Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC
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Opinion
Dismiss and Opinion Filed December 13, 2024
In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00091-CV
STANSLY MAPONGA AND CHRISTINA MAPONGA, Appellants V. AKROM ENTERPRISES LLC, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 002-03818-2023
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Pedersen, III Opinion by Chief Justice Burns This appeal challenges the trial court’s judgment in a forcible detainer suit
awarding appellee landlord possession of certain property, unpaid rent, and court
costs. Asserting the issues of possession and damages, and therefore the appeal,
have become moot because appellants–the tenants–have been evicted from the
property and the judgment has been released, appellee has filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion to the extent we vacate
the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case as moot. A case becomes moot if the controversy between the parties ceases to exist at
any stage of the legal proceedings. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d
732, 737 (Tex. 2005). An appellate court is prohibited from deciding moot
controversies, and when a case becomes moot on appeal, the appellate court must
set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case. See Marshall v. Housing
Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785, 790 (Tex. 2006); Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).
A forcible detainer action is filed by a landlord to obtain possession of real
property when the tenant refuses to surrender possession after proper demand. See
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002, 24.004. At issue, then, in a forcible detainer suit
for purposes of mootness is the right to actual possession of the property and any
damages. See id. §§ 24.0051, 24.006; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785.
When the tenant is evicted from the property, the issue of possession becomes
moot unless the tenant has a potentially meritorious claim of right to possession such
as by way of an unexpired lease agreement. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. And when
damages are awarded and the judgment is released, the damages issue becomes moot
as the release discharges the tenant of his monetary obligations under the judgment.
See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis, 627 S.W.3d 713, 740 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2021, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (“The unconditional release of a
judgment operates as a total relinquishment of all the creditor’s rights in the
judgment and a complete discharge of the debt created by the judgment).
–2– In response to appellee’s motion, appellants complain of “fundamental errors
of law” by the trial judge including exclusion of evidence and fraudulent statements
in the final judgment, deprivation of property rights, emotional distress, financial
hardship, and damage to their reputation. They do not, however, dispute they have
been evicted from the property or that appellee has released the judgment, and they
do not contend they have a right to current, actual possession of the property.
From a review of the record and with no dispute by appellants that they have
been evicted and no claim by them of a right to actual possession of the property, we
agree with appellee that the possession issue has become moot. The record includes
a copy of the parties’ lease agreement, and the agreement reflects the lease expired
in May 2024. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. And from a review of the release
of judgment, a file-stamped copy of which is attached as an exhibit to appellee’s
motion, we also agree with appellee that the damages issue has become moot. See
Reavis, 627 S.W.3d at 740. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s final judgment
and dismiss the case and all pending motions as moot.1 See id. at 790.
/Robert D. Burns, III// 240091f.p05 ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE
1 In the interest of justice, we have also reviewed appellants’ brief on the merits. Their complaints there, however, concern the deposit and late fees provisions under the lease; the conduct of appellee, appellee’s counsel, and the constables who served the writ of possession; and alleged constitutional and civil rights violations. –3– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
STANSLY MAPONGA AND On Appeal from the County Court at CHRISTINA MAPONGA, Law No. 2, Collin County, Texas Appellants Trial Court Cause No. 002-03818- 2023. No. 05-24-00091-CV V. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns, Justices Molberg and AKROM ENTERPRISES LLC, Pedersen, III participating. Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial court’s final judgment and DISMISS the case.
Judgment entered this 13th day of December, 2024.
–4–
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