State Bd. of Trustees v. Key West Conch
This text of 683 So. 2d 144 (State Bd. of Trustees v. Key West Conch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Florida, BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, Appellant,
v.
KEY WEST CONCH HARBOR, INC., Appellee.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Maureen M. Malvern, John W. Costigan and Nona R. Schaffner, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Mattson & Tobin, James S. Mattson and Andrew M. Tobin, Key Largo, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and GERSTEN, JJ.
BARKDULL, Judge.
Beginning in 1942, plaintiff, Key West Conch Harbor's, predecessor in title, obtained several permits from the Army Corps of Engineers for dredging and improving offshore submerged lands in Garrison Bight.[1] This predecessor in title bulkheaded and filled a parcel for which it received a Chapter 8537, Laws of Florida 1921 ("Butler Act") *145 deed in 1951 (referred to as Parcel B in the trial exhibits). The Butler Act permitted upland, riparian owners to obtain title by improving commerce and applied only to land that is "bulkheaded or filled in or permanently improved." Ch. 8537, Laws of Fla. (1921). This appeal focuses on whether or not Key West Conch Harbor's predecessor in title sufficiently improved Parcel A, and should therefore have obtained title to that land as well.[2] The parties contend that the issue before this court is whether dredging alone is a permanent improvement sufficient to convey title under the Butler Act of 1921. We disagree. This case does not involve dredging only; there are moorings and a dock on Parcel A, which must also be considered.
The trial court's findings were based on both an agreed stipulation entered into by the parties and a separate finding of fact by the trial court. The parties stipulated that Key West Conch Harbor's predecessor in title had constructed a 373 foot pier on Parcel A prior to May 29, 1951, the effective date of repeal of the Butler Act.[3] Key West Conch Harbor also presented evidence that a 138 foot extension was also added to the pier prior to May 29, 1951. As the Trustees did not produce any evidence to substantiate their position that the dredging or building of the pier on Parcel A did not occur prior to the repeal of the Butler Act, the trial court held that the dredging and entire dock had been completed by May 29, 1951. The trial court concluded that Key West Conch Harbor was vested with fee simple title to these submerged lands by virtue of the improvements made by its predecessor in interest. Accordingly, the court entered judgment confirming Key West Conch Harbor's title and fee simple interest in the submerged lands lying within 500 feet of its concrete bulkhead.
A distinguishing factor in this case is that the dredged area is adjacent to the parcel of land that was filled. This is not always the case. Often, a landowner seeking to fill land must retrieve the fill from an area offshore, rather than an area adjacent to the tract of land to be filled. If this landowner were to have dredged submerged lands out in the bight, for the sole purpose of filling another parcel of land, the Butler Act would not transfer title. However, this dredging was not done for the sole purpose of filling another parcel of land. The dredging was done to the waters around an improvement, to wit: a dock. In construing the Butler Act, the definition of an "improvement" certainly includes the construction of a dock or pier. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Industrial Plastics Technology, Inc., 603 So.2d 1303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (referring to "improvements" as "buildings, wharfs, piers, dry-docks and other structures affixed to tidal or submerged lands"), review denied, 617 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1993). Although the Trustees concede that the landowner is entitled to the "footprint" of the pier, it seems that the pier would be, for the most part, useless without some incidental dredging.
The Jacksonville Shipyards case followed similar facts. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 466 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). There, the dredging was incidental to the docks and piers and long list of improvements offered by the *146 plaintiff.[4] The First District found that the landowner was entitled to the dredged land "between these piers and docks," but the court never expressly addressed the issue of whether dredging alone is sufficient to convey title to a riparian owner under the Butler Act. Jacksonville Shipyards at 390, n. 3. Although the issue was implicated by the facts, the question was not presented to the First District. It is clear that the landowners must keep the channels and the area around the dock deep enough to be able to move vessels in and out. In fact, Jacksonville Shipyards Inc. dredged these open waters between the piers and docks every six months. Although this view is not expressed in the opinion, it seems to be the underlying rationale behind it.
Accordingly, where dredging is concerned, the determination of what constitutes an "improvement" must be determined on a caseby-case basis. The surrounding land, and other improvements under the Act must be considered in addition to the dredged land. Here, the submerged land sought is located either directly beneath the dock improvement or within 50 feet of the dock and mooring areas in the direction of the channel. We hold that the title to the land that has been dredged should pass to Key West Conch Harbor. However, the title to the land is subject to a public navigational easement, as stipulated by Key West Conch Harbor during its presentation before this Court. The trial court's order confirming Key West Conch Harbor's title and fee simple interest in the submerged lands lying within 500 feet of its concrete bulkhead is affirmed, subject to a navigational easement for the benefit of the public.
Affirmed as modified.
NESBITT, J., concurs.
GERSTEN, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree that the Butler Act confers title of Florida coastline to a private party. The Butler Act, a repealed hoary statute, is not an integral part of Florida's jurisprudence, and its application under these circumstances yields inequitable and environmentally unsound results. By this dissent, I register my dissatisfaction with piracy of land, land that belongs to our children and successive generations of Floridians.
The purpose of the Butler Act of 1921 was to encourage commerce by promising land rights to those enterprises that industrialized Florida's coast. See ch. 8537, Laws of Fla. (1921); Duval Eng'g & Contracting Co. v. Sales, 77 So.2d 431 (Fla.1954); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 466 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); see also ch. 791, Laws of Fla. (1856) (the Riparian Act of 1856, upon which the Butler Act was based). Industries could acquire title to coastal lands which they bulkheaded, filled in, or permanently improved. This made sense in 1921, at a time when Florida's coastline sat relatively pristine and untouched,[5] and the definition of "improvement" focused on economy and expansion.
However, we neither define nor value "improvements" quite the same way today. Admittedly, while coastal commerce is still valuable to society, encouraging businesses to develop coastal land (as did the Act) is not the only commercial route to prosperity. The sheer scenic beauty, and feelings and emotions that beauty evokes, are of value beyond mundane commerce. They are treasures to be preserved for the future.
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683 So. 2d 144, 1996 WL 333193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-bd-of-trustees-v-key-west-conch-fladistctapp-1996.