State (City of Broadview Heights) v. Kaplan

658 N.E.2d 825, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 55, 1994 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 87
CourtParma Municipal Court
DecidedNovember 22, 1994
DocketNo. 94-TRD-05986-1-1
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 658 N.E.2d 825 (State (City of Broadview Heights) v. Kaplan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Parma Municipal Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State (City of Broadview Heights) v. Kaplan, 658 N.E.2d 825, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 55, 1994 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 87 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1994).

Opinion

Kenneth R. Spanagel, Judge.

This matter came before the court upon the defendant’s motion to suppress testimony/motion to dismiss, with briefs and exhibits, the city’s brief in opposition, and the additional information as the court will present. The court, upon review of the same, makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment thereon.

This matter arises out of a speeding ticket issued by a police officer of the city of Broadview Heights, alleging a speed of seventy-four m.p.h. in a fifty-five m.p.h. zone on 1-77 North. The traffic stop involved the use of the police department’s motor vehicle which, unlike a standard police car, has limited markings and identification equipment in its use as a police vehicle (what would have been referred to in the past as an “unmarked” police car). The motion before the court is to suppress the testimony of the arresting officer or, in the alternative, to dismiss the charge, based upon the argument that the police vehicle was not properly marked so as to enable the police officer to testify under Evid.R. 601(C), and R.C. 4549.13, 4549.14, and 4549.16. These statutes would bar the testimony of the officer as incompetent unless the officer was using a properly marked motor vehicle as defined by R.C. 4549.13 and 4549.14.

R.C. 4549.13 sets forth the requirements for a motor vehicle to be used by a traffic officer. That section provides that a vehicle “shall be marked in some distinctive manner or color and shall be equipped with, but need not necessarily have in operation at all times, at least one flashing, oscillating, or rotating colored light mounted outside on top of the vehicle. The superintendent of the state highway patrol shall specify what constitutes such a distinctive marking or color for the state highway patrol.”

Although the statute provides guidance to the State Highway Patrol, the determinations as to the requirements on a vehicle used by a local police department are left with the local police department. The ultimate question [57]*57before the court is whether or not the vehicle involved meets the requirements of law as to its markings.

In addition to reviewing the exhibits filed by the defendant, which include color photographs of the subject police vehicle, the court has also made an inspection of the arresting officer’s vehicle, which is a gray Mustang 5.0 with normal Ohio license plate No. AJL784. The vehicle has all standard lighting equipment, but does not have any red and blue police-type lights inside the front grill work, nor is there a normal light bar attached to the top of the vehicle. (The department apparently uses a removable oscillating light when the vehicle is used in traffic operation.) The word “POLICE” is written in red paint on the lower portion of the door panels in a racing stripe design, wherein the letters are offset between and around them by three sets of horizontal racing stripe lines between each letter. This vehicle is used, among other purposes, for traffic enforcement by the city of Broadview Heights.

Defendant argues that the markings and equipment of the arresting officer’s vehicle are not sufficiently identified as required under R.C. 4549.13. As described by the defendant’s brief, the word “POLICE,” which is “Reverse Weeded,” makes the identification marking difficult to read and makes it difficult to identify the vehicle as a police car. The city contends that the vehicle is sufficiently identified, citing State v. Huth (1986), 24 Ohio St.3d 114, 24 OBR 306, 493 N.E.2d 961, which found that minimum markings on an airport security car, with a light and a siren but no other markings, were sufficient, and Cleveland Hts. v. Woodle (Ohio App.1963), 187 N.E.2d 398, where a pastel green car with 3%" height x %" wide letters spelling “POLICE” was approved. (The court notes the city’s argument that the letters in this case were larger in fact than the letters in the Woodle case.)

Due to legislative changes of R.C. 4549.13 in 1979, the requirements for what used to be called an “unmarked police car” for traffic enforcement were clarified. That statute then set forth minimum requirements for identification, so that although citizens would still probably refer to these vehicles as unmarked cars, they in fact have minimum markings to identify them as police vehicles. This is done not only for the protection of the officer, but also for the protection of traffic defendants, especially in situations presented to the court by the parties in which a stop recently occurred in Cleveland by persons impersonating police officers in traffic stops for the purposes of committing crimes upon the traffic offender. The court must therefore make a determination as to what should be the minimum identification items for a police vehicle.

The court has, in addition to the information presented, performed its own survey of a number of traffic-enforcement vehicles of other police departments in its jurisdiction. The purpose of this survey was to determine what other types of [58]*58vehicle identification were used in their so-called “minimum marked vehicles.” The court notes the following results of that survey:

DEPARTMENT A: A black motor vehicle with 4" black letters in darker shade, with the word “POLICE” along the upper right front quarter panel. The vehicle has a police department license plate, a permanently mounted blue-top flashing light, and red and blue lights inside the grill work.

DEPARTMENT B: A dark blue and gray vehicle with the words “POLICE” in silver 2" letters along the front upper quarter panels and on the rear trunk. The vehicle has a police department license plate with a magnetically mounted blue oscillating light; additionally, the vehicle has headlights which flash alternately with red and blue police lights on the rear seat deck and a dashboard strobe, when activated.

DEPARTMENT C: A white vehicle with 5" letters with the word “POLICE” on the upper front quarter panels. The vehicle has a removable blue roof light, with police department license plates and red and blue flashing lights on rear seat deck.

A review of the various police equipments identifies a number of patterns as to items consistently found in police vehicles of this type. These would include:

1. Police department license plates.

2. Reasonably identifiable letters in terms of size and color contrast, visible from reasonable distance.

3. Red and blue lights of a flashing nature located somewhere upon the vehicle, either on rear seat deck or inside front grill.

4. The statutorily required oscillating light with no consistency as to permanency or removability.

Clearly the vehicle involved here has minimum markings. The question that exists is whether or not it is sufficiently marked within the law for a permitted usage.

In Woodle, the court of appeals found that “so long as the marking or color provided by the police department reasonably distinguishes the police automobiles from other automobiles driven on the streets, the law is satisfied.” (Emphasis added.) Woodle, supra, 187 N.E.2d at 400.

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City of Cleveland v. Martinez
2003 Ohio 7046 (City of Cleveland Municipal Court, 2003)
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700 N.E.2d 430 (Parma Municipal Court, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
658 N.E.2d 825, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 55, 1994 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 87, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-city-of-broadview-heights-v-kaplan-ohmunictparma-1994.