Star Fish & Oystek Co. v. United States

223 F. Supp. 402, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9645
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedNovember 7, 1963
DocketCiv. A. No. 2633
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 223 F. Supp. 402 (Star Fish & Oystek Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Star Fish & Oystek Co. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 402, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9645 (S.D. Ala. 1963).

Opinion

DANIEL HOLCOMBE THOMAS, District Judge.

This is an action instituted under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1) by the plaintiff to recover taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.), and under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (26 U.S. C. § 3301 et seq.), which taxes are alleged [403]*403to have been erroneously paid by, and unlawfully collected from, the plaintiff for the calendar year 1956, with respect to the earnings of the captains and crew members of commercial fishing vessels owned by the plaintiff.

The sole issue is whether or not the captains and crew members of the vessels here involved were “employees” of the plaintiff within the meaning of sections 3301 through 3306, and section 3121, Title 26 United States Code, and the applicable regulations issued thereunder. (Treasury Regulations, Internal Revenue Service, 26 C.F.R. 31.3121 (d)-l (e), and 31.3306 (i)-l.)

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The plaintiff, a corporation duly incorporated and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, owned a number of commercial fishing vessels that operated out of Mobile, Alabama, during the year 1956. During said period, the plaintiff was engaged in the wholesale seafood business. The activities of the plaintiff’s business included (1) fishing for marketable seafood, (2) ownership and maintenance of fishing vessels, (3) ownership and operation of boat docks, (4) the manufacture and sale of ice, (5) the purchase of seafood from boats other than those owned by the plaintiff, (6) processing seafood, (7) packing seafood, and (8) selling the processed and packed seafood at wholesale.

2. In connection with its business activities, the plaintiff owned ten boats during the period in question. These ves-' seis are diesel-powered, two-masted schooners especially equipped for fishing operations. Some of these boats are more than twenty-five years old and have been depreciated considerably. However, the replacement value of one of these vessels is between $40,000 and $50,000. Each of these vessels was operated on what is known as the “lay” basis, in accordance with a long-standing custom in the fishing industry in this area. Under this system, settlement is made between the owner and the captain after each fishing trip. The amount of settlement is ascertained by unloading and weighing the catch and converting its weight into dollars-and-cents based on the prevailing market price. From this amount is first subtracted the cost of the bait; then the expenses of the trip are deducted, i. e., cost of groceries, fuel, ice, etc. Next, the boat’s percentage of 25% is taken out; and after the boat’s percentage is deducted, then the captain’s of 13% is also subtracted, and the remaining 62% belongs to the crew.

3. The plaintiff generally hires or “makes a captain” from personnel already shipping out on its vessels. After the selection is made, the prospective captain is informed of the plaintiff’s intentions and advised of the lay-basis sharing arrangement. If the captain agrees, then he is “given” one of the plaintiff’s boats. The arrangement between the plaintiff and the captain is entirely oral. The term of the arrangement is not limited, nor is it specified. While not formalized by the parties and designated as such, the arrangement constitutes an oral contract in accord with which the captains utilize the plaintiff’s vessels on terms and under conditions outlined in these findings of fact. After the plaintiff has selected an individual to be a captain and the arrangement between plaintiff and the captain has been concluded, the boat is turned over to the new captain, who then registers as captain of such vessel with the Bureau of Customs, as required by federal law.

4. Each captain determined the qualifications of and selected his own crew. The captain also determined the hours and working conditions of the crew, and how much and when the crew was to be paid. Each captain also had full charge of his crew and determined (1) when to ship out for a fishing trip, (2) when to return, (3) where to fish, (4) when to fish, (5) how to fish (i. e., the actual mechanical operation of the fishing gear); and (6) any other matters concerning the operation, maintenance, discipline of the crew, and fishing of the boat from the time the vessel left the plaintiff’s dock until it returned. The members of the [404]*404crew took their orders from the captain exclusively.

5. The above-enumerated prerogatives of the captain were for his decision exclusively. However, operational and economic exigencies would require their occasional modification from time to time. It is common knowledge that factors such as weather, market stability, icing conditions, vessel spacing, mechanical difficulties, crew illnesses and accidents, all play a major part in the success or failure of a particular fishing trip. The captain would therefore keep his plan of operation and fishing schedule flexible enough so as to be able to utilize information concerning the foregoing factors whenever it was made available to him over the ship-to-shore radio. Testimony bears out the fact that occasionally the plaintiff would request certain changes of operations by the captain, due to vessel spacing, market conditions, etc. The foregoing factors have necessarily been taken into account by seamen since time immemorial. The plaintiff, with a vested interest in each voyage, would have been remiss if it had failed to pass on any germane information and had neglected to make certain requests of the captains with respect to changed operating conditions due to unforeseen events. There is no evidence that any captain was released from his arrangement with the plaintiff for failure to follow any shore-to-ship requests made to the captain by the plaintiff.

6. The plaintiff had no right to and did not instruct the captains or the crews as to the methods or techniques employed in their work, or how to accomplish it. The plaintiff had no direct relationship with the crew. The captain selected them, worked them, paid them, and “fired” them, if necessary. The plaintiff did not know who the crew would be at the time the arrangement was made with the captain; and in fact, the crew changed frequently from trip to trip.

7. The plaintiff requested that the captains refrain from going into other ports to sell their catch there. However, if the captain wished to go into another port in order to sell his catch, he could do so. It was generally the custom for the captain to call in to the plaintiff’s office prior to entering a strange port. It was not imperative that the captain make such a call, but among captains operating another’s boat on the “lay” basis in this general area, it is considered the proper and cooperative thing to do. Such a report enabled the plaintiff to arrange maintenance, credit, and transportation for the vessel and crew in the event that it was required. It also allowed the plaintiff an opportunity to purchase at the strange port the catch itself, and have it shipped back to Mobile or processed there.

8. On occasion, the plaintiff would make an advance to a captain with the understanding that it was a loan. Such loans were repaid out of the captain’s share from future catches.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
223 F. Supp. 402, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9645, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/star-fish-oystek-co-v-united-states-alsd-1963.