UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JUSTIN W. STAPLETON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-1562-bhl
OFFICER STEBANE,
Defendant.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Justin Stapleton, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at Green Bay Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Stapleton has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). As required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), Stapleton has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six- month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $1.24. Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT According to Stapleton, on February 16, 2024, Defendant Officer Stebane stopped by
Stapleton’s cell to pick up his food tray, but Stapleton refused to give it to him. Either just before Stebane walked away or while he was walking away, Stapleton allegedly said, “I’m going to get suicidal dog” and “Hey C.O., I’m suicidal.” Stapleton asserts that Stebane came back to his cell less than ten minutes later and argued with him about his dinner tray. Stapleton asserts that Stebane then walked off, but he also asserts that he told Stebane he was suicidal and was going to harm himself. According to Stapleton, Stebane left the wing, at which time Stapleton began to cut himself. He states that he made fifteen new lacerations on his arms, wrist, and chest. Stapleton asserts he was in pain, lost a lot of blood, and suffered psychological distress. He states that, even though he harmed himself, this experience and others have made him afraid of officers. Dkt. No. 1.
THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are aware of an objectively serious risk of harm to an inmate and knowingly or recklessly disregard it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). Notwithstanding the fact that deliberately causing harm to oneself would normally constitute a superseding or intervening cause of injury, see Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888–89, 900 (E.D. Wis. 2006), the duty imposed on prison officials extends to protecting inmates from imminent threats of serious self-harm, and the “obligation to intervene covers self-destructive behaviors up to and including suicide.” Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018). With the foregoing legal standard in mind, the Court will allow Stapleton to proceed on a deliberate indifference claim against Stebane based on allegations that he disregarded the serious risk of harm that Stapleton posed to himself. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, copies of Stapleton’s complaint and this order are being electronically sent today to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Officer Stebane. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, Stebane shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Stapleton is located. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Stapleton shall collect
from his institution trust account the $348.76 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Stapleton’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
JUSTIN W. STAPLETON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 24-cv-1562-bhl
OFFICER STEBANE,
Defendant.
SCREENING ORDER
Plaintiff Justin Stapleton, who is currently serving a state prison sentence at Green Bay Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated. This matter comes before the Court on Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee and to screen the complaint. MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE Stapleton has requested leave to proceed without prepaying the full filing fee (in forma pauperis). A prisoner plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the $350.00 filing fee over time. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). As required under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2), Stapleton has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six- month period immediately preceding the filing of his complaint and has been assessed and paid an initial partial filing fee of $1.24. Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee will be granted. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT The Court has a duty to review any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity and must dismiss any complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised any claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In screening a complaint, the Court must determine whether the complaint complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states at least plausible claims for which relief may be granted. To state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff is required to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). It must be at least sufficient to provide notice to each defendant of what he or she is accused of doing, as well as when and where the alleged actions or inactions occurred, and the nature and extent of any damage or injury the actions or inactions caused. “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. “[T]he complaint’s allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555 (internal quotations omitted). ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT According to Stapleton, on February 16, 2024, Defendant Officer Stebane stopped by
Stapleton’s cell to pick up his food tray, but Stapleton refused to give it to him. Either just before Stebane walked away or while he was walking away, Stapleton allegedly said, “I’m going to get suicidal dog” and “Hey C.O., I’m suicidal.” Stapleton asserts that Stebane came back to his cell less than ten minutes later and argued with him about his dinner tray. Stapleton asserts that Stebane then walked off, but he also asserts that he told Stebane he was suicidal and was going to harm himself. According to Stapleton, Stebane left the wing, at which time Stapleton began to cut himself. He states that he made fifteen new lacerations on his arms, wrist, and chest. Stapleton asserts he was in pain, lost a lot of blood, and suffered psychological distress. He states that, even though he harmed himself, this experience and others have made him afraid of officers. Dkt. No. 1.
THE COURT’S ANALYSIS Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are aware of an objectively serious risk of harm to an inmate and knowingly or recklessly disregard it. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). Notwithstanding the fact that deliberately causing harm to oneself would normally constitute a superseding or intervening cause of injury, see Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888–89, 900 (E.D. Wis. 2006), the duty imposed on prison officials extends to protecting inmates from imminent threats of serious self-harm, and the “obligation to intervene covers self-destructive behaviors up to and including suicide.” Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018). With the foregoing legal standard in mind, the Court will allow Stapleton to proceed on a deliberate indifference claim against Stebane based on allegations that he disregarded the serious risk of harm that Stapleton posed to himself. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Stapleton’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to an informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, copies of Stapleton’s complaint and this order are being electronically sent today to the Wisconsin Department of Justice for service on Officer Stebane. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the informal service agreement between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this Court, Stebane shall file a responsive pleading to the complaint within sixty days of receiving electronic notice of this order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Stapleton is located. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Stapleton shall collect
from his institution trust account the $348.76 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Stapleton’s prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this action. If Stapleton is transferred to another institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with Stapleton’s remaining balance to the receiving institution. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions must submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. The Prisoner E-Filing Program is mandatory for all inmates of Green Bay Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, Dodge
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, Columbia Correctional Institution, and Oshkosh Correctional Institution. Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities must submit the original document for each filing to the Court to the following address: Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
PLEASE DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT’S CHAMBERS. It will only delay the processing of the matter. Stapleton is further advised that failure to make a timely submission may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. Failure to do so could result in orders or other information not being timely delivered, thus affecting the legal rights of the parties. Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin on March 31, 2025. s/ Brett H. Ludwig BRETT H. LUDWIG United States District Judge