State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.

New York Court of Appeals

State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.

39 N.Y.2d 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d 221, 1976 N.Y. LEXIS 2814, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,155, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1806

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedJune 3, 1976

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 39 N.Y.2d 873 (State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State Division of Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., 39 N.Y.2d 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d 221, 1976 N.Y. LEXIS 2814, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,155, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1806 (N.Y. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

Memorandum. The Appellate Division order should be affirmed.

Petitioner, a Black, asserts that respondent’s employment policy of temporarily suspending certain employees who are arrested for serious crimes constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice because statistical evidence establishes that Blacks are more likely to be arrested than whites. We find the argument unavailing. Were it true that respondent’s policy was self-executing upon arrest, the claim arguably might have merit (see State Div. of Human Rights v Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 NY2d 201; cf. Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424; Gregory v Litton Systems, 472 F2d 631; Carter v Gallagher, 452 F2d 315). However, the fact is that respondent expressly and specifically tailored its suspension policy to the individual case. Thus, the essential and distinguishing factor between the case at bar and those above cited is that the arrest here only triggered the invocation of the suspension process; and it was not determinative of its outcome. There is no claim of discrimination as to the administration or application of the policy.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Memorandum. The Appellate Division order should be affirmed.

Petitioner, a Black, asserts that respondent’s employment policy of temporarily suspending certain employees who are arrested for serious crimes constitutes an unlawful discriminatory practice because statistical evidence establishes that Blacks are more likely to be arrested than whites. We find the argument unavailing. Were it true that respondent’s policy was self-executing upon arrest, the claim arguably might have merit (see State Div. of Human Rights v Kilian Mfg. Corp., 35 NY2d 201; cf. Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 US 424; Gregory v Litton Systems, 472 F2d 631; Carter v Gallagher, 452 F2d 315). However, the fact is that respondent expressly and specifically tailored its suspension policy to the individual case. Thus, the essential and distinguishing factor between the case at bar and those above cited is that the arrest here only triggered the invocation of the suspension process; and it was not determinative of its outcome. There is no claim of discrimination as to the administration or application of the policy.

Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke concur.

Order affirmed, without costs, in a memorandum.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

39 N.Y.2d 873, 386 N.Y.S.2d 221, 1976 N.Y. LEXIS 2814, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,155, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1806, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-division-of-human-rights-v-xerox-corp-ny-1976.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack