Stanton v. Aramark

District Court, N.D. Indiana·Decided May 3, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-00666·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER A. STANTON,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:20-CV-666-JD-MGG

JOHN GALIPEAU, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER Christopher A. Stanton, an inmate at Westville Correctional Facility (“Westville”) proceeding without a lawyer, seeks preliminary injunctive relief related to his need for a diabetic diet. (ECF 12.) The court ordered a response from the Warden at Westville, which has now been received. (ECF 25.) As outlined in the screening order, Mr. Stanton alleges he is being given an improper diet that does not meet his needs as a diabetic. (ECF 11.) He was permitted to proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim for money damages against Dr. Andrew Liaw for allegedly taking him off the diabetic diet, as well as on a claim for injunctive relief against the Warden related to his ongoing need for a proper medical diet. (Id. at 8.) The court dismissed a number of his other claims, including his demand to be served a diet free of all soy-based products. (Id. at 2-7.) At present, he seeks a preliminary injunction requiring medical staff to place him on a “proper diabetic diet” that includes “low simple carbohydrates,” “no soy bi-products,” and requires him to be served “real meat.” (ECF 12 at 8.) “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of

persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (citation omitted). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show: (1) he will suffer irreparable harm before the final resolution of his claims; (2) available remedies at law are inadequate; and (3) he has a likelihood of success on the merits. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 323–24 (7th Cir. 2015). If these elements are satisfied, the court then “weighs the competing harms to the parties if an injunction is granted or denied and

also considers the public interest.” Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2013). An injunction ordering the defendant to take an affirmative act rather than merely refrain from specific conduct is “cautiously viewed and sparingly issued.” Graham v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 130 F.3d 293, 295 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Additionally, in the prison context, the court’s ability to grant injunctive relief is significantly circumscribed; any

remedial injunctive relief “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right.” Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The court must also bear in mind that “[p]rison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions

they manage.” Id. at 683 (citation omitted). Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to adequate medical care, although they are “not entitled to demand specific care,” Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Rather, they are entitled to “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” Forbes, 112 F.3d at 267.

Mere disagreement with a medical professional does not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, the court must “defer to medical professionals’ treatment decisions unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, inmates are entitled to food adequate to meet their dietary needs, but they

are not entitled to the food of their choosing, or to “food that is tasty or even appetizing.” Williams v. Berge, 102 F. App’x 506, 507 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2017). The Warden argues that Mr. Stanton is receiving an adequate diet and is not entitled to a preliminary injunction. (ECF 25.) The response and attached records reflect

that Mr. Stanton suffers from certain chronic conditions, including diabetes and major depression, for which he takes medication.1 (See ECF 25-2 at 1-31.) On June 5, 2020, Dr. Liaw ordered that Mr. Stanton receive an 1,800 calorie diabetic diet with a diabetic snack. (ECF 25-3 at 1.) On November 5, 2020, Mr. Stanton requested to be restored to a normal diet, and Dr. Liaw approved the change. (ECF 25-1 ¶ 9; ECF 25-2 at 1-4.) On

November 24, 2020, Dr. Liaw noted that Mr. Stanton’s diabetes was “improving,” and

1 Medical records reflect that he has also been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder. (ECF 25-2 at 7.) his A1C2 had improved from 9.7 percent to 8.7 in recent months. (ECF 25-2 at 6.) Dr. Liaw noted that Mr. Stanton asked to be placed back on the diabetic diet because he did

not like how early the regular breakfast trays arrived. Specifically, Dr. Liaw noted Mr. Stanton’s concern that “because if he is on a ‘regular diet,’ he reports his AM meals [are] arriving 4-5 am, but if he is on the [diabetic diet], it arrives closer to 6 am.” (Id.) Dr. Liaw declined to alter Mr. Stanton’s diet for this reason, particularly since he had just changed diets a few weeks earlier. (Id. at 5.) Dr. Liaw also noted that Mr. Stanton had engaged in “multiple hunger strikes . . . in the past few months.” (Id. at 7.) Dr. Liaw

concluded that “we will not make any changes to his diet for a period of 90 days since his last diet change,” and that “[u]nless there is a clear medical indication,” there would be no further diet changes. (Id. at 5.) Following this visit, Mr. Stanton began refusing blood sugar checks, insulin, and his other medications. (Id. at 12-18.) On November 26, 2020, the nurse noted that he was

refusing his blood sugar check and insulin against medical advice. (Id. at 12.) The same thing occurred on November 29, 2020. (Id. at 14.) On November 30, 2020, during morning medication rounds he again refused a blood sugar check and his insulin, and the nurse noted that he said he would “continue to refuse medical care until all his complaints are addressed properly.” (Id. at 16.) He was seen around 6:00 p.m. that same

day by nursing staff and allowed his blood sugar level to be taken. (Id. at 18.) The level

2 An A1C test “measures your average blood glucose, or blood sugar, level over the past 3 months.” A1C tests are used both to diagnose diabetes and to see how well the condition is being managed. An A1C below 5.7 percent is considered normal. See https://medlineplus.gov/a1c.html (last visited April 29, 2021). registered as high, and the nurse “explained how serious that is and . . . the damage that could be done.” (Id. at 19.) However, Mr. Stanton still refused his insulin and other

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