Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedDecember 13, 2024
Docket05-24-00091-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC (Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC, (Tex. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Dismiss and Opinion Filed December 13, 2024

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00091-CV

STANSLY MAPONGA AND CHRISTINA MAPONGA, Appellants V. AKROM ENTERPRISES LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 002-03818-2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Molberg, and Justice Pedersen, III Opinion by Chief Justice Burns This appeal challenges the trial court’s judgment in a forcible detainer suit

awarding appellee landlord possession of certain property, unpaid rent, and court

costs. Asserting the issues of possession and damages, and therefore the appeal,

have become moot because appellants–the tenants–have been evicted from the

property and the judgment has been released, appellee has filed a motion to dismiss

the appeal. For the reasons that follow, we grant the motion to the extent we vacate

the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case as moot. A case becomes moot if the controversy between the parties ceases to exist at

any stage of the legal proceedings. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d

732, 737 (Tex. 2005). An appellate court is prohibited from deciding moot

controversies, and when a case becomes moot on appeal, the appellate court must

set aside the trial court’s judgment and dismiss the case. See Marshall v. Housing

Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785, 790 (Tex. 2006); Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999).

A forcible detainer action is filed by a landlord to obtain possession of real

property when the tenant refuses to surrender possession after proper demand. See

TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.002, 24.004. At issue, then, in a forcible detainer suit

for purposes of mootness is the right to actual possession of the property and any

damages. See id. §§ 24.0051, 24.006; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 785.

When the tenant is evicted from the property, the issue of possession becomes

moot unless the tenant has a potentially meritorious claim of right to possession such

as by way of an unexpired lease agreement. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. And when

damages are awarded and the judgment is released, the damages issue becomes moot

as the release discharges the tenant of his monetary obligations under the judgment.

See Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Reavis, 627 S.W.3d 713, 740 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2021, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (“The unconditional release of a

judgment operates as a total relinquishment of all the creditor’s rights in the

judgment and a complete discharge of the debt created by the judgment).

–2– In response to appellee’s motion, appellants complain of “fundamental errors

of law” by the trial judge including exclusion of evidence and fraudulent statements

in the final judgment, deprivation of property rights, emotional distress, financial

hardship, and damage to their reputation. They do not, however, dispute they have

been evicted from the property or that appellee has released the judgment, and they

do not contend they have a right to current, actual possession of the property.

From a review of the record and with no dispute by appellants that they have

been evicted and no claim by them of a right to actual possession of the property, we

agree with appellee that the possession issue has become moot. The record includes

a copy of the parties’ lease agreement, and the agreement reflects the lease expired

in May 2024. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. And from a review of the release

of judgment, a file-stamped copy of which is attached as an exhibit to appellee’s

motion, we also agree with appellee that the damages issue has become moot. See

Reavis, 627 S.W.3d at 740. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s final judgment

and dismiss the case and all pending motions as moot.1 See id. at 790.

/Robert D. Burns, III// 240091f.p05 ROBERT D. BURNS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

1 In the interest of justice, we have also reviewed appellants’ brief on the merits. Their complaints there, however, concern the deposit and late fees provisions under the lease; the conduct of appellee, appellee’s counsel, and the constables who served the writ of possession; and alleged constitutional and civil rights violations. –3– Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT

STANSLY MAPONGA AND On Appeal from the County Court at CHRISTINA MAPONGA, Law No. 2, Collin County, Texas Appellants Trial Court Cause No. 002-03818- 2023. No. 05-24-00091-CV V. Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burns, Justices Molberg and AKROM ENTERPRISES LLC, Pedersen, III participating. Appellee

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, we VACATE the trial court’s final judgment and DISMISS the case.

Judgment entered this 13th day of December, 2024.

–4–

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Related

In Re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc.
166 S.W.3d 732 (Texas Supreme Court, 2005)
Marshall v. Housing Authority of San Antonio
198 S.W.3d 782 (Texas Supreme Court, 2006)
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones
1 S.W.3d 83 (Texas Supreme Court, 1999)

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Stansly Maponga, Christina Maponga v. AKRom Enterprises LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stansly-maponga-christina-maponga-v-akrom-enterprises-llc-texapp-2024.