State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedApril 4, 2023
Docket2:21-cv-02174
StatusUnknown

This text of State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC (State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC, (E.D. La. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CIVIL ACTION CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY

VERSUS NO. 21-2174

TAYLOR FORTUNE GROUP SECTION “B”(2) TENNESSEE, LLC

ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court are plaintiff State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Co.’s motion to strike or dismiss untimely counterclaim (Rec. Doc. 22), and responsive pleadings to same (Rec. Docs. 27, 30). For the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to strike or dismiss untimely counterclaim is DENIED, with directives that appear herein. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This matter involves an insurance coverage dispute between plaintiff State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Co. (“State Auto”) and defendant Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC (“TFGT”). See Rec. Doc. 20; Rec. Doc. 27 at 1. State Auto initially refused to defend TFGT in an underlying action in California state court, Kytch, Inc. v. Gamble, et. al., No. RG21099155, Cal. Super. Ct., Alamedia Cnty (the “underlying action”). Id. at 1-2; Rec. Doc. 22- 1 at 2. As a result, State Auto filed a declaratory judgment action on November 23, 2021, seeking a declaration of the parties’ rights and obligations under an insurance policy issued by State Auto to TFGT. See Rec Doc. 1; Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 2. State Auto seeks a declaration that it has no duty to defend or indemnify TFGT in the underlying action. Rec Doc. 1; Rec. Doc 20 at 1; Rec. Doc. 22-1 at

2. Conversely, TFGT contends that State Auto must defend it in the underlying action. See Rec. Doc. 21 at 1-2; Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 2. On June 2, 2022, pursuant to the Rule 16 Scheduling Order, this Court gave the parties until August 1, 20221 to amend the pleadings and bring counterclaims: “Amendments to pleadings, third-party actions, cross-claims and counter-claims shall be filed no later than August 1, 2022.” Rec. Doc. 17 at 1. On August 1, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint and Magistrate Judge Currault granted said motion on August 17, 2022. Rec. Docs. 18, 19. Also on August 1, 2022, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant, agreeing to participate in its defense in the underlying action so not to disrupt this matter. See Rec. Doc. 21 at 24, ¶¶ 16–17.

On October 12, 2022, TFGT filed its answer and counterclaim in response to the first amended complaint. Rec. Doc. 21. The counterclaim avers breach of written contract; breach of the

1 TFGT’s response to State Auto’s initial complaint was due on January 25, 2022. Rec. Doc. 9. Defendant moved for an extension to file its responsive pleadings on January 25. Id. This Court extended that deadline to February 15, 2022. Rec. Doc. 10. TFGT failed to file its responsive pleadings by that date and this Court subsequently ordered that plaintiff obtain responsive pleadings before March 23, 2022, or defendant risked a preliminary default. See Rec. Doc. 11. TFGT filed its answer to State Auto’s initial complaint on March 14, 2022. Rec. Doc. 12. TFGT did not file its counterclaims at that time despite TFGT’s claim that State Auto owed a duty to it and State Auto’s refusal to honor that duty. See id.; see also Rec. Doc. 22-1 at 2. covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and violations of LSA-RS 22:1892 and LSA-RS 22:1973. Rec. Doc. 21. On November 2, 2022, plaintiff filed the instant motion to strike or dismiss defendant’s counterclaims. Rec. Doc. 22.2

LAW AND ANALYSIS Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) applies once a scheduling order has been issued by the district court. Buchanan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 834 Fed. Appx. 58, 61 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003)). Under Rule 16, “[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The good cause standard requires the “party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.” S & W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003). Courts evaluate four factors to determine good cause: “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend;

(2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel., 346 F.3d at

2 Plaintiff notes that this was not the first time the defendant failed to timely respond to a pleading in this case and that TFGT missed the scheduling order’s deadline by about two-and-a-half months. Id. (citing Rec. Docs. 10, 11, 12). Notably, plaintiff waited several months to amend its complaint and did so on the very last day allowable by the Rule 16 Order. 546)). If the movant can show good cause, the Court will then apply the liberal amendment standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a). See S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536. If the movant

cannot show good cause, federal district courts have the authority to enforce their scheduling orders. See Flaska v. Little River Marine Const. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)). Pursuant to this Court's scheduling order, “[a]mendments to pleadings, third-party actions, cross-claims and counter-claims shall be filed no later than August 1, 2022.” Rec. Doc. 17 at 1. The scheduling order’s pleading deadline for counterclaims lapsed without extension before defendant filed its answer and counterclaims. See Rec. Docs. 17, 21. Because a scheduling order has been issued by this Court, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) controls and the defendant must show good cause to modify

the scheduling order before the more liberal amendment standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 15(a) will apply to allow defendant to add its counterclaims. See Buchanan, 834 Fed. Appx. at 61; Laborfest, L.L.C. v. City of San Antonio, No. 22-50038, 2023 WL 1434272, at *3 (5th Cir. 2023). In determining whether good cause exists, the Court first considers defendant's explanation for its failure to timely move for leave to amend. See S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536. Defendant does not address Rule 16’s good cause standard but does provide several explanations for its failure to timely bring its counterclaims. It argues that the bad faith conduct of State Auto allegedly engaged in, the actions that underlie its counterclaim,

occurred through August 1, 2022, causing its failure to meet the deadline for filing counterclaims. See Rec. Doc. 27 at 1, 4.3 Defendant also states that because State Auto did not amend its initial complaint until August 17, 2022, defendant was not able to comply with the August 1 deadline. See id at 3.

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State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Taylor Fortune Group Tennessee, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-auto-property-and-casualty-insurance-company-v-taylor-fortune-group-laed-2023.