Starr v. United Services Automobile Association

CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedJune 4, 2025
Docket1:23-cv-02745
StatusUnknown

This text of Starr v. United Services Automobile Association (Starr v. United Services Automobile Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Starr v. United Services Automobile Association, (D. Colo. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 23-cv-02745-CNS-NRN

BECCI STARR and SCOTT MATTES,

Plaintiffs,

v.

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY (USAA CIC)

Defendants.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER (ECF No. 71)

N. REID NEUREITER United States Magistrate Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Becci Starr and Scott Mattes’s Motion for Entry of Protective Order (the “Motion”), ECF No. 71, filed December 2, 2024. The Motion was filed after the Court held a discovery hearing on November 8, 2024 and ordered briefing on the question of whether, during discovery, Defendant USAA Casualty Insurance Company (“USAA”) may elicit additional information or evidence on which it did not previously rely to explain its delay in approving insurance benefits. See ECF No. 50. The issue was supposed to be to what extent the doctrine articulated in Schultz v. GEICO Cas. Co., 429 P.3d 844 (Colo. 2018) should bar portions USAA’s requested discovery. USAA filed its response on January 6, 2025. ECF No. 85. On January 27, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply in support of the Motion. ECF No. 89. The Parties then informed the Court that they would be participating in a mediation, first set for March 11, 2025, and later rescheduled to April 8, 2025. See ECF Nos. 90, 94. Because of the Court’s hope that the mediation would be successful, the Court declined to rule on the Motion. On April 28, 2025, the Parties informed the Court that the mediation had failed and that discovery is to proceed. The Parties now desire a

ruling on the Motion to provide guidance as to scope of discovery to come. In connection with the Motion, the Parties have submitted Plaintiffs’ responses to USAA’s various interrogatory requests and requests for production of documents. See, e.g., ECF No. 71-2 (Plaintiffs’ Third Amended and Second Supplemental Responses to Defendant’s First Set of Written Discovery Requests to Plaintiffs). These are the discovery requests and responses that have prompted the present controversy. Plaintiffs also submitted a notice of supplemental authority, ECF No. 98, providing the Court with a citation to Uhl v. Progressive Direct Insurance Co., 2025 WL 460941, 23- cv-01904-NYW-SBP (D. Colo. February 11, 2025).

It is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth below. I. Background

Plaintiffs made an insurance claim for water damage to their Colorado home from a pipe that burst while they were vacationing in Mexico in March 2022. Plaintiffs allege numerous delays by USAA in investigating and paying the claim and have filed suit against USAA for breach of contract, common law bad faith, and violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and 1116. USAA eventually paid Plaintiffs’ entire claim by issuing payments of $317,650.06 in benefits for repairs to the house and $82,779.75 in benefits for Plaintiffs’ loss of use or for additional living expenses. Plaintiffs seek no additional payments in terms of contractual insurance benefits for the loss. See ECF No. 31 at 6 (Scheduling Order, Undisputed Facts). Thus, the issues for litigation are limited to whether USAA

unreasonably delayed investigating and ultimately paying the benefits that were issued, or, instead, whether USAA conducted a reasonable investigation into an admittedly complicated claim before ultimately making payment in a reasonable time. As an example of the complexity in the case, Mr. Mattes decided to act as his own general contractor and USAA questions whether delays in repairing the property were attributable not to USAA but to Mr. Mattes’s management of the project. There was a further question as to whether USAA should have had to pay for profit and overhead above subcontractor invoices for Mr. Mattes’s role as a general contractor. Although USAA ultimately paid for profit and overhead, presumably there was some

delay associated with investigating this relatively unusual situation where an insured requests that he be paid profit and overhead for repairs on his own home. In addition, one of USAA’s defenses is that Plaintiffs may have failed to fulfil the conditions precedent to coverage under the policy, including failing to timely submit documentation and information requested by USAA. To the extent that Plaintiffs failed to submit timely documentation or responses to USAA’s inquiries, those failures may have caused delays which Plaintiffs now assert are the fault of USAA. See id. at 5 (Scheduling Order, Defendant’s Defenses). Plaintiffs purport to have identified at least 22 distinct delays in the processing or payment of their claim. They seek damages of at least $20 million statutory penalties and, perhaps, up to $1 billion in noneconomic losses. See ECF No. 71-2 at 65 (Plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Discovery Responses). Plaintiffs’ theory appears to be that because they can identify 22 distinct unreasonable delays or denials of a covered

benefit, they are entitled to 22 times $800,859.62 (twice the benefits to which they are entitled under the policy), which equals $17,618,91.60. Id. at 68. From the submissions of the Parties, the Court identifies several issues, some of which go beyond the scope of the application of Schultz v. GEICO. One important question is whether USAA is entitled to seek discovery about whether the claim is covered under the policy. But USAA has paid all the benefits requested and has done so without reserving any rights. Plaintiffs therefore argue, not without some basis, that issues going to coverage, such as the cause of the pipe bursting (allegedly a window was left open during cold weather) and other events leading up to the submission of the

claim to USAA are, at this point, irrelevant to what will ultimately be decided at trial: whether USAA unreasonably delayed payment. USAA also claims that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses are vague and fail to provide the requested information. For example, Plaintiffs have not spelled out with any specificity the supposed 22 instances of unreasonable delay, and USAA asks that Plaintiffs be required, for each alleged instance of delay, to specify: “the date of the alleged delay, the amount claimed to have been delayed, the date on which they claim the benefits should have been paid, and all facts known to date supporting those contentions.” ECF No. 85 at 16. USAA also takes issue with Plaintiffs’ constant referral to USAA’s claim file, rather than providing their own recitation as to what happened over the course of the claim. USAA has helpfully winnowed its list of requests and interrogatories to which it seeks a response, see ECF No. 85-5, and the Court will address each of the requested areas below.

II. Application of Schultz v. GEICO Plaintiffs argue that Schultz stands for the proposition that “[i]nsurers are prohibited from using discovery to create new evidence to support earlier delays in paying benefits, or other coverage decisions.” ECF No. 71 at 1. I am not sure that is exactly what Schultz stands for. Later in the Motion, Plaintiffs put it slightly differently, suggesting the issue is the following: “When an insurer never disputes coverage, pays benefits without a reservation of rights or raising any defenses and is sued for bad faith due because of delays in the claim, is the insurer permitted to use discovery to create new evidence to attempt to argue it might not have owed the benefits, so the delays are

justified?” Id. at 3. Schultz involved an insurer who initially declined to pay an injury claim but then, “after months of correspondence” but not requiring an independent medical examination (“IME”), offered its policy limit. 429 P.3d at 846. When the insurer was sued for common law bad faith and violations of Colo. Rev. Stat.

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Related

v. GEICO Casualty Company
2018 CO 87 (Supreme Court of Colorado, 2018)
Simpson v. University of Colorado
220 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colorado, 2004)
Martensen v. Koch
301 F.R.D. 562 (D. Colorado, 2014)

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Starr v. United Services Automobile Association, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/starr-v-united-services-automobile-association-cod-2025.