Stanley v. Board of Professional Responsibility

640 S.W.2d 210, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 353
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 4, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 640 S.W.2d 210 (Stanley v. Board of Professional Responsibility) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanley v. Board of Professional Responsibility, 640 S.W.2d 210, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 353 (Tenn. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION

FONES, Chief Justice.

The Board of Professional Responsibility charged Harry Parker Stanley with preparation of usurious notes, the lending of money to a client without full disclosure, the failure to deal honestly and candidly with clients, the representation of both the victim and defendant in a criminal matter, incompetency for legal representation, and conflict of interest. The charges were based upon Stanley’s conduct in three separate episodes.

The charges, resulting in Stanley’s permanent disbarment, were heard by a hearing committee consisting of three lawyers practicing in District Two wherein Stanley resided and practiced. Stanley appealed to the Circuit Court of Anderson County, and upon the transcript made before the hearing committee consisting of 430 pages and additional proof consisting of 135 pages, Chancellor Wilkes Thrasher, sitting specially, affirmed the judgment of the hearing committee.

Stanley was thirty-three years old at the time of the circuit court hearing. He was admitted to the bar in April 1971, and entered practice with Jimmy D. Turner, in the City of Oak Ridge, Anderson County. Seven months later he opened his own office and has since practiced alone.

I.

John E. Newby was described by Stanley and Mrs. Shirley Newby as a friend and client of Stanley. Newby was a pharmacist, the owner of Union Prescription Shop in Oak Ridge. One of the witnesses testified that Newby’s hobby was spending money. His widow testified that he opened ten drug stores and one camera shop during the last fifteen years of his life and all failed except three; that he was a poor businessman and constantly in financial difficulty.

Stanley testified that beginning about four years before Newby’s death in December, 1978, he would lend Newby twenty, fifty or one hundred dollars and would be repaid promptly. Apparently Stanley would be given a note if the amount was as much as one hundred dollars with various items of personal property as collateral. Stanley testified, at one point in the record, that with respect to those loans, either no interest or ten percent interest was charged. Newby died on December 18, 1978. On December 22, 1978, Shirley New-[211]*211by filed suit against Stanley in the Circuit Court of Anderson County alleging that she and her late husband had borrowed money from Stanley and had given notes that were usurious on their face and that Stanley held jewelry, diamond rings, and other personal property valued in excess of ten thousand dollars, which was described in detail in the petition. She sought and obtained an order restraining Stanley from disposing of the property. The usurious notes were described in this record as follows:

1. A note dated August 22, 1978, in the principal sum of $560.00 bearing interest at twelve percent per annum with an additional ten percent penalty charge for late payment;
2. A note dated August 24, 1978, in the principal sum of $672.00 with interest at twelve percent plus an additional ten percent penalty for late payment.
3. A note dated August 30, 1978, in the principal sum of $2,446.50 bearing interest at twelve percent per annum with an additional ten percent penalty for late payment;
4. A note dated September 30, 1978, in the principal sum of $2,563.00 bearing interest at twelve percent per annum with the same penalty for late payment as the preceding notes; and
5. A note dated September 8, 1978, in the principal sum of $7,641.00 bearing interest at the rate of fifteen percent per annum.

The maximum interest rate at the dates of each of said notes was ten percent per annum. Mrs. Newby testified that Stanley supplied the money for the principal amount of each of those notes. Stanley testified that the money loaned belonged to his mother. He admitted that he negotiated all the loans, prepared the notes, transmitted the funds to Newby, and made the collections that were made.

On January 12, 1979, Mrs. Newby’s lawsuit against Stanley was settled by entry of an order reciting that Stanley would return all of the property held as collateral to Mrs. Newby and neither party would file or prosecute any suit based upon notes or security instruments executed by Mr. or Mrs. Newby payable to Stanley or his mother. No other terms of the settlement were revealed either in the order or in the testimony of the witnesses in this case.

Stanley’s defense was that the interest charge that exceeded ten percent was a service charge. Stanley testified that, at Newby’s insistence, Stanley obligated himself to notify Newby a few days in advance of the due dates of payments on the respective notes, and “then appear in person at his place of business in order to collect payment.” He further said that Newby “could mail a payment and mail in ten percent at any time.” No such terms appeared in the notes and there was no evidence that New-by mailed in payments at only ten percent interest.

Stanley testified that he was a frequent customer and friendly visitor of Newby’s at the Union Prescription Shop. Mrs. Newby also testified that Stanley frequently dropped in the shop. The chancellor found that any services rendered by Stanley in the respects mentioned were of nominal value, if any, and would not purge the transactions of usury. There was absolutely no corroboration, circumstantial or otherwise to support the service charge arrangement.

At another point in the record Stanley suggested that some of the excess interest beyond the legal rate was charged in the larger notes because in prior years Stanley had made “out of pocket loans” of twenty, fifty or one hundred dollars and charged no interest whatsoever.

Stanley also insisted there was no conflict of interest involved in the usurious loan transactions with his client, because there was no lawyer-client relationship, as to those transactions. That conclusion was based on Stanley’s testimony that he made the loans to decedent in the role of a friend, not a lawyer; that decedent did not expect or receive any “independent advice” from Stanley in connection with the loan transactions and nothing was misrepresented or withheld from Newby. That was also a patently spurious attempt to avoid the con[212]*212sequences of a lawyer entering into an illegal transaction with a client wherein the lawyer and the client had conflicting interests.

II.

The next episode involved two clients, Janet Whittlesay and her nineteen-year-old friend, Ronnie Green.

According to an Oak Ridge police report that was introduced into evidence, Janet Whittlesay reported the theft of stereo equipment, albums and clothes, valued at approximately seven hundred dollars from the residence where she lived with one Ronald Stevens. After reporting the theft she discovered that her friend Ronnie Green had taken the items and removed them to his home in Cleveland, Tennessee. Whittle-say recovered all of the property and informed the police that she did not want to prosecute, whereupon someone in the police department allegedly threatened her with prosecution for obstructing justice and withholding information.

Ms. Whittlesay sought legal advice from Stanley who testified he did a “limited amount of legal research on the matter of obstruction of justice.” In addition, he made two visits to the Oak Ridge Police Department to Sergeant Faust, who apparently made the threat to Ms. Whittlesay.

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Bluebook (online)
640 S.W.2d 210, 1982 Tenn. LEXIS 353, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanley-v-board-of-professional-responsibility-tenn-1982.