 19, 2013

Evans Law Office, and Marquette D. Evans, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Corinna V. Efkeman, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

SADLER, J. {¶ 1} In this original action, relator, Milton Estuardo Ramos Agustin, requests a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order denying him permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and to enter an order granting said compensation. I. BACKGROUND {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings No. 12AP-972 2

of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate concluded that, when addressing relator's non-medical factors, the commission abused its discretion by considering statements of relator's counsel as evidence. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that this court grant a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its staff hearing officer's ("SHO") order of January 31, 2011, as to the analysis or explanation of the non-medical factors and to enter an amended order consistent with the magistrate's decision. II. OBJECTIONS A. Relator's Objection The Magistrate erred in failing to enter an order directing the Industrial Commission to award Relator permanent and total disability compensation pursuant to State, ex rel. Gay v. Mihm, (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 315.

B. The Commission's Objection The magistrate erred in concluding that the commission abused its discretion by referencing "testimony" of counsel in its decision to deny PTD benefits to Ramos Agustin.

III. DISCUSSION {¶ 3} In the January 31, 2011 order, the SHO concluded that, when relator's impairments arising out of the allowed condition were considered in conjunction with relator's non-medical disability factors, relator was not entitled to PTD compensation. In his brief to the magistrate, relator challenged the SHO's reliance on what the SHO termed to be counsel's testimony indicating that relator was "not interested" in obtaining a work visa. As the magistrate's decision indicates, though stating in the order that relator's counsel "testified" at the January 31, 2011 hearing, there is no evidence indicating counsel was actually sworn in and gave testimony at the hearing. Presuming the SHO was referring to counsel's "statements" at the hearing, rather than actual testimony, the magistrate correctly noted that statements of counsel are not evidence. (Magistrate's Decision, ¶ 37.) This was the basis for the magistrate's recommendation that a limited writ of mandamus be issued so that the commission could enter a new order with an appropriate analysis of relator's non-medical factors. No. 12AP-972 3

{¶ 4} In relator's objection, he asserts the appropriate remedy is not to issue a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to re-address the issue of non- medical factors but, rather, is to issue a full writ of mandamus ordering the commission to grant relator PTD compensation. In support, relator relies on State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm, 68 Ohio St.3d 315 (1994), which found that, "where the facts of the case indicate that there is a substantial likelihood that a claimant is permanently and totally disabled, courts are not and will not be precluded from ordering the [commission], in a mandamus action, to award [PTD]." Id. at 323. Such relief, however, should be only awarded in extraordinary circumstances. State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1996). {¶ 5} In the present case, there are no such extraordinary circumstances to warrant Gay relief as requested by relator. As the magistrate's decision concludes, the SHO based its decision in significant part on what the SHO referred to as testimony of counsel. Yet, relator's counsel states no such testimony was provided, and there is no evidence in the record that counsel was actually sworn in and provided such testimony. As the magistrate's decision demonstrates, this record is not one in which, absent the challenged "evidence," analysis of non-medical factors in conjunction with relator's impairments would necessarily result in a finding of PTD. Thus, Gay relief is not warranted in this case, and relator's objection is overruled. {¶ 6} The commission argues that, rather than issue a limited writ of mandamus, this court should simply deny the requested writ of mandamus. According to the commission, the magistrate inappropriately focused on the word "testimony" to reach his conclusion that a limited writ is warranted. We disagree. {¶ 7} As set forth extensively in the magistrate's decision, the basis for the SHO's analysis, with respect to relator's non-medical factors, appears to turn on what the SHO indicated was testimonial evidence that relator was "not interested in obtaining a work visa." The SHO's order states the SHO found relator had not made diligent and sincere attempts to undergo vocational rehabilitation based upon the fact that relator "has no interest" in obtaining a work visa. The SHO proceeds to state, "[i]mportantly, [relator] has failed to set forth any reason as to why he is not interested in obtaining a work visa, even if he only obtained it for the purposes of participating in vocational rehabilitation." No. 12AP-972 4

Thus, the SHO's order regarding non-medical factors is premised in large part on a factual finding that has no evidentiary support. {¶ 8} Though contending a limited writ of mandamus is not necessary, the commission does not direct us to any evidence in the record that would necessarily compel, in the absence of the alleged testimonial evidence, the commission's denial of relator's application for PTD. "Where there is no evidence upon which the commission could have based its factual conclusion an abuse of discretion is present and mandamus becomes appropriate." State ex rel. Kramer v. Indus. Comm., 59 Ohio St.2d 39, 42 (1979). The commission, as the ultimate evaluator of non-medical vocational factors, is entitled to independently weigh the evidence and reach its own conclusion. State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 266, 270 (1997). {¶ 9} Accordingly, we overrule the commission's objection to the magistrate's decision. IV. CONCLUSION {¶ 10} Upon review of the magistrate's decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of the objections presented by relator and the commission, we find that the magistrate has properly stated the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law. Therefore, we overrule both the commission's and relator's objections to the magistrate's decision and adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. Accordingly, we issue a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its SHO's order of January 31, 2011 as to the analysis and explanation of non-medical factors and to enter an amended order consistent with this decision. Objections overruled; limited writ of mandamus granted.

DORRIAN and O'GRADY, JJ., concur. _____________________________ No. 12AP-972 5

APPENDIX

State ex rel. : Milton Estuardo Ramos Agustin, : Relator, : No.

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Related

Reichard v. RJ Wheels, Inc.
951 N.E.2d 1091 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2011)
State ex rel. Kramer v. Industrial Commission
391 N.E.2d 1015 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1979)
State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm
626 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co.
658 N.E.2d 1055 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1996)
State ex rel. Jackson v. Industrial Commission
680 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Cunningham v. Industrial Commission
744 N.E.2d 711 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2001)

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2013 Ohio 5600, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-agustin-v-tepe-ohioctapp-2013.