Stanton v Lassonde et al.

2014 DNH 153

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: July 9, 2014
• Docket: 13-cv-537-PB
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Charles Stanton

v. Case No. 13-cv-537-PB Opinion No. 2014 DNH 153 Harold Lassonde, III, et al.

O R D E R

Charles Stanton was held liable in a state court action for

breach of contract and defamation. After losing in state court,

he filed this action against the victorious plaintiff and his

attorney. Although Stanton’s theories of liability are

difficult to understand, he appears to argue that the defendants

are liable under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 because they

conspired with a state court clerk and the state court judge who

presided over his case. The defendants have moved to dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

In deciding a motion to dismiss, I employ a two-step

approach. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1,

12 (1st Cir. 2011). First, I screen the complaint for

statements that “merely offer legal conclusions couched as fact

or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations

omitted). A claim consisting of little more than “allegations

that merely parrot the elements of the cause of action” may be

dismissed. Id. Second, I credit as true all non-conclusory

factual allegations and the reasonable inferences drawn from

those allegations, and then determine if the claim is plausible.

Id. The plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact

to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” of illegal conduct. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The “make-or-break standard” is that

those allegations and inferences, taken as true, “must state a

plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.”

Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep’t of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 29

(1st Cir. 2010); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level . . . .”).

Stanton’s amended complaint does not come close to

satisfying the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Although he bases his

claim on a charge of conspiracy, he pleads no facts to support

his conclusory assertions. Instead, he points to what he claims

are obviously illegal actions by the state court actors and

argues that the defendants must have joined in the conspiracy

because they were the beneficiaries of the state actors’ illegal 2 actions. This is simply not sufficient to support a viable

conspiracy claim.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 16) is granted.

SO ORDERED.

/s/Paul Barbadoro Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge July 9, 2014

cc: Charles Stanton, pro se William Saturley, Esq.