Stanley v. County of King

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedAugust 22, 2025
Docket24-5558
StatusUnpublished

This text of Stanley v. County of King (Stanley v. County of King) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanley v. County of King, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SLOAN STANLEY; JACINTA STANLEY, No. 24-5558 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellants, 2:24-cv-00108-JCC v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF KING; RANDE CHRISTIANSEN, Detective; NICHOLAS MEYST, Detective; JASON STOLT; GARY M. ERNSDORFF, Prosecutor; CITY OF SEATTLE,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges

Mother and son Sloan and Jacinta Stanley (“the Stanleys”), appeal the

dismissal of nine federal claims against the City of Seattle, King County (together

“Municipal Appellees”), Detectives Rande Christiansen, Jason Stolt, Nicholas

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Meyst, and prosecuting attorney Gary Ernsdorff (together “Individual Appellees”).

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and reverse

in part.

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule

12(b)(6).” Patterson v. Van Arsdel, 883 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2018). “We review

a decision by a district court to afford a public official or a municipality absolute or

qualified immunity de novo.” Botello v. Gammick, 413 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2005)

(collecting cases).

The Complaint alleges the probable cause certification “was built on false

statements” which the Individual Appellees deliberately or recklessly failed to

corroborate. Specifically, the Complaint points to alleged fabrications and Detective

Christiansen’s representation that Burleson lacked credibility. Accepting these

allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the Stanleys, these

false statements or omissions undermined the existence of probable cause in 2017.

See Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing the

district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 claim where plaintiff had adequately alleged

that his prosecution was based on false accusations). This is sufficient to state a

violation of Mr. Stanley’s constitutional rights under the color of state law by the

Individual Appellees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, we reverse the district

court’s dismissal of claims 1, 2, and 4 –9 and remand for further proceedings.

2 24-5558 The Complaint also sufficiently alleges that Prosecutor Ernsdorff is not

entitled to absolute immunity for his alleged actions outside the traditional role of a

prosecutor. Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Ernsdorff (1) questioned

“snitches and other witnesses,” (2) “shap[ed] the investigation,” and (3) coached

Detective Christiansen “to adeptly falsify his probable cause certification.” See

Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 275–76 (1993) (participating in

investigation); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 496 (1991) (providing legal advice to

law enforcement); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (executing probable

cause certification). Therefore, the claims against Ernsdorff based on these alleged

facts survive. However, where the Complaint alleges that Ernsdorff withheld Brady

material, or solicited perjury from Burleson at trial, Ernsdorff is absolutely immune.

See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 126.

The Complaint fails to plead adequately that either the Seattle Police

Department or the King County Prosecutors office had an unconstitutional policy,

practice, or custom. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead,

the Complaint alleges only one incident, which “is insufficient to demonstrate a

custom supporting Monell liability.” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d

1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,

824 (1985)). Insofar as the Complaint points to the King County policy on electronic

surveillance, it alleges no facts as to why this policy is unconstitutional or how it

3 24-5558 relates to the probable cause certification. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of the

claims against the Municipal Appellees.

Because we reverse the dismissal of most of the Stanleys’ federal claims, we

also reverse the district court’s dismissal of the state claims for lack of supplemental

jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. Each

party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

4 24-5558

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Related

City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle
471 U.S. 808 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Burns v. Reed
500 U.S. 478 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
509 U.S. 259 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Kalina v. Fletcher
522 U.S. 118 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Sarah Patterson v. James Van Arsdel
883 F.3d 826 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Trevino v. Gates
99 F.3d 911 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
Stanley v. County of King, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanley-v-county-of-king-ca9-2025.