Stanton v. Galipeau

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJanuary 14, 2022
Docket3:20-cv-00640
StatusUnknown

This text of Stanton v. Galipeau (Stanton v. Galipeau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanton v. Galipeau, (N.D. Ind. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER A. STANTON,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-640 DRL-MGG

JOHN GALIPEAU et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Christopher A. Stanton, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case on two claims. ECF 17. He is proceeding “against Warden John Galipeau, Captain Gary Lewis, Unit Team Manager John Salyer, Unit Team Manager Sonnenberg (first name unknown), Deputy Warden Gann (first name unknown), and Ms. Johnston (first name unknown) in their personal capacities for monetary damages for denying the plaintiff adequate clothing, showers, and sanitation in violation of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. at 4. He is also proceeding “against Warden John Galipeau in his official capacity for permanent injunctive relief related to providing the plaintiff with adequate clothing, showers, and sanitary living conditions as required by the Eighth Amendment[.]” Id. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Mr. Stanton did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit. ECF 27. Mr. Stanton filed a response, and the defendants filed a reply. ECF 31, 32. The summary judgment motion is fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Prisoners are prohibited from bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015).

The law takes a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, “unless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002). However, inmates are only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are available. Woodford v. Ngo,

548 U.S. 81, 102 (2006). The availability of a remedy is not a matter of what appears on paper but rather whether the process was in actuality available for the prisoner to pursue. Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, when prison staff hinder an inmate’s ability to use the administrative process, administrative remedies are not considered available. Id. In essence, “[p]rison officials may not take unfair advantage of the

exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Mr. Stanton is proceeding against the defendants in this case on two claims, each of which contain three sub-claims. Specifically, Mr. Stanton is proceeding on (1) one claim

for monetary damages, and (2) one claim for injunctive relief, both of which argue the defendants denied him adequate (a) clothing, (b) hot water, and (c) sanitary living conditions. See ECF 17. Because the exhaustion analysis is different for each sub-claim, each sub-claim will be addressed in turn. A. Clothing. Mr. Stanton is proceeding against the defendants on one claim for monetary

damages and one claim for injunctive relief for denying him adequate clothing. ECF 17 at 4. Specifically, Mr. Stanton alleged in his complaint that he had been forced to wear the same uniform for up to two months at a time. ECF 16 at 3. The prison’s Grievance Specialist attests Mr. Stanton did not submit any grievances regarding having to wear the same uniform for extended periods of time. ECF

27-1 at 6. In his response, Mr. Stanton provides evidence he submitted several informal grievances regarding being forced to wear the same uniform, but he does not allege or provide any evidence he ever submitted a formal grievance regarding his clothing. See ECF 31, ECF 31-1. Thus, because it is undisputed Mr. Stanton did not submit any formal grievances alleging the defendants denied him adequate clothing, the undisputed facts

show Mr. Stanton did not exhaust his clothing sub-claims prior to filing this lawsuit. See ECF 27-2 at 3 (the Offender Grievance Process requires offenders to complete three steps before filing a lawsuit: (1) a formal attempt at resolution; (2) a written appeal to the warden; and (3) a written appeal to the Department Grievance Manager); Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023 (“unless the prisoner completes the administrative process by following the rules the state has established for that process, exhaustion has not occurred”); Maddox v. Love,

655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (observing that the purpose of the grievance process is to alert officials to a problem so that corrective action can be taken). Summary judgment is warranted in favor of the defendants on Mr. Stanton’s clothing sub-claims. B. Hot Water. Mr. Stanton is proceeding against the defendants on one claim for monetary damages and one claim for injunctive relief for denying him hot water. ECF 17 at 4.

Specifically, Mr. Stanton alleged in his complaint that he had no hot water in his cell or in his shower. ECF 16 at 3. The defendants provide evidence that, on June 3, 2020, Mr. Stanton submitted a formal grievance asserting his shower and his cell did not have hot water. ECF 27-1 at 6; 27-4 at 1. The prison’s Grievance Specialist has no record of ever having responded to this

grievance. ECF 27-1 at 6. Moreover, the prison’s Grievance Specialist attests Mr. Stanton did not follow up regarding this grievance or attempt to appeal the grievance. Id. at 7. Because Mr. Stanton does not dispute these facts, the court accepts them as undisputed. See ECF 31. Here, because it is undisputed that (1) the Grievance Specialist never responded

to Mr. Stanton’s June 3 grievance, and (2) Mr. Stanton did not follow up or appeal this grievance, the undisputed facts show Mr. Stanton did not exhaust his June 3 grievance. Specifically, the Offender Grievance Process provides that “[i]f an offender does not receive either a receipt or a rejected form from the Offender Grievance Specialist within ten (10) business days of submitting it, the offender shall notify the Offender Grievance Specialist of that fact[.]” ECF 27-2 at 9. Moreover, the Offender Grievance Process

provides that “[i]f the offender receives no grievance response within twenty (20) business days of the Offender Grievance Specialist’s receipt of the grievance, the offender may appeal as though the grievance had been denied.” Id. at 11. Thus, because it is undisputed Mr. Stanton did not notify the Grievance Specialist that he did not receive a “receipt” or “rejected form” within ten business days of submitting his June 3 grievance, and did not appeal the grievance after twenty days passed without any response, the

undisputed facts show Mr. Stanton did not exhaust his June 3 grievance. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023. Mr.

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Related

Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Maddox v. Love
655 F.3d 709 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Marshall King v. Robert McCarty
781 F.3d 889 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)

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Stanton v. Galipeau, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanton-v-galipeau-innd-2022.