ROBERTS, J.
The state brought a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.125(l)(b) to establish defendant’s support obligation for a child to whom it was furnishing support.
The child was born on October 7, 1972. Plaintiff brought this action in August, 1980, when the child was seven years and 10 months old. The statute of limitation in effect when the child was born limited the time for bringing filiation proceedings to six years from birth. ORS 109.135(3).
Defendant raised the statute of limitation as a defense. Plaintiff responded with an equal protection challenge to the limitation period. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the six year statute of limitation violated the illegitimate child’s right to equal protection of the laws because it denied her the right to paternal support to which legitimate children are entitled throughout their minority.
The trial court held that “the ‘illegitimate’ child’s right to support from the natural parent is a substantial right and is a right equal to that of the ‘legitimate’ child’s. Hence, any statute limiting this right during a child’s minority works an illogical injustice on a child born out of wedlock and is constitutionally impermissible.” The Court of Appeals ruled that “[weighing the state’s interest in enacting the statutory limitation of six years against the constitutional rights of an illegitimate child to the protection of the laws equal to that afforded legitimate children, we hold that the
six-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional.” 58 Or App at 671. Under article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution we affirm.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 US 91, 102 S Ct 1549, 71 LEd 2d 770 (1982), decided after the trial court’s decision in this case.
Mills
held unconstitutional a Texas one year statute of limitation for paternity actions. Prior to
Mills, Gomez v. Perez,
409 US 535, 93 S Ct 872, 35 LEd 2d 56 (1973), had compelled Texas to grant its illegitimate children paternal support rights. Texas chose not to bestow entitlements equal to those enjoyed by legitimate children.
Instead, an illegitimate child’s substantive right to support existed only where the child was able to establish paternity within one year of its birth.
See Mills,
456 US at 94-95. In
Mills,
the Supreme Court was faced with a twofold inquiry: 1) whether the state had provided illegitimate children an adequate opportunity to obtain support as required by
Gomez
and, 2) if it had, whether the time limitation was substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. The court found the statute inadequate on both points.
Our analysis of illegitimate children’s rights to support begins from a different premise. We need not consider the first prong of the
Mills
test, the adequacy of the illegitimate child’s substantive right to support, because under Oregon law all children are entitled to the same rights whether or not their
parents have married. ORS 109.060.
This includes the right to support from both parents throughout minority. ORS 109.010,
109.100.
We have no occasion to consider whether some lesser support right may be constitutionally “adequate.” By statutory mandate the only adequate right is an equal right. These statutes reflect the principle set forth in article I, section 20 that classes of citizens cannot be denied privileges by virtue of personal characteristics, in this instance the circumstances of birth. Rather, we proceed to the second consideration in
Mills
and examine what reasons support the six year statute of limitation on filiation proceedings. That limitation period, by foreclosing initiation of filiation proceedings beyond a child’s sixth birthday, erects a procedural barrier to the exercise of support rights to which a child is entitled until the age of 18, and it does so on the basis of illegitimacy, a status which defines a class to whom equal privileges have been otherwise extended by law.
Oregon regulates the methods by which paternity may be established in ORS 109.070.
That statute grants
presumptions of paternity for children born of married parents and provides that paternity may be otherwise resolved by marriage of the parents after the birth of the child, by filiation proceedings, by parental acknowledgment, and by other provisions of law. These other provisions have been held to include a determination of paternity under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ORS 110.005
et seq, Clarkston v. Bridge,
273 Or 68, 539 P2d 1094 (1975); a declaratory judgment proceeding, where the plaintiff mother is not the proper plaintiff to bring a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.124 and 109.125(1)(a),
Fox v. Hohenshelt,
275 Or 91, 549 P2d 1117 (1976); and a declaratory judgment after the death of the putative father to determine heirship pursuant to ORS 111.095(2) and 28.040,
Thom v. Bailey,
257 Or 572, 481 P2d 355 (1971). This court has never considered whether the limitation period of ORS 109.135(3) applies when paternity is established or declared “by other provision of law.” It is apparent, however, that, at least in the context of an heirship proceeding, paternity may be established at any time during the life of the child without regard to the amount of time since the child’s birth. ORS 112.105.
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ROBERTS, J.
The state brought a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.125(l)(b) to establish defendant’s support obligation for a child to whom it was furnishing support.
The child was born on October 7, 1972. Plaintiff brought this action in August, 1980, when the child was seven years and 10 months old. The statute of limitation in effect when the child was born limited the time for bringing filiation proceedings to six years from birth. ORS 109.135(3).
Defendant raised the statute of limitation as a defense. Plaintiff responded with an equal protection challenge to the limitation period. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the six year statute of limitation violated the illegitimate child’s right to equal protection of the laws because it denied her the right to paternal support to which legitimate children are entitled throughout their minority.
The trial court held that “the ‘illegitimate’ child’s right to support from the natural parent is a substantial right and is a right equal to that of the ‘legitimate’ child’s. Hence, any statute limiting this right during a child’s minority works an illogical injustice on a child born out of wedlock and is constitutionally impermissible.” The Court of Appeals ruled that “[weighing the state’s interest in enacting the statutory limitation of six years against the constitutional rights of an illegitimate child to the protection of the laws equal to that afforded legitimate children, we hold that the
six-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional.” 58 Or App at 671. Under article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution we affirm.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals relied on
Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 US 91, 102 S Ct 1549, 71 LEd 2d 770 (1982), decided after the trial court’s decision in this case.
Mills
held unconstitutional a Texas one year statute of limitation for paternity actions. Prior to
Mills, Gomez v. Perez,
409 US 535, 93 S Ct 872, 35 LEd 2d 56 (1973), had compelled Texas to grant its illegitimate children paternal support rights. Texas chose not to bestow entitlements equal to those enjoyed by legitimate children.
Instead, an illegitimate child’s substantive right to support existed only where the child was able to establish paternity within one year of its birth.
See Mills,
456 US at 94-95. In
Mills,
the Supreme Court was faced with a twofold inquiry: 1) whether the state had provided illegitimate children an adequate opportunity to obtain support as required by
Gomez
and, 2) if it had, whether the time limitation was substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. The court found the statute inadequate on both points.
Our analysis of illegitimate children’s rights to support begins from a different premise. We need not consider the first prong of the
Mills
test, the adequacy of the illegitimate child’s substantive right to support, because under Oregon law all children are entitled to the same rights whether or not their
parents have married. ORS 109.060.
This includes the right to support from both parents throughout minority. ORS 109.010,
109.100.
We have no occasion to consider whether some lesser support right may be constitutionally “adequate.” By statutory mandate the only adequate right is an equal right. These statutes reflect the principle set forth in article I, section 20 that classes of citizens cannot be denied privileges by virtue of personal characteristics, in this instance the circumstances of birth. Rather, we proceed to the second consideration in
Mills
and examine what reasons support the six year statute of limitation on filiation proceedings. That limitation period, by foreclosing initiation of filiation proceedings beyond a child’s sixth birthday, erects a procedural barrier to the exercise of support rights to which a child is entitled until the age of 18, and it does so on the basis of illegitimacy, a status which defines a class to whom equal privileges have been otherwise extended by law.
Oregon regulates the methods by which paternity may be established in ORS 109.070.
That statute grants
presumptions of paternity for children born of married parents and provides that paternity may be otherwise resolved by marriage of the parents after the birth of the child, by filiation proceedings, by parental acknowledgment, and by other provisions of law. These other provisions have been held to include a determination of paternity under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ORS 110.005
et seq, Clarkston v. Bridge,
273 Or 68, 539 P2d 1094 (1975); a declaratory judgment proceeding, where the plaintiff mother is not the proper plaintiff to bring a filiation proceeding under ORS 109.124 and 109.125(1)(a),
Fox v. Hohenshelt,
275 Or 91, 549 P2d 1117 (1976); and a declaratory judgment after the death of the putative father to determine heirship pursuant to ORS 111.095(2) and 28.040,
Thom v. Bailey,
257 Or 572, 481 P2d 355 (1971). This court has never considered whether the limitation period of ORS 109.135(3) applies when paternity is established or declared “by other provision of law.” It is apparent, however, that, at least in the context of an heirship proceeding, paternity may be established at any time during the life of the child without regard to the amount of time since the child’s birth. ORS 112.105.
We must consider whether, in light of this inconsistent application, there is something unique to the determination of paternity in the context of a filiation proceeding which justifies the imposition of this limitation period.
Defendant asserts that the time limit provides putative fathers necessary protection from stale and fraudulent claims, and from defense of claims at a time when rebuttal evidence may have disappeared.
Difficulties of proof are a valid and important consideration in the regulation of paternity proceedings. However, the federal equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires at a minimum that states refrain from totally foreclosing the rights of illegitimate children for reasons of proof problems alone.
Jimenez v. Weinberger,
417 US 628, 94 S Ct 2496, 41 LEd 2d 363 (1974);
Mathews v. Lucas,
427 US 495, 96 S Ct 2755, 49 LEd 2d 651 (1976).
These cases are
founded on the premise that if the state seeks to address difficulties of proof of paternity it must do so by alternatives which deal directly with that issue and in some way short of a total preclusion of the rights of illegitimate children. Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution requires no less.
We have held that the appropriate beginning point in the analysis of a constitutional claim is with our own constitution.
Hewitt v. SAIF,
294 Or 33, 41-42, 653 P2d 970 (1982);
State v. Caraher,
293 Or 741, 750-52, 653 P2d 942 (1982);
Sterling v. Cupp,
290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123 (1981).
Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution provides:
“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”
The clause protects against a law’s disparate treatment of groups or persons by virtue of characteristics by which it would be otherwise impermissible to classify people. Illegitimacy is one such characteristic. Our laws have made steady progress toward eliminating the legal disabilities under which illegitimate children have labored.
See Thom v. Bailey, supra,
257 Or at 579-84;
see also
ORS 656.005(6) which eliminates any distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation laws.
The statutory scheme reflected in the filiation statute, ORS 109.125, imposes a limitation period only on children “born out of wedlock,”
see supra,
note 10, and only on children seeking to establish paternity for purposes of support. We have shown that all children regardless of the circumstances of their birth may prove paternity for purposes of inheritance so long as they do so within ten years of the death of the putative father. Further, a legitimate child seeking to prove paternity who does not meet the statutory definition of “child born out of wedlock” may not employ the filiation statute and would not be subject to its limitation period. The statute classifies illegitimate children seeking to prove paternity for purposes of support less favorably then legitimate children who prove paternity for any purpose and illegitimate children who prove paternity for the resolution of heirship. This classification is drawn upon a characteristic,
the circumstances of birth, which our laws in other areas have eliminated as an impediment to the exercise of a person’s rights.
We recognize that the consequence of illegitimacy is that the child has no legally recognized father. By necessity the illegitimate child must prove paternity while its legitimate counterpart need not. We also recognize that the requirements for such proof are established by the state. Because equality in support rights means nothing if the father remains unknown, any limitations placed on the child’s ability to prove paternity must be narrowly drawn, for a state may as easily discriminate invidiously by unduly burdensome requirements for proof of paternity as by precluding privileges outright. Accordingly, we hold that restraints on the ability of illegitimate children to ascertain paternity must be imposed only for reasons relating specifically to the proof problems encountered in paternity determinations. Restrictions not so justified cannot be upheld.
Oregon has directly addressed the difficulties of proof of paternity in statutes other than the limitation period. ORS 109.252 requires the use of blood tests if requested by a party, and under ORS 109.258 a defendant must prevail when all experts conclude that the test results eliminate the possibility of his paternity.
ORS 109.145 requires corroborating evidence of paternity in addition to the mother’s testimony. Although proof of paternity in some cases may become more difficult with the passage of time, that possibility does not condone the total preclusion of illegitimate children beyond a certain age from attempting to ascertain their father’s identity. In this case, sufficient proof existed to establish defendant’s paternity; nonetheless, were the limitation period to be enforced the child would be precluded from seeking support to which she is entitled throughout her minority because a filiation proceeding was not commenced before her sixth birthday.
We find this additional hurdle unjustified by assertions that the time limit enhances accuracy and fairness in
paternity adjudications. We are in agreement with the observations found in
County of Lenoir ex rel Cogdell v. Johnson,
46 NC App 182, 264 SE2d 816, 820 (1980) quoting
J.L.P. v. C.L.B.,
107 Daily Wash L Rep 401, 406 (Super Ct DC 1979):
“The mere passage of a certain amount of time before the custodial parent sues for child support has no logical connection with whether the noncustodial putative parent is or is not the actual parent. The absurdity (and tragedy) of the situation becomes manifest when we consider that under the statute, an out of wedlock parent could voluntarily support his or her child from the time of birth to age ten; the custodial parent could neglect or not need to seek child support for two years but desperately need it when the child turns twelve; and at that point the child would be precluded from ever establishing parentage or receiving support from its parent.”
The limitation period appears particularly arbitrary under our statutory scheme, which permits paternity declarations outside the filiation procedure without regard to the amount of time since the child’s birth, for purposes of intestate succession up to 10 years after the alleged father’s death.
Moreover, six years has no connection with the continuing nature of the support obligation.
State Dept. of Health v. West,
378 So2d 1220, 1227 (Fla 1979), invalidating a four year statute of limitation, observes:
“An action to determine paternity is not a stale claim when employed as a prerequisite to an illegitimate’s obtaining of continuing, recurring support. This right has never become dormant, and for the statute of limitations to act to preclude this right on the basis that it is stale is illogical.”
We find that the statute of limitation is a heavy-handed substitute for particularized requirements of proof. It denies to illegitimate children the privilege of seeking support from their fathers by placing an undue burden on the ascertainment of paternity which neither advances the accuracy of the outcome of the case nor diminishes the likelihood of fraudulent claims. Such an impediment to the exercise of the right to paternal support, a right which belongs equally to all
children, cannot be sustained under article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Accordingly, we hold the statute unconstitutional.
We affirm the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals.