STATE BY AND THROUGH DEPT. OF HIGH. v. Howery
This text of 664 P.2d 1387 (STATE BY AND THROUGH DEPT. OF HIGH. v. Howery) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The STATE of Montana, Acting By and Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS of the State of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Clinton L. and Jacqueline J. HOWERY, Husband and Wife, as Joint Tenants, and State Bank & Trust Company, as Mortgagee, Defendants and Respondents.
Supreme Court of Montana.
W.D. Hutchison, argued, Helena, for plaintiff and appellant.
Max Hansen, argued, Dillon, Corette, Smith, Pohlman & Allen, Butte, Kendrick A. Smith, argued, Butte, for defendants and respondents.
*1388 MORRISON, Justice.
The Montana Department of Highways brought this action in the Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, for the purpose of obtaining right-of-way for a frontage road along Interstate 15. Clinton and Jacqueline Howery owned the 0.76 acre tract subject to the condemnation action. Trial on the issue of just compensation was had after the Department of Highways appealed from an award by the Highway Commission.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Howerys in the amount of $243,475.00; $3,750.00 was awarded as damages for the property actually taken and $239,725.00, as damages to the remainder. A final judgment was entered in the amount of the verdict plus interest, costs and fees. The Department of Highways appeals from denial of their motion for a new trial, raising three issues:
1) Whether the District Court erred in admitting the testimony of the landowner concerning the effects of the frontage road on his remaining property?
2) Whether the jury's verdict of $239,725.00 as damages to the remainder was excessive, given under the influence of passion or prejudice and supported only by speculative testimony?
3) Whether the District Court erred in refusing the Highway Department's proposed instructions, numbered 20 and 22?
We affirm.
The Howerys purchased their property which is located about 5 miles south of Dillon, Montana, in 1974. At that time they knew that a new four lane highway, Interstate 15, was to be constructed between Highway 91 and the 3.26 acre tract that they purchased; the Highway Department previously had purchased right of way for this purpose from Howerys' predecessors in interest.
Taking the proximity of the proposed interstate into account, the Howerys constructed two specially designed total containment buildings on their property in 1975.
The Howerys raise hogs for market. The containment buildings are designed to eliminate pig stress, thus improving growth rate at lower feed levels, by controlling the environment during the life cycle of pigs from birth to market. Factors which cause pig stress, such as heat, noise, vibration and dust, are minimized or eliminated through building design.
The proposed frontage road was to be constructed approximately 92 feet from the containment unit buildings. The primary issue during the trial was the extent to which the taking for the frontage road would damage the remainder of the Howery property.
Mr. Howery testified that the increase in heat, noise, vibration and dust that would be produced by the traffic on the frontage road would render his containment unit buildings unuseable and his hog raising operation uneconomical. Therefore, using a cost approach appraisal, Mr. Howery gave his opinion that the depreciation in value to the remaining land and buildings, less any salvage value of the buildings and the unaffected value of their home and unimproved land, was $292,725.00; he further valued the land actually taken at $2,250.00.
The Highway Department contends Mr. Howery's testimony as to depreciation in value to the remainder should have been refused. The Department asserts that the Howerys failed to establish (1) how an increase in pig stress would result from the proposed frontage road and what would be the magnitude of the increase, and (2) whether the proposed frontage road would be paved or gravel. Lacking such a proper foundation, the Department argues that Mr. Howery's testimony was inherently unreasonable.
The Department's "reasonableness" argument stems from a landowner-witness rule this Court reconfirmed in State v. Marsh, (1974) 165 Mont. 198, 527 P.2d 573. Marsh clarified that in taking cases, the landowner could testify as to value so long as (1) the testimony is reasonable and (2) the value testified to is for the uses to which the *1389 landowner is putting the land. Additionally, if the landowner intended to testify as to value for other purposes, the landowner "must have `some peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct judgment ... beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men generally.'" 165 Mont. at 203, 527 P.2d at 576.
The rule of Marsh is not directly applicable to the instant case. Here the State is not contesting the ability of a landowner to give his opinion as to market value before taking; what is at issue is the competence of a landowner to testify as to the causal link between the taking and any damage to remainder, and ultimately to the depreciation in market value of the remainder as a result of the taking.
"As a general rule, a witness who is competent to give the value of particular real estate may give his opinion of its value immediately before particular damage to it, and its value immediately after such damage and as affected thereby, provided the witness discloses sufficient knowledge of the property in both conditions ... If an estimate of value or the cause of damage requires special knowledge, persons uninformed as to the facts, and without learning in the scientific principles of which they speak, are not competent ..." 27 Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 426, pp. 322-323.
Nichol explains that where the issue is whether the construction of a public work causes a decrease in market value of the land remaining after a taking:
"[i]t is, of course, competent for the owner to point out, either himself or by means of duly qualified expert witnesses, the particulars in which the land has been or will be damaged, such as the inconvenient size and shape in which it is left, the interference with access, the increased accumulation of surface water, the noise and dirt from the use of the public work, and the like."
5 Nichol on Eminent Domain, § 23.3, pp. 23-20, 21. The witness may describe the injuries to the property and its condition, state the circumstances affecting the value of the property in its damaged state, and testify as to the value of the property before and after the injury. Nichol, supra, pp. 23-24.
The record indicates that Mr. Howery was both informed about the facts concerning the proposed frontage road and very knowledgeable in the business of raising pigs. Mr. Howery had observed the dust associated with the unpaved extension of the frontage road already in existence approximately one mile south of his facility. Additionally he testified that in response to his inquiries about the surface of the proposed frontage road, he was given different answers: one, that the road would be paved; another, that it would be gravel. However, he stated the choice of surface would not alter his opinion that the containment buildings would be rendered unusuable by the proximity of the proposed frontage road.
Additionally, Mr.
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664 P.2d 1387, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-by-and-through-dept-of-high-v-howery-mont-1983.