STATE, ETC. v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.

382 So. 2d 293
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedFebruary 28, 1980
Docket54264
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 382 So. 2d 293 (STATE, ETC. v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
STATE, ETC. v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 382 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1980).

Opinion

382 So.2d 293 (1980)

STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellant,
v.
EDWARD M. CHADBOURNE, INC., Appellee.

No. 54264.

Supreme Court of Florida.

February 28, 1980.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1980.

Jerrold K. Phillips, Tallahassee, Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Gainesville, H. Reynolds Sampson and Alan E. DeSerio, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Thurston A. Shell of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, for appellee.

J. Rex Farrior and Joseph G. Thresher of Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for W.L. Cobb Construction Company and Cone Brothers Contracting Company, amicus curiae.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a decision of the First District Court of Appeal which passed on the constitutional validity of section 337.143, Florida Statutes (Chapter 74-262, Laws of Florida), and an amendment to the statute enacted by the legislature in 1976 as chapter 76-74, Laws of Florida.[1] We have jurisdiction.[2]

We hold that the statute, as originally enacted and as amended, is constitutional but that the 1976 amendment cannot be applied retroactively since to do so would result in an unconstitutional impairment of contract.

*294 In 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries instituted an embargo on shipments of oil to the United States. The embargo caused a dramatic increase in the price of petroleum and petroleum-based products including asphalt. The legislature, recognizing that road contractors had "no control over the rapidly increasing prices of bituminous material," enacted chapter 74-262, Laws of Florida, which became section 337.143, Florida Statutes (1975).[3]

The law allowed an adjustment to the contract unit price to be paid for bituminous materials on which bids were received prior to April 1, 1974, if the material had not been used prior to December 1, 1973. The act specified that no adjustment would be made to the contract "unless a contractor agrees to the application of this adjustment for all applicable contracts he holds with the department." The formula adopted in the statute provided that the adjusted contract unit price would be the asphalt price index computed by the Department of Transportation (department), plus five cents. The monthly index was determined by averaging price quotations on the first day of the month at terminals which could *295 reasonably be expected to supply asphalt to the affected contractors.

When the statute was implemented, an unintentional result became apparent. The index price failed to reflect the actual price paid by some contractors for the asphalt. This allowed those contractors to receive the benefits of the embargo-induced price adjustment and still require their suppliers to provide asphalt at pre-embargo prices in accordance with their subcontracts. This situation thwarted the statute's original objective and allowed some contractors to receive substantial windfall profits from the state. In order to correct the problem of windfall profits, the department enacted an emergency rule seeking to prevent potential overpayments; the legislature followed suit in 1976 by amending the price adjustment formula. § 337.143, Fla. Stat. (1977).[4]

Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., is an asphalt contractor which had entered into contracts with the department for the pavement of certain state roads. This contractor had elected to submit all of its contracts *296 to the department in accordance with the 1974 statute. When the department withheld funds which the contractor felt were due, it filed this suit seeking funds under the 1974 act. The department answered, counterclaimed, and sought recoupment of funds previously paid under the 1974 law's price formula, asserting that the 1976 amendment applied retroactively. The trial court found that the 1976 statute could not be applied retroactively and found for the contractor.

The district court affirmed the trial court and rejected the contention of the department that the state had given its tax power to aid a corporation or person in violation of article VII, section 10, of the Florida Constitution. In their rulings, the trial judge and the First District Court of Appeal were correct.

The department asserts that the legislature had no constitutional authority to enact this statute to give road contractors an adjustment on existing contracts because of the oil embargo. It also asserts that, if section 337.143 is valid, the 1976 amendment to that section should apply retroactively. Chadbourne contends that section 337.143 is valid and that, when the contractor accepted the price adjustment formula of the 1974 version of the law, the statutory price formula became a part of the contract. Therefore any attempt to apply the 1976 amendment retroactively constituted an impairment of contract in violation of both the Florida and United States Constitutions.[5]

There are two primary issues for us to resolve. First, whether section 337.143 as adopted originally and as amended is constitutional under article VII, section 10, of the Florida Constitution, and, second, if this section is constitutional, may the 1976 amendment be retroactively applied without violating the constitutional prohibition against the impairment of contractual obligations.

With reference to the constitutionality of the statute, the department contends that the law as enacted is prohibited by article VII, section 10, of the Florida Constitution, which provides:

Pledging credit. Neither the state nor any county, school district, municipality, special district, or agency of any of them, shall become a joint owner with, or stockholder of, or give, lend or use its taxing power or credit to aid any corporation, association, partnership or person; ...

Although this provision requires that the primary purpose of any governmental undertaking must be public in nature, see Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach District, 246 So.2d 737, 741 (Fla. 1971), this does not mean that the undertaking may not incidentally benefit private corporations or individuals. The purpose of the statute in issue was to made a fair adjustment of the price for both parties so that contractors who build public roads would not be irreparably harmed because of the sudden price escalation caused by a national oil shortage. By accepting the terms of this statute, the contractors subjected themselves to the possibility of receiving less than the original contract price. In fact, Chadbourne did receive less than its bid price on one contract.

We hold that the benefits of the 1974 law, as amended by the 1976 act, run to the public as well as to the road contractors. This statute facilitates the construction of public roads which is, in our view, manifestly a public purpose. We find that the legislature acted legitimately in response to a problem created by an unforeseen embargo on oil shipments. We reject the department's contention that the 1974 law does not benefit the public.

The second issue which must be addressed is whether the 1976 amendment unconstitutionally impaired contractual obligations created pursuant to the 1974 law.

The original enactment in 1974 did not contemplate that there would be windfall profits. The 1976 amendment, however, expressly records the legislative intent that *297 windfall profits be avoided. That was a noble and just attempt to correct a consequence not foreseen in the 1974 act.

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