Stansbury v. Helm-Woulard

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 26, 2025
• Docket: N24C-06-074 CLS
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BRENDA LEE STANSBURY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N24C-06-074 CLS ROLANDA HELM-WOULARD and ) BARRY SECURITY, ) ) Defendants. )

Submitted: February 21, 2025 Decided: March 26, 2025

ORDER

Having considered Defendant Universal Protection Service, LLC dba Allied

Universal Security Services’ (“Defendant”)1 Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff Brenda

Lee Stansbury’s Amended Complaint and Response to the Motion, it appears to the

Court the following:2

1 Defendant is named as Barry Security by Plaintiff. 2 The facts described here are drawn from the Amended Complaint and all documents the parties incorporated by reference. The Court accepts those facts solely for the purpose of ruling on the Motion.

1 1. On June 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint,3 which was later amended

on November 13, 2024.4 The Amended Complaint, though brief in its assertions,

alleges that Defendants “illegally” entered her apartment “without notification.”5

2. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was renting Apartment

2H at Luther Tower II in Wilmington, Delaware at the time of the alleged incident.6

During her tenancy, she noticed that “on several occasions,” various “items [were]

removed from the apartment.”7

3. On January 10, 2025, instead of filing an Answer, Defendant moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).8 Specifically, it argues

that the Amended Complaint fails to show: (1) Plaintiff had “exclusive” possession

of the apartment; (2) Defendants entered without permission from the property

owner; and (3) that Plaintiff suffered any damage resulting from the purported entry.9

Plaintiff filed her response to the Motion on February 21, 2025.10

3 See generally D.I. 1 (“Compl.”). 4 See generally D.I. 4 (“Am. Compl.”). 5 See id. 6 See id. 7 Id. 8 See generally Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Universal Protection Services, LLC dba Allied Universal Security Services, incorrectly named as Barry Security, D.I. 20 (“MTD”). 9 Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 10 See generally Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, D.I. 22.

2 4. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court (i) accepts all well-pled

factual allegations as true, (ii) accepts even vague allegations as well-pled if they

give the opposing party notice of the claim, (iii) draws all reasonable inferences in

favor of the non-moving party, and (iv) only dismisses a case where the non-moving

party would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of

circumstances.11 The Court does not, however, accept “conclusory allegations that

lack specific supporting factual allegations.”12

5. The Court acknowledges that pro se litigants’ submissions are to be

viewed with more forgiving eyes.13 A liberal reading of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint avers one count of trespass.14

6. To establish a prima facie case of trespass, Plaintiff bears the burden to

show that: “(1) the plaintiff must have lawful possession of the land; (2) the

defendant must have entered onto the plaintiff’s land without consent or privilege;

and (3) [] damages.”15

11 See ET Aggregator, LLC v. PFJE AssetCo Hldgs. LLC, 2023 WL 8535181, at *6 (Del. Super. Dec. 8, 2023). 12 Id. (quoting Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998)). 13 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Erickson v. Pardis. 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 14 A complaint needs to “put[] the opposing party on notice of the claim being brought against it.” Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1995) (citing Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Univ. of Del., 269 A.2d 52, 58 (Del. 1970)). Here, Defendant “[presumes]” that the Complaint is alleging trespass. MTD ¶ 3. 15 Williams v. Manning, 2009 WL 960670, at *8 (Del. Super. Mar. 13, 2009) (citing Cochran v. City of Wilmington, 77 A. 963 (Del. Super. 1908)).

3 7. For the first element, Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff was renting

the apartment.16 Instead, it argues that Plaintiff “does not have ‘exclusive’

possession of the premise in question.”17 Defendant does not cite to any case law to

support this contention regarding a tenant’s possessory rights. Rather, it appears to

the Court that the “exclusive[ness]” concept stems from State ex rel. Jennings v.

Monsanto Co.18

8. State ex rel. Jennings is a case concerning the State’s authority to bring

an action for trespass based on alleged PCB contamination.19 That court addressed

whether the State had “standing” to bring a trespass claim on behalf of its citizens.20

The situation here is fundamentally different.

9. A residential tenant has a direct leasehold interest that confers

possessory rights. Delaware law has long recognized that a tenant in actual and

lawful possession may bring a claim for trespass.21

“Damages may be sought for a wrongful act of a third person that interferes with or disturbs the tenant’s possession, use, or enjoyment of the premises. . . . The right of action for injury to the possession belongs

16 “Thus, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was renting the apartment.” MTD ¶ 4. 17 Id.; see also id. ¶ 5. 18 Id. ¶ 3 (citing State ex rel. Jennings v. Monsanto Co., 2022 WL 2663220 (Del. Super. July 11, 2022), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 299 A.3d 372 (Del. 2023)). 19 See State ex rel. Jennings, 2022 WL 2663220. 20 Id. at *4–6. 21 Jasinski v. Singer, 2024 WL 1257999, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 2024).

4 exclusively to the lessee, …because the lessee has the exclusive right of possession.”22

Plaintiff, therefore, has adequately presented the first element for the claim of

trespass.

10. For the second element, again, citing no case law in support, Defendant

argues that the Amended Complaint fails to show “that Barry Security did not have

permission from the owner to enter the apartment.”23 This argument is unavailing.

11. A plaintiff needs only demonstrate “himself in possession merely of the

property. . . .”24 It is defendant, who needs to prove “on his part a title to the

premises, or a right otherwise, as by license or permission, to make such entry.”25

Drawing all reasonable inference in favor of Plaintiff, as the Court must at this stage,

the Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges an unauthorized entry without consent

or privilege.

12. Lastly, for the third element, Plaintiff listed items that she noticed were

removed from her apartment.26 While Defendant contends that Plaintiff “fails to

allege any damages she suffered,”27 the Court finds that the allegation of missing

22 Id. (citations omitted). 23 MTD ¶ 5. 24 Phillips v. Brittingham, 25 Del. 173, 77 A. 964, 964 (Del. Super. Ct. 1910). 25 Id. 26 See Compl. 27 MTD ¶ 4.

5 personal property constitutes a sufficiently pled claim of damages. The loss of

personal property is a cognizable harm that satisfies the damages element at the

pleading stage.

13. In viewing the pleadings in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and

drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated

a claim for trespass upon which relief could be granted. Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Calvin Scott Calvin L. Scott, Jr. Judge