] 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 6 oR 7 STARR INDEMNITY AND LIABILITY Case No. 3:22-cv-00179-LRH-CLB COMPANY, dba STARR INSURANCE 8 COMPANIES as Subrogee of GLF AIR, ORDER 9 LLC., and 60-206, LLC, 10 Plaintiffs, 1 “ SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT 12 CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation; SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT, LLC, a 13 Nevada limited liability company; SIGNATURE FLIGHT SUPPORT OF 14 NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation; DOES 1 — X, inclusive, and ROW 15 || CORPORATIONS 1 — X, inclusive, 16 Defendants 17 18 Before the Court is Plaintiff Starr Indemnity and Liability Company’s (“Starr”) Motion to 19 || Remand to State Court. ECF No, 18. Signature Flight Support, LLC (“Signature”) opposed the 20 || motion (ECF No. 21) and Starr replied to the opposition (ECF No. 26). Also before the Court is 21 || Signature’s Motion for Intradistrict Transfer of Venue to the Southern Division. ECF No. 33. Starr 22 || opposed the motion (ECF No. 34) and Signature replied to the opposition (ECF No. 38). For the 23 |} reasons articulated herein, the Court denies Starr’s Motion to Remand and grants Signature’s 24 || Motion for Transfer, Although Signature’s Motion for Transfer to the Southern Division is granted, 25 || this action shall remain before the current presiding District Court and Magistrate Court judges, as 26 || explained below. 27 || H/ 28 | iv
BACKGROUND 2 In May of 2019, a 2000 Bombardier 60 Lear Jet (“Lear Jet”) parked at the Las Vegas airport 3 |} was hit and damaged by another plane being towed by Signature employees. ECF No. 18 at 3. 4 | Starr insured the Lear Jet and paid the following post-accident costs to the policy holder: $61, 5 || 277.31 in repair damages, and $279,413.23 in rental aircraft expense and use costs, Jd. In 6 | December of 2019, Starr demanded Signature pay for the post-accident costs it incurred. Jd, The 7 | demand included sworn proof of loss statements which named “Starr Indemnity & Liability 8 || Company” as the insurer. ECF No. 18-10 at 7. Signature rejected the demand. ECF No. 18 at 3. 9 On January 31, 2022, Starr filed its original complaint in State court alleging that Signature 10 | negligently cared for and maintained the Lear Jet and seeking declaratory relief regarding a parking 11 | waiver card (“Landing Card”) the parties executed in Las Vegas that effectively absolved 12 | Signature of tort liability should the Lear Jet be damaged. See generally, ECF No. 18-1. The 13 } complaint named “Starr Insurance Companies” as plaintiff, included a broad description of Starr 14 || Insurance Companies’ business, and named five defendants: (1) Signature Flight Support 15 || Corporation; (2) Signature Flight Support, LLC; (3) Signature Flight Support of Nevada, Inc.; (4) 16 |} DOES I-X, inclusive; and (5) ROE Corporations I-X, inclusive, Jd. at 1. Signature was served 17 || with the original complaint on March 8, 2022. ECF No. 18-6 at 7, 11. 18 On March 21, 2022, Signature’s counsel emailed Starr’s counsel and asked for clarification 19 || on who the proper plaintiff was because Signature could not find business registration information 20 || for “Starr Insurance Companies” in Nevada or elsewhere. ECF No. 18-8 at 2. Signature’s counsel 21 || also conveyed its belief that “Starr Indemnity & Liability Company” was the proper plaintiff 22 || because that entity was listed on the sworn proof of loss statements it received as part of the 23 || December 2019 demand. /d. at 2-3. Finally, Signature’s counsel informed Starr’s counsel that 24 || “Signature Flight Support, LLC” was the only proper defendant in the matter because “Signature 25 || Flight Support Corporation” had been converted into “Signature Flight Support, LLC,” and 26 || “Signature Flight Support of Nevada, Inc.,” had been merged into “Signature Flight Support, 27 || LLC,” long before Starr filed the original complaint. Id. at 2. On March 22, 2022, Starr’s counsel 28 || replied to the email and agreed to file an amended complaint. Jd.
1 Starr’s counsel emailed an amended complaint to Signature’s counsel on March 28, 2022. 2 || See generally, ECF No.18-9. The amended complaint named “Starr Indemnity & Liability 3 || Company” as the plaintiff, but all three Signature defendant entities remained. /d. at 6. Starr’s 4 || counsel refused to dismiss any defendants because counsel checked the Nevada Secretary of State 5 || website which listed the Signature Flight Support of Nevada, Inc.-Signature Flight Support, LLC, 6 || merger as “never completed.” Id. at 2. 7 On April 20, 2022, Signature filed a notice of removal from the Second Judictal District 8 || Court for the State of Nevada based on diversity jurisdiction. See generally, ECF No. 1. The case 9 || was randomly assigned to the Honorable James C. Mahan of Nevada’s unofficial Southern 10 |} Division until it was ordered “administratively closed and transferred to the unofficial northern 11 || division in Reno for further action per LR IA 1-8(c)[.J” ECF No, 5; See LR JA 1-8(c) (requiring 12 || filings and proceedings to be held in the division of the court in which the original case was filed); 13 || see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (requiring civil actions brought in state court be removed to the 14 || District Court embracing the state court where the action is pending). The Honorable Larry R. 15 || Hicks and Magistrate Judge Carla L. Baldwin of the unofficial Northern Division were randomly 16 || reassigned the matter for all further proceedings. ECF No. 17. 17 Starr filed its Motion to Remand on May 9, 2022, (ECF No. 18), and Signature filed its 18 || Motion for Intradistrict Transfer on August 29, 2022 (ECF No. 33). The Court addresses these 19 || motions in turn below. 20 || II. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A. Motion to Remand 22 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 23 || courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 24 || defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the 25 || place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has original jurisdiction 26 || over civil actions where the suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in 27 || controversy, exclusive of interests and costs, exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 28
1 “T]he removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the 2 |} evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds $[75],000.00.” Sanchez v, Monumental Life Ins. 3 || Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). In determining whether the defendant has established that 4 || diversity jurisdiction exists, the district court must first consider whether it is “facially apparent” 5 || from the complaint that the jurisdictional amount in controversy requirement is met. Singer v. State 6 || Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir.1997), Generally, courts apply a mechanical 7 || test to determine whether the amount in controversy requirement has been met: “[t]he district court 8 || simply reads the ad damnum clause of the complaint to determine whether the matter in 9 || controversy exceeds” $75,000.00. Jd. at 375. If it is apparent to the court that the claim was made 10 in good faith, then the vaiue of the claim controls for purposes of removal, unless it appears “to a 11 || legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed,” Jd. 12 Removal of a case to district court may be challenged by motion and a federal court must 13 || remand a matter if there is a lack of jurisdiction. See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Removal statutes 14 || are construed restrictively and in favor of remanding a case to state court. See Shamrock Oil & 15 || Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-109 (1941); see also, Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 16 || 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 17 B. Motion to Transfer 18 “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may 19 || transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to 20 | any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “Under 21 § 1404(a), the district court has discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 22 || individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Jones v. GNC 23 || Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted}, In making this 24 || assessment, courts normally “weigh the relevant [private and public-interest] factors and decide 25 || whether, on balance, a transfer would serve ‘the convenience of parties and witnesses’ and 26 || otherwise promote ‘the interest of justice.’” At. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. 27 || of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)) (listing common private and 28 || public-interest factors in n. 6); see also Jones, 211 F.3d at 498499 (listing other common factors).
1 || The moving party bears the burden of establishing that the proposed district is a more appropriate 2 || forum for the action. Operation: Heroes, Lid. v. Procter & Gamble Prods., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 3 1106, 1111 (D. Nev. 2012). WI. DISCUSSION 5 A. Motion te Remand 6 In its removal notice, Signature alleges that (1) it is facially apparent from the complaint 7 that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum of $75,000; (2) the only proper 8 || defendant, Signature Flight Support, LLC, consents to removal; and (3) complete diversity of 9 || citizenship exists because Starr is a citizen of Texas and New York while Signature Flight Support, 10 |} LLC’s, members are citizens of Delaware, Florida, and the United Kingdom. See generally, ECF 11 || No. 1. 12 In its motion to remand, Starr argues that Signature failed to (1) meet its burden of 13 || establishing diversity jurisdiction, (2) timely remove the matter within 30-days of receipt and 14 |} service of summons of the original complaint, and (3) meet its “heavy” burden of establishing 15 |] fraudulent joinder,! ECF No. 18 at 1-2, Starr argues that Signature had initial notice regarding 16 || Stare’s corporate citizenship from the sworn proof of loss statements it received in December of 17 || 2019, and the March 21, 2022, email correspondence, /d. at 9. Starr states its belief that the matter 18 || first became removable on March 8, 2022, when Signature was served with the original complaint 19 || and concludes that Signature’s April 20, 2022, removal was untimely. id, 20 In response, Signature argues that the four corners of Starr’s original complaint did not 21 || “establish a basis for removal.” ECF No, 21 at 4. Signature further argues that when the four 22 || corners of a complaint do not establish a basis for removal, the 30-day removal clock does not start 23 || until “after the defendant receives an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which 24 || it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” fd. (quotation 25 || omitted). Signature also argues that the sworn proof of loss statements are not considered “other 26 || paper” for removal purposes because receipt predated the complaint, Jd. at 5. Lastly, Signature 27 28 1 Because the Court finds that Signature’s removal was both proper and timely, the Court does not address the issue of fraudulent joinder.
1 alleges that the defendant’s subjective knowledge of removal grounds does not trigger the removal 21 clock. /d. at 4. Signature concludes that the matter first became removable on March 28, 2022, 3 || when it received the amended complaint containing the proper plaintiffs name because diversity 4 i| could be ascertained from independent research. /d. at 5. In reply, Starr admits that neither the 5 | original nor amended complaint established its corporate citizenship. ECF No. 26 at 2, 4. However, 6 || Starr maintains that Signature knew who the proper plaintiff was smce December of 2019. Jd. 7 1, Complete Diversity Existed When Starr Filed its Original Complaint 8 The Court’s jurisdiction over diversity cases is limited to when there is diversity of 9 || citizenship between the parties, no defendant is a citizen of the state where the action was filed, 10 and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C, 11 § 1441(b)@); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), It is clear to the Court from the face of the complaint that the 12 || amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. ECF No. 1-2 at 4-6. 13 Diversity of citizenship is determined, and must exist, at the time the complaint is filed. 14 || Strotek Corp. v. Air Transp. Ass'n. of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir, 2002), Here, diversity of 15 || citizenship must be determined as of January 31, 2022, when Starr filed its original complaint in 16 || State court. The parties dispute whether complete diversity exists in this case. It is Signature’s 17 || belief that the only proper defendant in the matter is Signature Support Flight, LLC, because of 18 || the business entity conversion and merger that took place prior te the filing of the original 19 || complaint. ECF No, | at 4-6. Starr argues that the State of Nevada did not fully recognize the 20 || alleged merger, as evidenced by Starr’s Nevada Secretary of State website check, and that 21 || Signature Flight Support of Nevada, Inc.’s existence precludes complete diversity in this case. 22 | ECF No. 18 at 11. 23 “When a civil action is filed after a merger takes place, the surviving entity's domicile is 24 || determinative of jurisdiction.” Garand v, J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N_A., Case No. 3:10-CV-0212- 25 || LRH-VPC, 2010 WL 2695666, at *1 (D. Nev. July 2, 2010); see also, Meadows v. Bicrodyne 26 || Corporation, 785 F.2d 670, 672 (9th Cir.1986). Signature Flight Support Corporation was 27 || converted into Signature Flight Support LLC in December of 2019, See ECF Nos. 1-5, 1-6, Here, 28 || the citizenship of the non-surviving entity, Signature Flight Support Corporation, is not considered
1 | for diversity purposes, Further, Signature Flight Support of Nevada, Inc., was merged with 2 | Signature Flight Support, LLC, in April of 2021. See ECF No. 24, The merger is supported by 3 1) documentation issued by Nevada’s Secretary of State and dated April 2021. See ECF No. 25, 4 || Although it appears a clerical mistake was made on the Nevada Secretary of State’s website, the 5 || dated documents clearly show the merger took place in April 2021, Therefore, Signature Flight 6 || Support of Nevada, Inc., ceased to exist as a legally entity at the time Starr filed its original 7 || complaint. The Court will not consider its citizenship for purposes of diversity. Further, “the 8 || citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded[,]” which means 9 || defendants “DOES I-X, inclusive,” and “ROE Corporations I-X, inclusive,” in the current matter 10 || are also disregarded for purposes of diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). 11 This leaves Starr and Signature Flight Support, LLC, as the only two entities for which the 12 || Court must determine citizenship. A corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it 13 || has been incorporated and where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see 14 || also JPMorgan Chase Bank v, Traffic Stream (BVD) Infrastructure Lid., 536 U.S. 88, 92 (2002), 15 || The Court finds that Starr, a corporation, is a citizen of Texas, its state of incorporation, and New 16 || York, its principal place of business. See generally, ECF No. 1-3 at 7, 14. 17 A limited liability company is a citizen of all states where its members are citizens. Johnson 18 1 v. Columbia Propes. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Signature Flight Support, 19 || LLC, is a limited liability company whose sole member, Signature Aviation USA, LLC, is a 20 || Delaware limited liability company. ECF No. 24 at 67. Signature Aviation USA, LLC, has two 21 || members: Signature Aviation USA Holdings, Inc., which is incorporated in Delaware and 22 || maintains its principal place of business in Florida, and BBA Aviation Finance, which is a United 23 || Kingdom entity maintaining its principal place of business in England. /d. at 73, 77. For purposes 24 || of diversity, Signature is a citizen of Delaware, Florida, and the United Kingdom. 25 The Court finds that complete diversity existed between the parties in this matter when the 26 || original complaint was filed as Starr is a corporate citizen of Texas and New York, and Signature 27 || is a citizen where its members are citizens: Delaware, Florida, and the United Kingdom. 28 jy Mv
1 2. Signature’s Removal was Timely and Proper 2 Timeliness of removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) which establishes two distinct 3 || pathways for removal. Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1093 (9th Cir, 2021); Harris v. 41 Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2005). 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) creates the 5 || first pathway: “notice of removal of a civil action [.. . | shall be filed within 30 days after the 6 || receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading[.]” 28 7 || U.S.C. § 1446(b)C1). The first pathway’s removal clock starts to run “only when that [initial] 8 || pleading affirmatively reveals on its face the facts necessary for federal court jurisdiction.” Harris, 9 || 425 F.3d at 690 (quotation omitted), When grounds for removal are clear from the complaint, the 10 || 30-day removal clock begins the day the complaint is received. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(); Dietrich, 11 |] 14 F.4th at 1090. Only the four corners of the complaint dictate removability, not the defendant’s 12 || subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry, Harris, 425 F.3d at 694. 13 Here, the original complaint does not name the proper plaintiff and includes only a loose 14 || description of the improper plaintiff's business activity, The four corners of Starr’s original 15 || complaint do nothing to affirmatively reveal the facts necessary for removal. Further, Ninth Circuit 16 || caselaw does not base removal on subjective knowledge or a duty to inquire. See /d. Simply, no 17 || grounds for removal are evident from the face of Starr’s original complaint and removal is not 18 || based on Signature’s subjective knowledge or a duty to inquire. Because the Court finds that no 19 || grounds for removal were evident from the original complaint, the first pathway’s 30-day removal 20 || clock did not start when Signature was served on March 8, 2022, 21 “{T]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,” then the second removal 22 || pathway can be triggered and “a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by 23 || the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or 24 || other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 25 || removable.” 28 U.S.C, § 1446(b)(3). The defendant must receive a subsequent amended pleading, 26 |} motion, order, or other paper, from which grounds for removal may be ascertained. Dietrich, 14 27 | F.4th at 1091 (emphasis added). In the Ninth Circuit, “ascertain[able]” means “unequivocally clear 28 || and certain.” Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1093. Therefore, the second pathway’s 30-day removal clock
1 will not start to run until an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper makes grounds for 2 || removal unequivocally clear and certain. 3 Here, two forms of “other paper” potentially place Signature on notice of removability and 4 || trigger the second pathway’s 30-day clock: (1) the sworn proof of loss statements from December 5 || of 2019, and (2) the emails the parties exchanged throughout March of 2022, The Court finds that 6 || neither make removability unequivocally clear and certain. The sworn proof of loss statements 7 || were not received subsequent to the complaint because Signature received them two years before 8 || any complaint was filed. Further, the emails the parties exchanged throughout March of 2022, 9 || certainly do not meet the unequivocally clear and certain standard adopted in this Circuit. At no 10 || point in the email exchanges does Starr confirm that “Starr Indemnity & Liability Company” is 11 || the correct plaintiff. While there may be clues, clues are not enough to meet the heightened 12 || unequivocally clear and certain standard that requires “a greater level of certainty or that the facts 13 || supporting removability be stated unequivocally.” Dietrich, 14 F Ath at 1093 (quotation omitted). 14 || The Court finds that the second pathway’s removal clock did not start because of the proof of loss 15 || statements or shared emails. 16 ‘The amended complaint made it unequivocally clear and certain who the proper plaintiff 17 || was in the matter. This allowed Signature to independently research plaintiffs business 18 || registration information, although it had no affirmative duty to do so. From that independent 19 || research, Signature was able to ascertain removability. The Court finds that the amended 20 || complaint, received on March 28, 2022, to be the first “amended pleading, motion, order or other 21 || paper” from which diversity could be unequivocally clear and certain. The second pathway’s 30- 22 || day removal clock was triggered when Signature received the amended complaint on March 28, 23 || 2022. Therefore, Signature’s notice of removal filed on April 20, 2022 was timely. 24 Because Signature’s April 20, 2022, removal notice was both timely and proper, because 25 || complete diversity exists between the parties, and because the amount in controversy exceeds the 26 || statutory minimum, the Court denies Starr’s motion to remand. 27 A 28 || fi
1 B. Motion to Transfer 2 There is dispute between the parties as to which statute governs Signature’s motion to 3 || transfer. Signature’s claims that its motion to transfer is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). ECF No. 4 || 33 at 1-2. Starr argues that, upon removal, the proper venue statute to apply is 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). 5 || ECF No. 34 at 2. 6 Starr is correct that venue of removed actions is dictated by 28 § U.S.C, 1441(a), which 7 || requires state court claims be removed to the district court “embracing” the state court where the 8 || action is pending, 28 § U.S.C, 1441 (a), However, Signature’s motion to transfer is not an attempt 9 || to cure improper venue. Rather, Signature’s motion is an independent attempt to transfer the matter 10 || toa venue that serves both convenience and fairness as it is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). One 11 || of the Ninth Circuit’s seminal cases on transfers was also a removed action where an independent 12 || motion to transfer was premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), not 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). Jones, 211 F.3d 13 || at 493, Mindful that venue for improper removal is dictated by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), this Court 14 || finds that independent motions to transfer premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) should be decided 15 || according to that statute. 16 When transfer is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1404fa), there are two requirements: “(1) that 17 || the district to which defendants seek to have the action transferred is one in which the action might 18 || have been brought, and (2) that the transfer be for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in 19 || the interest of justice.” Operation: Heroes, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. Those two requirements are 20 || addressed below, 21 1. The Action Could Have Been Brought in the Unofficial Southern Division 22 Signature alleges that transfer to the unofficial Southern Division is proper because the 23 || action could have been brought there originally. ECF No. 33 at 4. Specifically, Signature claims 24 || that the Southern Division was the more proper venue to bring the original complaint because Las 25 || Vegas is indisputably where contract performance was due and where the damage occurred to the 26 || Lear Jet. Jd. at 5. Signature also cites Local Rule IA 1-8(a), that requires Starr to file its civil claim 27 || with the clerk’s office in the unofficial division where the action allegedly arose. Jd. In opposition, 28 || Starr argues that Signature was “amenable to jurisdiction and service of process in either the
1 || Northern or Southern divisions.” ECF No. 34 at 3. In reply, Signature argues that where Signature 2 || accepted service does nothing to disprove that the action could have been brought in the Southern
_ 3 || Division originally. ECF No. 38 at 4. 4 A civil action may be brought in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events 5 || or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject 6 || of the action is situated[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Here, both parties agree that the events giving 7 || rise to this claim occurred at the airport in Las Vegas, Nevada, which is in the Southern Division. 8 || The Landing Card was executed in Las Vegas, and the Lear Jet was stored and damaged there. 9 || ECF No, 33 at 5; ECF No, 34 at 4. Under this statute, Starr may have originally brought the action 10 || in the unofficial Southern Division where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim 11 | occurred. 12 2, Transfer Serves Convenience and Justice After a Balancing of the Jones Factors 13 In its motion, Signature claims that relevant factors weigh heavily in favor of transfer. ECF 14 || No. 33 at 4. Signature supports its claim with the following: (1) all relevant agreements and events 15 || giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in Las Vegas, (2) no parties or witnesses have any ties to 16 || Northern Nevada relating to the case, (3) Starr is not a resident of Nevada, and (4) the Southern 17 |} Division is more convenient for potential witnesses. □□□ 6-9. In response, Starr argues that 18 || Signature failed to sufficiently establish inconvenience and that Starr’s choice of forum is entitled 19 || to substantial weight because the defendants are Nevada corporations or limited liability 20 || companies. ECF No. 34 at 2-4. In reply, Signature argues that Starr failed to address the relevant 21 || transfer factors, constituting “consent to the granting of the motion.” ECF No. 38 at 2. 22 The parties agree that Signature bears the burden of establishing that the unofficial 23 || Southern Division is a more appropriate forum, Signature’s burden requires that it make a “strong 24 || showing of inconvenience to watrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co. 25 || »v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). To determine whether the 26 || moving party has satisfied its burden, courts in the Ninth Circuit balance eight factors: 27 fff 28 || //
1 (1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff's choice of 2 forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff's cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs 3 of litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources 4 of proof. 5 6 || Jones, 211 F.3d at 498-499, 7 || Background consideration is also afforded to forum selection clauses as well as relevant public 8 || policy of the forum state when deciding motions to transfer venue under § 1404(a). Id. 9 After balancing these eight factors, the Court finds that Signature has met its burden of 10 || demonstrating that transfer will serve the convenience of parties and witnesses as well as the li || interest of justice. Most, if not all, contacts the parties have with Nevada take place at the Las 12 || Vegas airport which acts as the hub for both parties’ Nevada-based business. Most importantly, 13 || the contacts giving rise to this cause of action occurred in the Southern Division, The Landing 14 || Card at the heart of the declaratory relief claim was executed in Las Vegas, and the Lear Jet at the 15 || heart of the negligence claim was hit and damaged there. Clearly, the contacts giving rise to Starr’s 16 || cause of action are entirely located in Southern Nevada. Although the parties disagree over to what 17 || extent, transfer will undeniably impact witness availability in a favorable manner as the events 18 || witnessed occurred in Las Vegas. 19 The only adverse factor of note is Statr’s choice of forum. Typically, courts give deference 20 || toa plaintiffs choice of venue. Ed. Planeta Mexicana, S.A. de CLV. v. Argov, No, 2:11-CV-01375- 21 || GMN, 2012 WL 3027456, at *5 (D, Nev. July 23, 2012). However, less deference is given when 22 || “plaintiffs choice is not its residence or where the forum lacks a significant connection to the 23 || activities alleged in the complaint.” Starr has offered no support to counter Signature’s 24 || arguments that (1) Starr has no real connection to Northern Nevada, apart from its counsel, and (2) 25 || Starr’s claims center around events and contracts executed in Southern Nevada. The Count finds 26 || that less deference should be awarded to Starr’s forum selection because it is not a resident of 27 || Nevada, and the Northern Division lacks significant connection to the complaint’s alleged 28 || activities,
I Because this matter could have originally been brought in the unofficial Southern Division 2 || and because the balancing of Jones factors suggest transfer will serve justice and convenience, the 3 || Court grants Signature’s motion to transfer, However, this action will remain before the presiding 4 || Judge and the presiding Magistrate Judge as both are familiar with this action, For the convenience 5 || of the Court, parties and counsel, Magistrate Judge Baldwin routinely conducts pre-trial hearings 6 j| through videoconferencing, However, trial venue will be in Las Vegas and dispositive matters will 7 || remain before Judge Hicks. 8 || IV. CONCLUSION 9 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Starr’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 18) is DENIED. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Signature’s Motion for Intradistrict Transfer of Venue 11 |} (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED, The Clerk of the Court shail transfer venue to the unofficial Southern 12 || Division but keep the matter before this unofficial Northern Division Court. Non-dispositive 13 || matters shall remain before Magistrate Judge Carla Baldwin. 14 ITIS SO et / ' 15 DATED this (? day of December, 2022. An
17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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