State Board of Health v. Frohmiller

23 P.2d 941, 42 Ariz. 231, 1933 Ariz. LEXIS 128
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 14, 1933
DocketCivil No. 3392.
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 23 P.2d 941 (State Board of Health v. Frohmiller) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Board of Health v. Frohmiller, 23 P.2d 941, 42 Ariz. 231, 1933 Ariz. LEXIS 128 (Ark. 1933).

Opinion

ROSS, C. J.

The petitioner is a state agency organized and existing under article 1, chapter 61, Revised Code of 1928, entitled “State Board of Health.”

The general appropriation bill, chapter 95, Laws of 1933, approved March 18, 1933, section 1, reads as follows:

“The following sums herein set forth are hereby appropriated for the fiscal years beginning July 1, 1933 and ending June 30, 1934, hereinafter designated as the 22nd Fiscal Year, and beginning July 1, 1934 and ending June 30, 1935, hereinafter designated as the 23rd Fiscal Year, for the several purposes and objects as hereinafter specified, and the state auditor is hereby authorized and directed to draw warrants on the state treasurer to and not to exceed the amounts herein set forth and for the purposes herein specified; and the state treasurer is hereby authorized and directed to pay said warrants out of the general fund of the state and the appropriation for the respective state agencies herein made. . . .
“Subdivision 21. Board of Health, Child Hygiene and Child Welfare.
*234 “Fox the 22nd For the 23rd Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
For salaries and wages for the following positions :
Superintendent and Registrar..............$ 3,600.00 ‡ 3,600.00
Other salaries & wages..................... 7,780.00 7,780.00
Total salaries & wages for Board of Health & Vital Statistics ......................$11,380.00 $11,380.00
For operation ............................ 3,775.00 .3,775.00
For travel ............................... 250.00 250.00
For capital investment .................... 350.00 350.00
Total for Board of Health & Vital Statistics.$15,755.00 $15,755.00”

On July 6th the petitioner, representing that its activities required immediate cash outlays for postage, traveling expenses and other emergencies, applied to the respondent, state auditor, to provide it with the sum of $250 for such purposes. Section 2628 of the Revised Code of 1928,-being a part of what is known as the “State Financial Code” (article 2, §§ 2614-2631), provides that when such application is made in conformity therewith the auditor shall allow it, draw a warrant to the applicant officer, and charge the amount against the appropriation made to that office for the class of expenses covered by the application, and that the treasurer shall pay such warrant. The auditor, not being able to determine from the law what her duty in the premises was, refused to provide the petitioner with the funds applied for, hence this proceeding in mandamus.

On March 14, 1933, the legislature passed an emergency measure (chapter 48) suspending, or purporting to suspend, the Financial Code in its application to the general appropriation bill for the twenty-second and twenty-third fiscal years; and, if such legislation is effective, section 2628, supra, providing for an imprest fund, is inoperative. On the other hand, the legislature in the appropriation bill for those years, which was approved four days later than the said *235 emergency measure, or on March 18, 1933, in section 2 thereof announces that “the appropriations herein made are subject to the provisions of the State Financial Code.” If this expressed recognition, of the Financial Code is to be accepted, then section 2628 is in force and effect. The equivocal situation thus created by the legislature’s divergent expressions is apparent, and we are not surprised that the auditor should refuse to divine what was meant and should offer to do her duty as determined by the court.

We think it is a universal rule that the later of two acts of the legislature on the same subject, if there is a conflict, is accepted by the courts as the legislative will. Olson v. State, 36 Ariz. 294, 285 Pac. 282; Kitchel, Treasurer, v. Gadsden Hotel Co., ante, p. 226, 23 Pac. (2d) 939. Under this rule the Financial Code was not suspended and it and the appropriations for the twenty-second and twenty-third fiscal years'should be construed together, if possible; but since the appropriation bill for those years is the last expression of the legislative will, it will prevail in case of conflict.

In the appropriation bill for the twenty-second and twenty-third fiscal years the sums appropriated are allotted to the departments, institutions and offices, sometimes in a lump sum to be apportioned by the heads of departments or institutions or offices: “To salaries and wages,” “to operation,” “to travel,” “to capital investment,” etc.; and in some cases to each one of these classes is assigned a definite sum. In other words, the legislature has confided to these heads the duty and obligation of maintaining their respective institutions, departments or offices with the funds assigned them, in the proportions indicated, rather than itself fixing the number of employees and their salaries, or segregating operation into different items, etc., leaving this detail to the institution, department or office. This method of appropriating the *236 public funds is not one that commends itself, inasmuch as it is so easy to abuse the trust confided by using the funds intended for one purpose for another and different purpose, but we know of no rule that prohibits the legislature from reposing the discretion and power in such departments, institutions or offices.

The application to the auditor is for an advance allowance for postage, traveling expense and other emergencies. Under section 2618 of the Financial Code these charges are put in the classes of “operation” and “travel,” and, since the appropriation is $3,775 for operation and $250 for travel, the demand is within the appropriation and should be allowed as provided in section 2628 and section 1 of the current appropriation bill. When the legislature has specifically stated the amount that may be spent for any purpose, as for travel, the department, institution or office must operate within that sum and may not take from an appropriation for another purpose to supplement it.

Where, as in the case of the state auditor, the appropriation for each of the fiscal years is the lump sum of $25,062 “for salaries and wages; for operation; for capital investment; to defray the expense of employing a certified public accountant and assistants,” the proportion of the total appropriation that may be used for these different purposes is a matter to be determined by the auditor according to the necessities of her office. The same with reference to the Attorney General, banking department, corporation commission, land commission, law and legislative reference library, livestock sanitary board, mine inspector, secretary of state, sheep sanitary commission, state examiner, state loan board, Supreme Court, State Treasurer, tax commission, commission of agriculture and horticulture, dairy commissioner, and others.

*237

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Bluebook (online)
23 P.2d 941, 42 Ariz. 231, 1933 Ariz. LEXIS 128, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-board-of-health-v-frohmiller-ariz-1933.