Starnesheua L. White Personally and on Behalf of Minor Child, Tramyah White v. Morehouse Parish School Board an Incorporated Body Through Debbie Wilson, in her Official Capacity as President; and David Gray in his Official Capacity as Superintendent; Morehouse Parish School Board Members, Karen Diel, Louis Melton, Tab Wilkerson, Rick Hixon, Veronica Tappin, and Adrin Williams; Letha L. Heckford, in her Official Capacity as a Morehouse Elementary School Teacher

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 21, 2025
• Docket: 56,290-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered May 21, 2025. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 56,290-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

STARNESHEUA L. WHITE Plaintiffs-Appellants PERSONALLY AND ON BEHALF OF MINIOR CHILD, TRAMYAH WHITE

versus

MOREHOUSE PARISH SCHOOL Defendants-Appellees BOARD AN INCORPORATED BODY THROUGH DEBBIE WILSON, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT; AND DAVID GRAY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT; MOREHOUSE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS, KAREN DIEL, LOUIS MELTON, TAB WILKERSON, RICK HIXON, VERONICA TAPPIN, AND ADRIN WILLIAMS; LETHA L. HECKFORD, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A MOREHOUSE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER

Appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Morehouse, Louisiana Trial Court No. 2023-353

Honorable Walter M. Caldwell, IV, Judge

***** SMITH & NWOKORIE Counsel for Appellants By: Brian G. Smith

RANKIN, YELDELL & KATZ, APLC Counsel for Appellees By: Stephen J. Katz

Before STEPHENS, THOMPSON, and HUNTER, JJ. STEPHENS, J., This action arises from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Parish of

Morehouse, the Honorable Walter M. Caldwell, IV, Judge, presiding. One of

the defendants, David Gray, filed exceptions of vagueness, no cause of

action, and nonjoinder of a party in response to the petition for damages

filed by the plaintiffs. The remaining defendants filed a declinatory

exception of insufficiency of service of process as well as a motion for

involuntary dismissal. Following a hearing on the above exceptions and

motions, the trial court rendered a judgment granting the exception of no

cause of action and one granting the exception of insufficient service and

motion for involuntary dismissal. Plaintiffs have appealed from the adverse

judgments. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial

court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 14, 2023, Starnesheua White (“Ms. White”) filed a

petition individually and on behalf of her minor child T.W., a student at

Morehouse Parish Elementary School in Bastrop, Louisiana, alleging that

one of the defendants, Letha Heckford (“Ms. Heckford”), an employee at the

school, committed an assault and battery on her minor child in the

classroom. Ms. White also named the following parties as defendants:

David Gray, Morehouse Parish School Board Superintendent, and School

Board Members Karen Diel, Louis Melton, Tab Wilkerson, Rick Hixon,

Debbie Wilson, Veronica Tappin, and Adrin Williams (“the defendants”).1

1 A petition was filed previously with docket number 2022-507. This petition was dismissed without prejudice for failure to request service on the defendants. The plaintiffs refiled the petition on the same day as the dismissal, and this second pleading was assigned docket number 2023-353, which is the appeal before this Court. In her petition, Ms. White asserted that the defendants are responsible

for the acts of Ms. Heckford under the theory of respondeat superior.

Although each of the defendants was named in the petition, Ms. White

requested service only on David Gray. On October 10, 2023, Gray filed

three exceptions: vagueness, no cause of action, and nonjoinder of a party.

In his memorandum, he argued that the petition was too vague, general, and

indefinite as to (1) the date of the alleged incident between the minor child

and Ms. Heckford; (2) the allegations of an assault and battery; and (3) the

“criminal act” or “crimes” referenced but not specifically stated throughout

the petition. Gray also claimed that the petition failed to establish why Ms.

White is the proper person to assert the action, considering she did not allege

either to be a biological parent who has parental authority over the minor

childor that she is the tutrix of the minor child. Furthermore, in support of

his exception of no cause of action, Gray explained that the petition failed to

point to any specific act or inaction he may or may not have taken.

On February 5, 2024, the remaining defendants (excluding David

Gray) filed an exception of insufficiency of service of process and a motion

for involuntary dismissal for failure to request service of citation on them.

The defendants urged that service of citation was not requested on them

within 90 days of the commencement of the action in compliance with La.

C.C.P. art. 1201(C). Given Ms. White’s failure to properly request service of

citation on them, the defendants sought involuntary dismissal of the

plaintiffs’ petition.

The trial court held a hearing on the exceptions and the motion for

involuntary dismissal on May 14, 2024. On that same day, the trial court

found that the exception of no cause of action could not be cured with an 2 amendment; therefore, the trial court rendered judgment granting the

exception and dismissed the matter with prejudice as to Gray. The trial court

found that the exceptions of vagueness and nonjoinder of party were moot as

a result of its ruling on the exception of no cause of action. As it pertained

to the remaining defendants, the trial court rendered a separate judgment

granting both the exception of insufficiency of service of process and the

motion for involuntary dismissal. However, this dismissal was without

prejudice as it related to these defendants. The plaintiffs filed the instant

appeal.2

DISCUSSION

No Cause of Action

Ms. White asserts that the trial court erred in granting Gray’s

exception of no cause of action. In support, she argues that Gray knew of

Ms. Heckford’s actions and failed to take steps regarding those actions as is

required by the School Board’s own policy. Ms. White contends that Gray

refused to respond to the incident between the minor child and Ms.

Heckford. She maintains that the plaintiffs addressed this issue in the

petition in their allegations that Gray failed to address the attack and injuries,

failed to take steps to assist the minor child with her injuries or allow

medical aid by the school nurse, failed to notify the parents about the

incident, and failed to make a report about the incident.

In response, Gray urges that the trial court properly dismissed all

claims against him. He asserts that the petition did not contain a paragraph

2 The following associated cases were filed in this Court: Kennedy v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 56,267 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25) and Robinson v. Morehouse Parish School Bd., 56,289 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/21/25). 3 alleging any act or inaction he specifically took. Furthermore, Gray also

cites La. R.S. 17:439 and contends that this statute provides immunity for

school employees from tort actions arising out of what allegedly happened in

this case. He maintains that the plaintiffs never alleged that Gray’s actions

were outside the scope of his duties connected with his employment as

Superintendent of Schools, resulting in no cause of action raised against him.

The peremptory exception of no cause of action tests the legal

sufficiency of the plaintiff’s petition by determining whether the law affords

a remedy on the facts alleged in the petition. Scheffler v. Adams and Reese,

LLP, 06-1774 (La. 2/22/07), 950 So. 2d 641; Blanche v. Varner, 52,659 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 5/22/19), 273 So. 3d 620; Gipson v. Fortune, 45,021 (La. App. 2

Cir. 1/27/10), 30 So. 3d 1076, writ denied, 10-0432 (La. 4/30/10), 34 So. 3d

298. A “cause of action,” when used in the context of the peremptory

exception of no cause of action, refers to the operative facts that give rise to

the plaintiff’s right to judicially assert the action against the defendant.

Blanche, supra; White v. St. Elizabeth B.C. Bd. of Directors, 45,213 (La.

App. 2 Cir. 6/2/10), 37 So. 3d 1139. The purpose of the exception of no

cause of action is not to determine whether the plaintiff will prevail at trial

but is to ascertain if a cause of action exists. Blanche, supra; Bogues v.

Louisiana Energy Consultants, Inc., 46,434 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/10/11), 71 So.

3d 1128. The exception is triable on the face of the petition, and for the

purpose of determining the issues raised by the exception, the well-pleaded

facts in the petition must be accepted as true. Fink v. Bryant, 01-0987 (La.

11/28/01), 801 So. 2d 346; Blanche, supra.

An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling sustaining an

exception of no cause of action is de novo because the exception raises a 4 question of law, and the trial court’s decision is based only on the sufficiency

of the petition. Id. The essential question is whether, in the light most

favorable to plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in plaintiff’s favor, the

petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Wright v. Louisiana

Power & Light, 06-1181 (La. 3/9/07), 951 So. 2d 1058; Scheffler, supra;

Blanche, supra.

La. R.S. 17:439 provides, in pertinent part:

A. Except as otherwise provided in this Section, no person shall have a cause of action against any school employee based on any statement made or action taken by the school employee provided that the action or statement was within the course and scope of the school employee’s duties as defined by the school board in which the school employee is employed and was within the specific guidelines for school employee behavior as established by that school board.

B. As used in this Section, the terms “school employee” means any school employee who has direct contact with students in the course and scope of the school employee's duties as defined by the school board by which the school employee is employed, and includes but is not limited to school-based administrators, classroom teachers, coaches, librarians, counselors, teachers' aides, clerical employees, lunchroom workers, custodial workers, school bus operators, and school bus operators’ aides.

C. The immunity from liability established by this Section shall not apply to any action or statement by a school employee that was maliciously, willfully, and deliberately intended to cause bodily harm to a student or to harass or intimidate a student.

Aside from the petition naming Gray as a defendant and requesting

that he be served with the petition, the plaintiffs have failed to plead facts

giving rise to a cause of action against Gray in his capacity as Morehouse

Parish School Board Superintendent. Apart from broadly stating that the

elementary school failed to address the alleged attack and injuries, failed to

assist the minor child after the alleged incident, and failed to notify the

5 parents of the minor child or call the police department, nothing in the

petition addresses any action or inaction by Gray. The petition also lacks

allegations challenging Gray’s immunity pursuant to La. R.S. 17:439(C).

Most notably, when questioned about the exception of no cause of action at

the hearing held on May 14, 2024, counsel for the plaintiffs made no

objections to the trial court’s ruling as seen in the following exchange:

MR. KATZ: Insofar as -- I have the same arguments as I had in the other cases and I think with the sustaining of the exception of no cause of action, meaning it’d be dismissed with prejudice, that means vagueness and nonjoinder are moot because they would have been without prejudice.

MR. SMITH: You’re talking about as it relates to David Gray?

MR. KATZ: Only, yes.

THE COURT: Your position, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Okay.

THE COURT: Sir?

MR. SMITH: I’ll agree with that as it relates to David Gray. MR. KATZ: Okay.

THE COURT: Do you wish to enter any objections as to that ruling?

MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor.

....

Given that the petition lacks well-pleaded facts to accept as true

related to Gray’s actions or inactions, and that counsel for Gray made no

objections to the ruling of the trial court at the hearing, the plaintiffs’ first

assignment of error lacks merit. Therefore, we affirm that part of the trial

court’s judgment granting the exception of no cause of action and dismissing

Gray from the lawsuit.

6 Insufficient Service

Ms. White next asserts that the trial court erred in granting the

defendants’ exception of insufficiency of service of process and motion for

involuntary dismissal for failure to request service within the time

prescribed. In reply, the defendants reiterate that the plaintiffs requested

service be made only on Gray, and only Gray was served with the petition.

Ms. White failed to request service on the remaining defendants within 90

days of the commencement of the action as required by La. C.C.P. art.

1201(C), and according to the defendants, service has still not been

requested to date.

Service of the citation shall be requested on all named defendants

within 90 days of commencement of the action. La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C). La.

C.C.P. art. 1672(C) states:

A judgment dismissing an action without prejudice shall be rendered as to a person named as a defendant for whom service has not been requested within the time prescribed by Article 1201(C) or 3955 upon the sustaining of a declinatory exception filed by such defendant, or upon contradictory motion of any other party, unless good cause is shown why service could not be requested, in which case the court may order that service be effected within a specified time.

On appeal, the trial court’s dismissal of a suit for failure of the

plaintiff to timely request service is subject to the manifest error standard of

review. Wilson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 53,433 (La. App. 2 Cir.

4/22/20), 295 So. 3d 1274, writ denied, 20-00717 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So. 3d

1176; Pylant v. Jefferson Parish, State of La. Dept. of Health & Hosp., 05-

148 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/28/05), 907 So. 2d 807, writ denied, 05-1992 (La.

3/17/06), 925 So. 2d 537; Johnson v. Brown, 03-0679 (La. App. 4 Cir.

6/25/03), 851 So. 2d 319.

7 In the petition, the plaintiffs requested that David Gray be served

within 90 days of the commencement of the action, but notably Ms. White

failed to request this same service on the other named defendants. In

response, the remaining defendants filed a declinatory exception of

insufficiency of service of process and motioned for an involuntary

dismissal. At the hearing, counsel for Ms. White stated that he did not object

to the trial court’s conclusions that service was not requested on the

defendants other than Gray. The defendants clearly followed the proper

procedure, and the trial court correctly granted the defendants’ exception and

motion. Consequently, Ms. White’s second assignment of error is without

merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

granting the defendant David Gray’s exception of no cause of action (with

prejudice). We also affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the

defendants’ declinatory exception of insufficiency of service of process and

motion for involuntary dismissal (without prejudice). Costs of this appeal

are assessed to the plaintiffs, Starnesheua White, personally and on behalf of

the minor child, Tramyah White.

AFFIRMED.