Stanley v. Laughter

590 S.E.2d 429, 162 N.C. App. 322, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 124
CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedJanuary 20, 2004
DocketNo. COA03-49
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 590 S.E.2d 429 (Stanley v. Laughter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanley v. Laughter, 590 S.E.2d 429, 162 N.C. App. 322, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

TYSON, Judge.

Gilbert J. Stanley and Dorothy H. Stanley (“plaintiffs”) appeal the trial court’s judgment granting Billy Laughter’s (“defendant”) motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence and dismissing the case with prejudice. We affirm.

I. Background

Sardonyx Investments, Inc. (“Sardonyx”) purchased a 118.62 acre tract of land from Fulton and Ruth Roper (“Ropers”). The Ropers retained an easement, sixty-foot wide, running through a portion of the northern section of the property sold to Sardonyx. Sardonyx subdivided 111.87 acres of the original 118.62 into six tracts of land, labeled Lots “A” through “F,” to create the Stirrup Downs Development (“development”) by survey dated 25 April 1989, and revised 29 May 1989. Sardonyx recorded a plat entitled, “Sardonyx Investments, Inc.” in the Polk County Registry on 3 June 1989. All six tracts of land are subject to the Declaration of Restrictions (“declaration”) recorded on 6 October 1992.

The remaining acreage, a 1.46 acre tract and a 5.29 acre tract, was not included in this subdivision. The 1.46 acre tract is located on the northern section of the original 118.62 acre tract and the 5.29 acre tract is located on the southern section. Both of these properties directly adjoin North Carolina Highway 9 (“Highway 9”).

Sardonyx established a thirty-foot (30) wide access road to the development known as Stirrup Downs Road (“the road”) on the plat. The road begins at Highway 9 and continues into the development. The road runs concurrently with the southern portion of the sixty-foot wide easement. Each of the six subdivided tracts of land is subject to and has a right of ingress, egress, and regress along the road. The declaration requires each property owner of Lots A through F to pay one-sixth of the cost of maintaining the road. The declaration makes no reference to the 1.46 acre tract or the 5.29 acre tract retained by Sardonyx.

[324]*324All of the land derives from a common source of title. Sardonyx conveyed to plaintiffs a 14.32 acre tract designated as Lot E of the recorded plat by deed recorded on 7 December 1992. The deed was expressly conveyed subject to the thirty-foot wide and the sixty-foot wide easements. Sardonyx conveyed to defendant a 16.65 acre tract designated as Lot F on the recorded plat. This lot was subject to the same easements as plaintiffs’ lot. Sardonyx also conveyed the 1.46 acre tract of land to defendant’s predecessors-in-title, John and Joyce Hart (“Harts”), and described the tract by incorporating the recorded plat map by reference. Defendant subsequently purchased this tract on 17 July 1999. No express language in the deed of the 1.46 acre tract granted the Harts use of the sixty-foot wide easement or the thirty-foot wide road. The deed, however, specifically referenced the plat map containing the easements. No language made the 1.46 acre tract subject to the declaration.

The plat clearly shows that the northern boundary of plaintiffs’ property runs to the middle of the sixty-foot wide easement and stops at the road. This line is labeled as line “C-D” on the plat map. There is a thirty-foot strip of land that runs from the northern portion of the road to the southern boundary of defendant’s 1.46 acre tract. This thirty-foot strip lies on the opposite side of the road from plaintiffs’ land and is contained within the boundaries of the sixty-foot wide easement. When defendant purchased Lot F on 17 July 1999, this thirty-foot strip of land contained a thick screen of trees and shrubs. Plaintiffs were provided privacy and seclusion from the other properties by these trees and anticipated that these trees would remain in place when they purchased Tract E.

During July of 2000, defendant removed the trees and shrubbery from his land and the thirty-foot strip of land in order to gain access to the sixty-foot wide easement from his 1.46 acre tract. In September of 2000, plaintiffs spoke to defendant’s lawyer concerning the trees and shrubbery removed from the thirty-foot strip of land. On 2 October 2000, plaintiffs notified defendant that defendant was not to use the land for access to the sixty-foot wide easement and demanded compensation for the trees and shrubs cut on the strip. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant alleging trespass, injury to real property, and negligence. At trial, defendant moved for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs’ evidence. Defendant’s motion was granted and plaintiffs’ cause of action was dismissed. Plaintiffs appeal.

[325]*325II. Issues

The issues are whether the trial court erred in: (1) granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict and finding that the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to all purchasers from Sardonyx Investments, Inc. and (2) failing to grant damages for the value of the trees and shrubbery removed by defendant.

TTT. Dedication bv Reference to Plat Map

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict and finding that the recording of the plat constituted a dedication of the sixty-foot wide easement to benefit all property shown on the recorded plat including the 1.46 acre tract owned by defendant. We disagree.

“The purpose of a motion for a directed verdict is to test the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury.” Freese v. Smith, 110 N.C. App. 28, 33, 428 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1993). “A motion for directed verdict, requires that the trial court consider the evidence in the fight most favorable to the non-movant, and determine whether the evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury.” Town of Highlands v. Edwards, 144 N.C. App. 363, 366, 548 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001). Only where the evidence, when considered in that fight, is insufficient to support a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor should defendant’s motion for a directed verdict be granted. Snow v. Power Co., 297 N.C. 591, 596, 256 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1979). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence in the non-movant’s favor, the motion must be denied. Freese, 110 N.C. App. at 33-34, 428 S.E.2d at 845.

Our Supreme Court, in Wofford v. Highway Commission, stated the general rule of dedication by plat reference and held,

where lots are sold and conveyed by reference to a map or plat which represents a division of a tract of land into subdivisions of streets and lots, such streets become dedicated to public use, and the purchaser of the lot or lots acquires the right to have all and each of the streets kept open.

263 N.C. 677, 683, 140 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1965). Our Supreme Court further held,

[i]t is a settled principle that if the owner of land, located within or without a city or town, has it subdivided and platted into lots [326]*326and streets, and sells and conveys the lots or any of them with reference to the plat, nothing else appearing, he thereby dedicates the streets, and all of them, to the use of the purchasers, and those claiming under them, and of the public.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Swaps, LLC v. ASL Props., Inc.
Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2014

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
590 S.E.2d 429, 162 N.C. App. 322, 2004 N.C. App. LEXIS 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanley-v-laughter-ncctapp-2004.