STANLEY v. WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES INC.

District Court, S.D. Indiana·Decided December 22, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00294·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

DAVID A. STANLEY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 2:20-cv-00294-JMS-MJD ) WEXFORD OF INDIANA, LLC, ) BYRD, ) ROBERTSON, ) ) Defendants. )

Order Denying Exhaustion Defense Following Pavey Hearing

Plaintiff David A. Stanley alleges that the defendants are deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that Dr. Byrd and Dr. Robertson are liable to him for medical malpractice under Indiana law. The defendants argue that Mr. Stanley's claims are barred because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing this civil action. A Pavey hearing was held to resolve the exhaustion issue. See Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2008). For the reasons explained in this Order, the Court finds that defendants Dr. Byrd and Wexford of Indiana, LLC (Wexford) have not met their burden of proof by establishing that the grievance process was available to Mr. Stanley and that he failed to complete that process before he filed this action. Accordingly, the defendants' exhaustion defense is denied, and this action shall proceed to the merits. I. Background Mr. Stanley, an Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility (Wabash Valley), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 8, 2020. Dkt. 2. Mr. Stanley alleges that a two-inch mass was detected on his left lung shortly after he arrived at the Reception Diagnostic Center on December 6, 2018. Dkt. 6. In February 2019, Mr. Stanley was transferred to Wabash Valley and was told by defendant Dr. Byrd that it was uncertain if Mr. Stanley had cancer. Id. A biopsy taken by an outside physician confirmed that Mr. Stanley had cancer. Id.

Mr. Stanley alleges that the defendant physicians denied or delayed his treatment. As a result, the mass grew, and his left lung was ultimately removed. Id. He alleges that defendant Wexford has a routine practice of withholding adequate treatment, inclusive of chemotherapy, due to costs considerations and to secure profits. Id. II. Applicable Law The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides, "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25 (2002). "[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or

some other wrong." Id. at 532 (citation omitted). The requirement to exhaust provides "that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2006) (citation omitted). Exhaustion of available administrative remedies "means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits)." Id. at 90. Proper use of the facility's grievance system requires a prisoner "to file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time [as] the prison's administrative rules require." Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). As the movant, the defendants bear the burden of establishing that the administrative remedies upon which they rely were available to the plaintiff. See Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, the defendants must establish that an administrative remedy was available and that [the plaintiff] failed to pursue it."). "[T]he

ordinary meaning of the word 'available' is 'capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which 'is accessible or may be obtained.'" Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) (internal quotation omitted). "[A]n inmate is required to exhaust those, but only those, grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of." Id. at 1859 (internal quotation omitted). Administrative remedies are primarily "unavailable" to prisoners where "affirmative misconduct" prevents prisoners from pursuing administrative remedies. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809 (remedies unavailable where prison officials "do not respond to a properly filed grievance"); see also Thomas, 787 F.3d at 847–48 (remedies unavailable where correctional officer tells prisoner that prisoner cannot file grievance when in fact prisoner can do so); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678,

680-86 (7th. Cir. 2006) (remedies unavailable where prisoner presents evidence that prison personnel have "denied [prisoner] grievance forms, threatened him, and solicited other inmates to attack him in retaliation for filing grievances"); Dale v. Lappin, 376 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (remedies unavailable where prison personnel prevent prisoner access to grievance forms). "[U]navailability" may also extend beyond "affirmative misconduct" to include omissions by prison personnel, particularly failing to inform the prisoner of the grievance process. See King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 895–96 (7th Cir. 2015). III. Pavey Hearing The Pavey hearing was held on June 28, 2021. Dkt. 71. Mr. Stanley appeared by videoconference, and he was ably represented by recruited counsel, John Kautzman.1 Counsel appeared on behalf of Dr. Byrd and Wexford. Dr. Robertson did not raise an exhaustion defense, but counsel was present at the hearing on his behalf.2 The parties' stipulated Exhibits 1-13 were

admitted. Mr. Stanley and witnesses Kelly Sweazey, Thomas Wellington, Mark Dunn, and Dale Richard testified. IV. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law The following facts are found by the Court to be true based on the evidence presented in the record and during the evidentiary hearing. A. IDOC Grievance Process

The IDOC maintains and recognizes only one Offender Grievance Process. See dkt. 19-2 (Offender Grievance Process 00-02-301, effective date April 1, 2020).3 The purpose of the Offender Grievance Process "is to provide a process where offenders committed to the [IDOC] may resolve concerns and complaints relating to their conditions of confinement." Id. at 1. The policy specifically states that medical care issues are among those that can be grieved through this process. Id. at 3.

1 The Court greatly appreciates the efforts of recruited counsel in representing Mr. Stanley for the purposes of filing his summary judgment response and for his representation at the Pavey hearing.

2 On December 3, 2020, counsel appeared for Dr. Robertson and filed a notice of suggestion of death informing the parties and the Court that Dr. Robertson died on or about November 11, 2020. Dkt.33; dkt. 34; dkt. 35. In this notice, counsel stated that they were not aware of an estate being opened for Dr. Robertson. Dkt. 35.

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STANLEY v. WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES INC., (S.D. Ind. 2021).

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