Startz v. Army

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedOctober 20, 2025
Docket25-1375
StatusUnpublished

This text of Startz v. Army (Startz v. Army) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Startz v. Army, (Fed. Cir. 2025).

Opinion

Case: 25-1375 Document: 33 Page: 1 Filed: 10/20/2025

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SHERMAN S. STARTZ, JR., Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Respondent ______________________

2025-1375 ______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board in No. SF-1221-23-0258-W-1. ______________________

Decided: October 20, 2025 ______________________

SHERMAN S. STARTZ, JR., Bremerton, WA, pro se.

BLAKE WILLIAM COWMAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Jus- tice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by TARA K. HOGAN, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, YAAKOV ROTH. ______________________

Before DYK, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. Case: 25-1375 Document: 33 Page: 2 Filed: 10/20/2025

Sherman Shelby Startz, Jr., petitions pro se for review of a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying his request for corrective action follow- ing his termination. We affirm. I On January 31, 2022, Mr. Startz began work as a Con- struction Control Inspector for the United States Army (the “Agency”) at Fort Wainwright. He was subject to a two- year probationary period. His work included monitoring government construction contractors. During his proba- tionary period, Mr. Startz was terminated on June 27, 2022. In January 2023, Mr. Startz filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”) asserting an allegation of whistleblower retaliation. Mr. Startz alleged he was sub- jected to a hostile work environment and eventually termi- nated because he reported concerns of misconduct to his direct supervisor, David Zrna. On March 22, 2023, OSC notified Mr. Startz that it had closed the investigation.

Following OSC’s action, Mr. Startz filed an individual right of action (“IRA”) appeal with the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). He stated that he did not want a hear- ing. The Board considered Mr. Startz’s allegations that he witnessed a litany of misconduct, including that Agency of- ficials were not properly overseeing work completed by con- tractors, that a contractor was submitting fictitious specification numbers for construction materials, and that he was instructed by agency personnel to sign for construc- tion materials that were not delivered. Mr. Startz then al- leged that he refused to sign for the non-existent deliveries and raised these concerns to Mr. Zrna on or about June 24, 2022. During discovery, Mr. Starz filed a motion to compel discovery, alleging that the Agency “continually ignored” Case: 25-1375 Document: 33 Page: 3 Filed: 10/20/2025

STARTZ v. ARMY 3

his discovery requests. S. App’x 45. 1 Despite Mr. Startz’s failure to include a copy of his requests in his motion, see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(c)(1)(i), the administrative judge (“AJ”) granted it. The Agency produced additional documents, which Mr. Startz asserted “in no way can be considered suitable” as a response to his discovery requests. S. App’x 68–69. The AJ issued an initial decision on January 8, 2024, denying Mr. Startz’s request for corrective action. The AJ found that Mr. Startz did not meet his initial burden to prove (1) that he made any disclosure to Mr. Zrna that the contractors were submitting fictitious specification num- bers for flooring materials; (2) that he was ever asked by a supervisor to sign for undelivered flooring materials; (3) that he had a reasonable belief that the contractors were submitting fictitious specification numbers for floor- ing materials; and (4) that the alleged disclosure of con- tractor misconduct, if it occurred, was related to any government misconduct. As a result, the AJ determined that Mr. Startz failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that he was terminated because he engaged in a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or any protected ac- tivities under § 2302(b)(9). The Board then denied Mr. Startz’s petition for review, issuing a final order af- firming the initial decision on January 17, 2025, and mak- ing it the final decision of the Board. Mr. Startz now petitions for review of the Board’s decision. We have juris- diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). II On review, Mr. Startz asserts the Board made several errors that warrant reversal or remand. We set aside the decision of the Board if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an

1 “S. App’x” refers to the Supplemental Appendix submitted by the Agency. Dkt. No. 18. Case: 25-1375 Document: 33 Page: 4 Filed: 10/20/2025

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); accord Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., 818 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2016). This review “is limited.” Bryant v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 26 F.4th 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Ultimately, we conclude that the Board’s findings are supported by law and substantial evidence. Mr. Startz primarily contends that the Board’s finding that he did not make a protected disclosure was not sup- ported by substantial evidence. Under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”), Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), an employee in Mr. Startz’s position may not be terminated because of “any disclosure of information by [the] employee . . . which the employee . . . reasonably be- lieves evidences—(i) any violation of any law, rule, or reg- ulation, or (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.” See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). To establish a “reasonable belief” that mis- conduct occurred, the employee need not prove the miscon- duct actually occurred. Drake v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 543 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Instead, reasonable belief is determined by an objective test that asks, “whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee would reasonably conclude that the actions of the government evidence wrongdoing as defined by the [WPA].” Young v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 961 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (citing Giove v. Dep’t of Transp., 230 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). This objective test is based on what was known by the employee at the time of the disclo- sure. Edenfield v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 54 F.4th 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Case: 25-1375 Document: 33 Page: 5 Filed: 10/20/2025

STARTZ v. ARMY 5

The Board did not err in determining that Mr. Startz did not present sufficient evidence that, at the time of his alleged disclosure to Mr. Zrna, he was aware of any govern- ment misconduct.

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Related

Drake v. Agency for International Development
543 F.3d 1377 (Federal Circuit, 2008)
William F. Curtin v. Office of Personnel Management
846 F.2d 1373 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
Salvatore Giove v. Department of Transportation
230 F.3d 1333 (Federal Circuit, 2000)
Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance
818 F.3d 1357 (Federal Circuit, 2016)
Young v. MSPB
961 F.3d 1323 (Federal Circuit, 2020)
Edenfield v. DVA
54 F.4th 1357 (Federal Circuit, 2022)

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