Stanton v. Power

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Stanton v. Power

254 A.D.2d 153, 679 N.Y.S.2d 293, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10998

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 20, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 254 A.D.2d 153 (Stanton v. Power) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Stanton v. Power, 254 A.D.2d 153, 679 N.Y.S.2d 293, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10998 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

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Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.), entered on or about August 26, 1997, which, to the extent appealed as limited by plaintiff’s brief, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Since, under the parties’ agreement, defendants’ duty to pay plaintiff was expressly conditioned upon plaintiff’s written presentation of potential merger candidates, and plaintiff failed, in responding to defendants’ summary judgment motion, to adduce any evidence that that condition had been satisfied, the motion court properly found plaintiff’s recovery of a finder’s fee pursuant to the agreement precluded as a matter of law (see, Oppenheimer & Co. v Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 NY2d 685). Since this case involves an express condition precedent to defendants’ payment obligation, we perceive no basis upon which the doctrine of substantial performance might be invoked (see, supra, at 692). Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Wallach, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

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Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Sheila Abdus-Salaam, J.), entered on or about August 26, 1997, which, to the extent appealed as limited by plaintiff’s brief, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Since, under the parties’ agreement, defendants’ duty to pay plaintiff was expressly conditioned upon plaintiff’s written presentation of potential merger candidates, and plaintiff failed, in responding to defendants’ summary judgment motion, to adduce any evidence that that condition had been satisfied, the motion court properly found plaintiff’s recovery of a finder’s fee pursuant to the agreement precluded as a matter of law (see, Oppenheimer & Co. v Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 86 NY2d 685). Since this case involves an express condition precedent to defendants’ payment obligation, we perceive no basis upon which the doctrine of substantial performance might be invoked (see, supra, at 692). Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Wallach, Tom and Andrias, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

254 A.D.2d 153, 679 N.Y.S.2d 293, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10998, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanton-v-power-nyappdiv-1998.

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