Stansbury v. Helm-Woulard and Barry Security

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: N24C-06-074 CLS
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BRENDA LEE STANSBURY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N24C-06-074 CLS ROLANDA HELM-WOULARD and ) BARRY SECURITY, ) ) Defendants. ) )

Date Submitted: May 12, 2026 Date Decided: May 20, 2026

Upon Consideration of Defendant Universal Protection Service, LLC d/b/a Allied Universal Security Services Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTED.

Upon consideration of Defendant Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s Motion for Summary Judgment, GRANTED.

ORDER

Brenda Lee Stansbury, Pro se Plaintiff.

Loreto P. Rufo, Esquire of RAWLE & HENDERSON, LLP, Attorney for Universal Protection Service, LLC, incorrectly named Barry Security.

Josiah R. Wolcott, Esquire of CONNOLLY GALLAGHER LLP, Attorney for Defendant Rolanda Helm-Woulard.

SCOTT, J. Having considered Defendant Universal Protection Service, LLC’s

(“Universal”), incorrectly named Barry Security, Motion for Summary Judgment,1

Defendant Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s (“Helm-Woulard”) Motion for Summary

Judgment,2 and pro se Plaintiff Brenda Lee Stansbury’s (“Plaintiff”) Response,3 it

appears to the Court that:

1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint4 pro se—i.e., as a self-represented litigant—on

June 12, 2024, which was later amended on November 13, 2024.5 The Amended

Complaint, though brief in its assertions, alleges that Defendants “illegally” entered

her apartment “without notification.”6

2. According to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was renting Apartment 2H at

Luther Tower II in Wilmington, Delaware at the time of the alleged incident. 7

During her tenancy, she noticed “on several occasions,” that various “items [were]

removed from her apartment.”8

3. On January 13, 2025, Universal filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state

a claim for trespass.9 Plaintiff, consistent with the Briefing Schedule, filed a

1 Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 35. 2 Def. Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 37; Universal and Helm-Woulard are collectively referred to as “Defendants” throughout this Order when appropriate. 3 Pro se Pl. Brenda Lee Stansbury’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mots. for Summ. J., D.I. 39. 4 See generally Compl., D.I. 1. 5 See generally Am. Compl., D.I. 4. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 20. Response to the Motion to Dismiss on February 21, 2025.10 The Court issued an

Order on March 26, 2025, denying Universal’s Motion to Dismiss.11

4. Plaintiff issued a Letter to the Court on April 22, 2025, asking the Court to

amend the Amended Complaint.12 Defendants filed Answers to the Amended

Complaint and discovery began.

5. Universal served on Plaintiff interrogatories and requests for production on

July 28, 2025, via hand delivery.13 On September 12, 2025, Universal sent Plaintiff

a letter regarding outstanding discovery requests, and asked Plaintiff to complete

and return the requests as soon as possible.14 On October 29, 2025, Helm-Woulard

served on Plaintiff interrogatories and requests for production via first class mail.15

6. By November 2, 2025, Plaintiff had not responded to Universal’s written

discovery requests, so Universal filed a Motion to Compel.16

7. On November 3, 2026, Universal filed a Notice of Deposition to take

Plaintiff’s deposition on December 1, 2025 at 2:00 PM, which was mailed and hand-

10 Briefing Schedule, D.I. 21; Pro se Pl.’s Resp. to Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.I. 22. 11 Stansbury v. Helm-Woulard, 2025 WL 929351, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 26, 2025). 12 Pro se Pl.’s Letter to the Court, D.I. 26. 13 Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Notice of Serv. of Interrogs. and Req. for Produc. Directed to Pl., D.I. 28; Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. 33, Ex. A. 14 Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Letter to Pl. Regarding Outstanding Discovery Req., D.I. 30. 15 Def. Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s Notice of Serv. of Interrogs. and Req. for Produc. Directed to Pl., D.I. 32. 16 See generally Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. to Compel. delivered to Plaintiff.17 Plaintiff did not respond to Universal’s Motion to Compel

or attend the deposition.

8. On December 5, 2025, Universal filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.18

Helm-Woulard also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on December 9, 2025,

asserting the same arguments as Universal.19

9. Plaintiff, consistent with the Briefing Schedule, timely responded to

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment on January 12, 2026.20 Aside from

what appears to be Plaintiff’s permission for the Court to proceed with the

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff did not provide a substantive

response to Defendants’ arguments.21

10. Upon review of Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, the Court

became aware of Universal’s unopposed Motion to Compel. Consequently, on

January 21, 2026, the Court granted Universal’s Motion to Compel and ordered

Plaintiff to provide complete responses to the interrogatories within 20 days of the

Order.22 On February 3, 2026, the Court notified Plaintiff that it granted Universal’s

Motion to Compel.23

17 Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Notice of Deposition, D.I. 34. 18 See generally Def. Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. for Summ. J. 19 See generally Def. Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s Mot. for Summ. J. 20 See Briefing Schedule, D.I. 38; Pro se Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., D.I. 39. 21 Id. 22 Order Granting Universal Protection Serv., LLC’s Mot. to Compel, D.I. 40. 23 See Letter Issued to Pl., D.I. 41. 11. On March 3, 2026, after receiving no response from Plaintiff on the Motion

to Compel, Universal filed a letter requesting that the Court move forward with its

Motion for Summary Judgment.24

12. On April 21, 2026, the Court issued Plaintiff a Rule 41(e) Notice and

provided Plaintiff with 15 days to respond.25 Plaintiff has not responded to either

the Defendants or the Court, and the Rule 41(e) Notice was “[n]ot deliverable as

addressed.”26

13. On May 12, 2026, Defendants filed a letter asking the Court to move forward

and dismiss the action for want of prosecution because Plaintiff “has never

responded to discovery requests, ignored deposition notices, ignored the Court’s

[Orders], and failed to respond in any substance to Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment.”27

14. First, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment under Superior Court Civil

Rule 56 falls on the moving party to demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.”28 If the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the non-moving party must

24 See Letter Regarding State of Litig., D.I. 42. 25 Letter Issued by Judge Scott on April 21, 2026, D.I. 43. 26 Notice of Mail: Return to Sender. Not deliverable as addressed, D.I. 44. 27 Letter Regarding State of Litigation and the Court’s April 21, 2026 Letter, D.I. 45. 28 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). sufficiently establish the “existence of one or more genuine issues of material

fact.”29 Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute

or if “it seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the

application of the law to the circumstances.”30 “All facts and reasonable inferences

must be considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.”31

15. Defendants proffer that the Court should grant summary judgment because

Plaintiff has failed to provide evidence of her claim. The Court agrees. Because

there is no evidence to support her claim for trespass, there is no genuine issue of

material fact, and the Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

16. The Court also finds it appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim under Rule

41(e). Under Rule 41(e), the Court “may order an action dismissed, sua sponte, upon

notice of the Court, for failure of a party [to] diligently . . . prosecute the action, for

failure to comply with any rule, statute, or order of the Court, or for any other reason

deemed by the Court to be appropriate.” “The Court is mindful that, ‘[t]he sanction

of dismissal is severe and courts are and have been reluctant to apply it except as a

29 Quality Elec. Co., Inc. v. E. States Const. Serv., Inc., 663 A.2d 488, 1995 WL 379125, at *3–4 (Del. June 19, 1995) (TABLE); see also Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 681 (Del. 1979). 30 Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 469–70 (Del. 1962); see also CNH Indus. Am. LLC v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 2015 WL 3863225, at *1 (Del. Super. June 8, 2015). 31 Nutt v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., 517 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 1986) (citing Mechell v. Plamer, 343 A.2d 620, 621 (Del. 1975); Allstate Auto Leasing Co. v. Caldwell, 394 A.2d 748, 752 (Del. Super. 1978)). last resort.’”32 The duty to diligently prosecute, however, “falls upon the plaintiff,

not the court.”33

17. While the Court is sensitive to Plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant, it does

not absolve her duty to diligently prepare her case for trial or “risk dismissal for

failure to prosecute” so as not to “affect the substantive rights of the parties.”34 The

Delaware Supreme Court has instructed trial courts to consider the following factors

in dismissing a case under Rule 41(e):

(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.35

18. Applying these factors here, the Court concludes that dismissal is

appropriate. As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is personally responsible for litigating her

claim against Defendants. The Court and Defendants have been lenient,

accommodating, and provided Plaintiff with multiple opportunities to pursue her

claim. Plaintiff’s conduct is prejudicial to Defendants because they cannot

32 Bolden-Loat v. Main Event Ent., Inc., 2025 WL 262666, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 22, 2025) (quoting Drejka v. Hitchens Tire Serv. Inc., 15 A.3d 1221, 1224 (Del. 2010)). 33 Alston v. Maahs, 207 A.3d 564, 2019 WL 1220932, at *2 (Del. Mar. 14, 2019) (TABLE). 34 Bolden-Loat, 2025 WL 262666, at *3 (quoting Draper v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del. 2001); Maddox v. Isaacs, 2013 WL 2297030, at *2 (Del. Super. May 7, 2013)). 35 Drejka, 15 A.3d at 1224 (quoting Minna v. Energy Coal S.p.A., 984 A.2d 1210, 1215 (Del. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). adequately prepare a defense in a case that has not moved past the discovery stage

since the Complaint was filed close to two years ago. Plaintiff has a history of

dilatoriness because she has failed to comply with court orders and deadlines.

Although it does not appear that Plaintiff is acting in bad faith, she is willfully

choosing not to participate.36 The Court also finds that no other sanctions would be

effective here given the numerous attempts by both the Court and Defendants to

engage Plaintiff in the prosecution of her case. Finally, Plaintiff’s case lacks merit

because there is no evidence to support the allegations in the Amended Complaint

as discussed above. Hence, the Drejka factors weigh in favor of dismissing this case

under Rule 41(e).

19. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Universal Protection Service, LLC’s

Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, Rolanda Helm-Woulard’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED for failure to

prosecute.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Calvin Scott Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

36 See e.g., Bolden-Loat, 2025 WL 262666, at *3.