COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Causey and Bernhard UNPUBLISHED
STANLEY UCHENNA NWOKE MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0831-24-4 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY OCTOBER 28, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY Robert P. Coleman, Judge
(Danielle S. Brown; Danielle S. Brown Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Allison M. Mentch, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Stanley Uchenna Nwoke of four counts of
grand larceny, four counts of larceny with intent to sell, two counts of obtaining money by false
pretenses, and one count of petit larceny. By final order dated May 9, 2024, the trial court
sentenced Nwoke to 29 years of incarceration, with 27 years and 6 months suspended, for an active
sentence of a year and a half. On appeal, Nwoke’s assignments of error fall into two categories: the
trial court’s denial of Nwoke’s presentation of a defense, and whether charges should be
misdemeanors or felonies. Nwoke’s contention that he was denied the presentation of a defense
relies primarily on challenging several of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and the court’s
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). rejection of proffered jury instructions. We find no reversible error in the trial court’s rulings and
affirm the judgment. 1
BACKGROUND2
Between June 2020 and February 2021, Nwoke worked for Visiting Angels and Brightstar
as a home health aide assisting elderly clients. During that time, Nwoke admittedly stole jewelry
and other items from his clients’ homes and sold the items to pawn shops, accumulating over
$66,000.
I. Pre-trial Proceedings
Following a pre-trial conference, the trial court entered an order stating that discovery
was complete. Nwoke agreed. Later, Nwoke filed a motion requesting that his family members
in Nigeria and the United Kingdom be permitted to testify remotely at trial, because his family
members were unable to travel to the United States due to financial constraints. He also filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that he committed the thefts “pursuant to a single larcenous impulse.”
He reasoned that he should have been charged with only one count of larceny and one count of
obtaining money by false pretenses. Nwoke also filed a memorandum stating that he intended to
rely on a duress defense at trial. He explained that his brother had been kidnapped in Nigeria
and held for ransom and that he committed the thefts in order to raise the ransom money. The
1 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” Code § 17.1 403(ii)(c); Rule 5A:27(c). 2 “On appeal, we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.” Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). “This well-settled principle of appellate review ‘requires us to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.”’” Wandemberg v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 124, 133 (2019) (quoting Camp v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 694, 698 (2018)). -2- Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to prohibit Nwoke from raising the duress defense at
trial because he failed to satisfy all the elements of the defense.
In September 2023, the trial court heard argument on the motions. The trial court denied
Nwoke’s motion to dismiss, holding that the single impulse doctrine was “not appropriate” in
this case, finding that “it’s a significant stretch to say that [Nwoke] was acting under a single
impulse for eight months [when he committed a] string of larcenies.” The trial court held that it
would wait until trial to rule on the duress defense issue because it was so close to the scheduled
trial. The trial court, however, prohibited defense counsel from bringing up the issue of duress
during voir dire. The court also denied Nwoke’s motion to permit remote testimony from his
witnesses. The trial court held that “WebEx is inherently unreliable” and the court would have
“absolutely no ability to know whether or not these witnesses are being coached.”
II. Trial
A. The Proffer
Before voir dire, the trial court instructed Nwoke to proffer the anticipated duress-related
testimony. Nwoke proffered that his brother was kidnapped, the kidnappers threatened to kill his
brother unless they received $250,000, and Nwoke sent the money he received from the stolen
jewelry to Nigeria to pay his brother’s ransom. The trial court then reconsidered its prior ruling
and permitted Nwoke to discuss the issue of the duress defense during voir dire and opening
statements. The court cautioned Nwoke that if he did not establish a prima facie case for duress,
the court would not only “be required to strike that defense and not allow the duress instruction,
but [the court] may therefore be required to provide a curative instruction as well which tells the
jury to essentially as a matter of law disregard any testimony that they’ve heard as to that duress
defense.” Nwoke agreed. Nwoke proffered statements from his family members describing
their anticipated testimony, had they been permitted to testify remotely. The trial court received
-3- the statements from the family members which stated that Nwoke’s brother was kidnapped and
held for ransom. During voir dire, defense counsel stated that Nwoke planned to present
evidence that he acted out of duress. In opening statements, defense counsel described the
kidnapping and argued that Nwoke committed the thefts “out of desperation to try to save his
brother.”
B. The Testimony
Robert Enzer testified that he hired Visiting Angels to help provide care for his late father
in July or August 2020. Enzer later discovered that his father’s and mother’s watches were
missing. Enzer testified that two of the items on the list were his parents’ watches. Enzer further
testified that his father purchased his watch during a family vacation to Switzerland in 1977 and
when he last saw the watch in 2000, it “was in good shape.”
Patricia Stephan testified that she hired Bright Star to help provide care for her late father
in October 2020. Stephan later noticed that four of her father’s rings were missing, specifically,
a white gold diamond ring, a U.S. Air Force ring, a gold signet ring, and a yellow gold ruby ring.
Stephan testified that she was familiar with her father’s jewelry and that the rings had “little wear
and tear.” The prosecutor showed Stephan an October 27, 2020 pawn shop receipt showing that
Nwoke was paid $2,500 for eight items. The first item on the receipt described four rings, and
Stephan identified one of these rings as her father’s white gold diamond ring. Stephan
recognized the second item on the receipt as her father’s U.S. Air Force ring. The seventh item
on the receipt described two rings, and Stephan identified one of these rings as her father’s
yellow gold signet ring. Stephan testified that in October 2020, she would have sold the white
gold diamond ring for $1,500, the U.S. Air Force ring for $400, and the yellow gold signet ring
for $750 or $1,000.
-4- Opal Arnold testified that she hired Visiting Angels to help provide care for her late
husband, Edward Arnold. After Nwoke began caring for Edward in October 2020, Arnold
noticed that several pieces of her husband’s jewelry were missing, specifically, a Rolex watch, a
24-karat gold sapphire ring, a gold wedding band, and an insignia ring. Arnold testified that the
jewelry was “in really good shape.” Arnold purchased the Rolex watch for $10,000 “many years
prior,” and she would have sold it in October 2020 for $15,000. Arnold testified that the police
recovered the watch and returned it to her. In October 2020, Arnold would have sold the gold
sapphire ring for $5,000, the gold wedding band for $3,000, and the insignia ring for $5,000.
Suzanne Parker hired Visiting Angels to help provide care for her late husband, Douglas
Parker. In January 2021, Visiting Angels assigned Nwoke to her house. Parker later discovered
that several pieces of her jewelry were missing, specifically, a necklace, a diamond and ruby
bracelet, and a gold mesh bracelet with diamonds. Parker also noticed that several pieces of her
husband’s jewelry were missing, including a gold Cartier watch, a gold ring with the initials D.P.
on it, a gold flat top diamond ring, a pair of gold nugget cufflinks, and a pair of gold knot
cufflinks. Parker testified that she was familiar with her husband’s jewelry and that it was in
“fine” condition. Parker recognized three items on a pawn receipt and explained that they were
her husband’s gold nugget cufflinks, gold initialed ring, and gold flat top diamond ring. Parker
recognized both items on another pawn shop receipt and explained that one of the items was her
diamond and ruby bracelet and the other was her husband’s gold knot cufflinks. Parker testified
that she purchased the bracelet for $6,800 and would have sold it for $6,000 in January 2021.
She paid $500 for the cufflinks and would have sold them for $300 or $500 in January 2021. In
January 2021, Parker would have sold the gold Cartier watch for $18,000 or $20,000 and the
gold mesh bracelet with diamonds for $3,600 or $3,800.
-5- Michael Morris, the manager of the Metro Pawn shop, testified as an expert in the
valuation of jewelry. Morris testified that he tries to buy items “for half of what [he] can sell it
for.” On October 27, 2020, Nwoke brought in a “larger parcel of goods” to the pawn shop.
Morris viewed the receipt for the transaction and explained that the first item on the receipt listed
four rings that were made of 10-karat and 14-karat gold and were worth $904.
Morris stated that the second item on the receipt was the U.S. Air Force ring, and he
determined that it was worth $327.29. The seventh item on the receipt listed two rings which
were worth $993. Morris testified that he would have paid Nwoke between $1,000 and $1,100
for items one, two, and seven on the receipt. On January 7, 2021, Nwoke brought in gold nugget
cufflinks, a gold initialed ring, and a gold flat top diamond ring; Morris determined that the items
were worth $750, $650, and $450, respectively. The next day, Nwoke brought a diamond and
ruby bracelet and gold knot cufflinks into the pawn shop, worth $1,300 and between $350 and
$400, respectively.
During the trial, the Commonwealth stated its intention to introduce Nwoke’s recorded
interview with the police. Nwoke objected. Defense counsel informed the court that the
Commonwealth had shared a link to the recorded interview in May 2021, but the link expired in
August 2021. Counsel stated that she had asked the Commonwealth twice in November 2021
and once in October 2022 for a new link to the interview. The trial court questioned counsel
about why she did not file a discovery motion or ask the court to issue a show cause. Counsel
replied that she did not realize that the link had not been re-sent and considered it a “discovery
violation, essentially.” The trial court noted that at the pre-trial conference, Nwoke agreed that
discovery was complete, but directed the Commonwealth to re-send the link and allowed defense
counsel an hour to review the recording.
-6- After the recess, defense counsel stated that she did not have enough time to listen to the
entire recording. She acknowledged her mistake at the pretrial conference. The trial court
denied counsel’s request to have the Commonwealth “demonstrate that the statement was
voluntary outside of the jury even for admissibility reasons.” The trial court chided counsel that
“[t]his is totally on you . . . .”
Prince William County Police Officer Ware testified that he interviewed Nwoke at his
apartment on March 1, 2021. During the recorded interview, Nwoke admitted that he stole most
of the jewelry he sold to Metro Pawn and that he stole it from his clients’ houses. Specifically,
he admitted stealing two rings and a Rolex watch from Arnold.
Nwoke testified that in February 2020, he believed that his brother had been kidnapped
and tortured. He thought the only way he could save his brother was to pay the ransom money.
He stated that he was in a “panicked state” during the period of the thefts. He admitted at trial
that he began stealing items from clients’ homes. He claimed that he sent all the money he
received to his cousin in Nigeria to help his brother. He acknowledged that he had not been to
Nigeria since 2015, but that at that time, kidnappings were “[v]ery common.” During
cross-examination, Nwoke admitted that he sometimes worked less than 40 hours a week, had
not looked for another job to obtain additional money, and had not sought a loan to pay the
ransom. He also acknowledged that he did not contact the police about his brother’s kidnapping,
but stated that he did so because he believed that doing so would place his brother in danger.
Nwoke attempted to introduce an unauthenticated death certificate for his brother, but the
trial court rejected it, instead allowing Nwoke to testify if he attended his brother’s funeral,
which he had not. The trial court allowed Nwoke to testify about his personal experiences in
Nigeria but not about the “current state of affairs in Nigeria.” The trial court disallowed the
introduction of a purported Nigerian police report for a lack of foundation. Nwoke testified that
-7- he had bank transfer receipts showing he made payments to his cousin in Nigeria. The trial court
allowed Nwoke to testify about the payments but would not admit the documents because they
lacked foundation and authentication.
The trial court denied Nwoke’s motion to strike. The court granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to strike Nwoke’s duress-related testimony and provided a curative jury instruction. The
trial court found that the “threat of harm was clearly not imminent” and that Nwoke had failed to
show that there were no available legal means of obtaining the funds. The trial court rejected
Nwoke’s proffered jury instructions on duress, justification, necessity, and the single larceny
doctrine. The trial court gave the jury a curative instruction informing them that there was
insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support a duress defense.
The jury found Nwoke guilty of all charges. Nwoke appeals.
ANALYSIS
I. Constitutional Argument3
Nwoke contends that the trial court erred by admitting the recorded interview with
Officer Ware because it contained a potential Miranda4 issue. Nwoke did not raise the issue
until the second day of trial. Nwoke did not file a written motion to suppress at least seven days
before trial. Because Nwoke failed timely to challenge the admissibility of the evidence
obtained in the interview, he is procedurally barred from raising this issue under Code
§ 19.2-266.2.
Code § 19.2-266.2 requires that “[d]efense motions or objections seeking . . . suppression
of evidence on the grounds [that] such evidence was obtained in violation of the . . . Fifth . . .
3 This section of the opinion addresses Nwoke’s assignments of error X and XI. 4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -8- Amendment[] to the Constitution . . . shall be raised by motion or objection.” Code
§ 19.2-266.2(A)(i). This section further provides:
Such a motion or objection in a proceeding in circuit court shall be raised in writing, before trial. The motions or objections shall be filed and notice given to opposing counsel not later than seven days before trial . . . . A hearing on all such motions or objections shall be held not later than three days prior to trial in circuit court, unless such period is waived by the accused, as set by the trial judge. The circuit court may, however, for good cause shown and in the interest of justice, permit the motions or objections to be raised at a later time.
Code § 19.2-266.2(B).
“The plain language of Code § 19.2-266.2 requires that a defendant seeking to suppress
evidence based on a violation of his [Fifth] Amendment rights must file a suppression motion no
later than seven days before trial, absent ‘good cause shown and in the interest of justice.’”
Arrington v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 635, 639-40 (2009) (quoting Upchurch v.
Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 48, 51 (1999)). “Failure to follow this statutory requirement results
in a waiver of an accused’s constitutional challenge to the admissibility of the evidence.”
Magruder v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 283, 300 (2008); see, e.g., Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262
Va. 127, 146 (2001) (argument regarding admissibility of tape recording waived because
appellant failed to comply with statutory requirements of Code § 19.2-266.2); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 634, 644-45 (2002) (constitutionality of a code section not
preserved for appeal because appellant failed to comply with Code § 19.2-266.2); Morrison v.
Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 273, 279 (2002) (Court refusing to address constitutional challenge
to statute where defendant failed to comply with Code § 19.2-266.2). The filing and notice
requirements of Code § 19.2-266.2 “serve[] legitimate state interests in protecting against
surprise, harassment, and undue delay.” Magruder, 275 Va. at 300 (quoting Michigan v. Lucas,
500 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1991)). Nwoke failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence of his
-9- statements to the police in accordance with the requirements of Code § 19.2-266.2. Therefore,
he waived his right to challenge its admissibility. The trial court properly denied Nwoke’s
motion, finding it was untimely raised in the midst of trial.
Nwoke asserts, however, that he “met [the] standard of good cause” and, therefore, the
trial court erred by prohibiting him from challenging the voluntariness of the statement. He
acknowledges that the Commonwealth shared the audio of the confession in May 2021, more
than two years before his trial. Counsel neither opened nor saved the file in the months that the
link was active. Inexplicably, at the pre-trial hearing, Nwoke specifically confirmed that
discovery was complete. Later, in November 2021, soon before the preliminary hearing, Nwoke
twice asked the Commonwealth to re-send the file, but he did not receive it. Nwoke asked again
in October 2022. The trial court observed that Nwoke then waited nearly a year before asking
during trial that the evidence be suppressed. Although Nwoke did not ask the trial court to find
good cause to address the untimely motion, the trial court did note that the delay in receiving the
evidence was due to his lack of diligence. The trial court allowed Nwoke a recess to listen to the
recording but declined to entertain his late motion to suppress. Good cause for a late motion may
also be found where testimony at trial constitutes a surprise. See Upchurch, 31 Va. App. at
51-52. However, a lack of diligence or mere inadvertence does not establish good cause. See id.
(holding that the evidence supported a finding of lack of diligence). Accordingly, the record
demonstrates that Nwoke waived his constitutional argument by failing to timely file his motion
to suppress.
Nwoke asserts that the trial court erred by denying him “the ability to cross-examine the
officer on anything involving the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and
voluntariness.”5
5 Nwoke’s assignment of error XI. - 10 - “The failure to proffer the expected testimony is fatal to [a] claim on appeal.” Tynes v.
Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 21 (2006) (quoting Molina v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 338,
367-68 (2006)). “[W]here admissibility is challenged, the litigant must provide a proffer that is
sufficiently detailed to give the trial judge a fair opportunity to resolve the issue correctly and
contemporaneously.” Creamer v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 185, 199 n.7 (2015). Nwoke
failed to proffer any of the questions he sought to ask Officer Ware or Officer Ware’s anticipated
answers. We cannot “speculate what the answer might have been to [Nwoke’s] questions.”
O’Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 697 (1988). Without a proper proffer, we are unable to
address the merits of this claim.
II. Jury Instructions6
A. Standard of review for the denial of jury instructions
“As a general rule, the matter of granting and denying instructions . . . rest[s] in the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Dandridge v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 669, 679 (2021)
(alterations in original) (quoting Lienau v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 254, 263 (2018)). “The
trial court’s ‘broad discretion in giving or denying instructions requested’ is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 580, 586 (2015) (en
banc)). “The exercise of judicial discretion presupposes ‘that, for some decisions, conscientious
jurists could reach different conclusions based on exactly the same facts—yet still remain
entirely reasonable.’” Commonwealth v. Kartozia, ___ Va. ___, ___ (June 5, 2025) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Barney, 302 Va. 84, 94 (2023)). Thus, “[o]nly when reasonable jurists could
not differ can we say an abuse of discretion has occurred.” Id. at ___.
“[A]n instruction is proper only if supported by more than a scintilla of evidence.” Avent
v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 175, 202 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729
6 This section of the opinion addresses Nwoke’s assignments of error IV, V, VI, and VII. - 11 - (2001)). The reason for this rule is that “the tendency of such instruction is to mislead the jury
by withdrawing their attention from the legitimate points involved in the issue” because “[j]uries
are sufficiently prone to indulge in conjectures, without having possible facts not in evidence
suggested for their consideration.” Andrews v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 231, 276 (2010).
“Whether evidence amounts to more than a ‘scintilla’ ‘must necessarily be determined in the
factual context of a particular case,’ considering ‘the weight of that evidence in comparison to
the weight of the other credible evidence that negates the proposition in question.’” Green v.
Commonwealth, No. 0344-17-1, 2018 Va. App. LEXIS 36, at *18 (Feb. 13, 2018) (quoting
Brandau v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 408, 411-12 (1993)). When reviewing “whether the
circuit court erred in refusing an instruction proffered by the defendant” we must “view[] the
evidence in the light most favorable to [Nwoke].” Andrews, 280 Va. at 277.
B. The duress instruction
Nwoke asserts that the trial court erred by denying his jury instructions on duress.7
Further, Nwoke argues the trial court erred by providing the curative instruction that due to the
insufficient evidence presented, the jury could “not consider the defense of duress as justification
for Mr. Nwoke’s actions.”8
Duress is an affirmative defense. Graham v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 662, 674
(2000). While “the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving every essential element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , it is the defendant that bears the burden of producing
evidence in support of an affirmative defense.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 186, 199
(2014) (citation omitted).
7 Nwoke’s assignment of error V. 8 Nwoke’s assignment of error IV. - 12 - “Duress excuses criminal behavior ‘where the defendant shows that the acts were the
product of threats inducing a reasonable fear of immediate death or serious bodily injury.’”
Graham, 31 Va. App. at 674 (quoting Pancoast v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 28, 33 (1986)).
Accordingly, to establish duress, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) a reasonable belief that the
action was necessary to avoid an imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means
to avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship that may be reasonably
anticipated between the action taken and the avoidance of the harm.” Edmonds v.
Commonwealth, 292 Va. 301, 306 (2016) (quoting Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App.
36, 45 (2001)). To establish the requisite nexus between the commission of a criminal act and
avoidance of the threatened harm, a defendant must show “that the threat, which is ‘specifically
directed toward causing [them] to commit the crime charged,’ was coupled with evidence that
[they] ‘reasonably believed that participation in the crime was the only way to avoid the
threatened harm.’” Graham, 31 Va. App. at 675 (first emphasis added) (quoting Roger D. Groot,
Criminal Offenses and Defenses 181 (4th ed. 1999)). Thus, “[w]here the defendant fails ‘to take
advantage of a reasonable opportunity to escape, or of a reasonable opportunity to avoid doing
the acts without being harmed, [they] may not rely on duress as a defense.’” Id. at 674-75
(quoting Pancoast, 2 Va. App. at 33).
Here, the trial court held that Nwoke failed to provide more than a scintilla of evidence to
establish duress. After reviewing Nwoke’s arguments, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
Pursuant to our duty to decide cases on the “best and narrowest grounds,” Commonwealth v.
Swann, 290 Va. 194, 196 (2015), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that Nwoke did not provide more than a scintilla of evidence to support at least one
- 13 - essential element of his proffered duress defense: that it was reasonable for Nwoke to believe
that he had no other adequate means of preventing the harm to his brother. 9
In this case, the record contains no evidence that Nwoke considered or sought available
legal alternatives to obtain the funds. Nwoke provided no evidence or testimony that suggested
that he made any attempt to pursue any means of obtaining additional funds besides the criminal
activity he engaged in. Instead, Nwoke immediately resorted to stealing property and selling it
to the pawn shop. When asked whether he felt that he had “any other choice but to steal,”
Nwoke responded in the negative but explained that he was seeking “an easier way out to pay
this ransom so [he] c[ould] get [his] brother out.” (Emphasis added).
In addition to the absence of evidence that Nwoke attempted to pursue alternative legal
means, Nwoke’s testimony affirmatively showed his lack of an attempt to pursue several
different potential options to raise funds. For instance, Nwoke acknowledged that during the
relevant period, he sometimes did not work 40 hours per week despite being able to control the
number of hours he worked. Nor did Nwoke seek additional employment. Nwoke also
acknowledged that he did not attempt to secure a bank or a personal loan. Further, Nwoke
testified that he and his wife were leasing a 2016 Mercedes and that they did not stop leasing the
car during the relevant timeframe. Nwoke testified that he lived in a “nice” neighborhood and
that he and his wife never considered seeking less expensive rent elsewhere.
Considering all these aspects of the evidence together— the lack of evidence that Nwoke
sought any legal alternatives, Nwoke’s testimony characterizing stealing as an “easier way” of
obtaining the money, and the affirmative evidence of Nwoke’s failure to pursue numerous
9 Because of our holding, we need not consider the trial court’s reasoning concerning the other required elements of duress, including the lack of an imminent threat. See Swann, 290 Va. at 196 (“The doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases ‘on the best and narrowest grounds available.’” (quoting McGhee v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 620, 626 n.4 (2010))). - 14 - potential alternatives—we cannot say that “reasonable jurists could not differ” in concluding that
Nwoke failed to present more than a scintilla of evidence that he reasonably believed that
stealing was the only available adequate means to avoid the threatened harm. See Kartozia, ___
Va. at ___ (abuse of discretion standard); Graham, 31 Va. App. at 675 (reasonable belief
standard).10
Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s finding that there was not
more than a scintilla of evidence on each element of the affirmative duress defense.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the duress instruction and
providing the curative instruction.
B. The instruction on the single larceny doctrine
Nwoke asserts that the trial court erred by refusing his instruction on the single larceny
doctrine.11 He states that “all of the thefts happened pursuant to a single larcenous impulse,”
“[d]espite the fact that the larcenies happened over the course of a year . . . .” He concludes that
“the larcenies share the same rationale: Nwoke’s desperation to get funds to pay the kidnappers
[for] his brother’s kidnapping.”
“A ‘series of larcenous acts’ can constitute a ‘single larceny’ if the factfinder reasonably
concludes that ‘the several acts [were] done pursuant to a single impulse and in execution of a
general fraudulent scheme.’” Dennos v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 139, 147 (2014)
(alteration in original) (quoting West v. Commonwealth, 125 Va. 747, 754 (1919)). “The
standard is in the conjunctive. It is not enough for a series of larcenous acts to take place during
the execution of a general fraudulent scheme.” Id. “Each act must be the product of a common
10 We note that our holding in this case is narrow and follows from all of the evidence in this case considered cumulatively. We do not suggest that any of the particular actions that Nwoke did not perform in this case are necessary when duress is asserted as a defense to larceny. 11 Nwoke’s assignments of error VI and VII. - 15 - single impulse. The doctrine thus does not apply to larcenous acts that are part of a general
fraudulent scheme but not individually the product of a single impulse.” Id. at 147-48.
“When reviewing a factfinder’s decision on this issue, we apply the same deferential
standard of appellate review generally applicable to factual findings. We consider whether the
factfinder could reasonably conclude that the thefts occurred at different locations, with different
victims, at different times, or under different conditions.” Id. at 148.
“The application of the doctrine is a fact specific analysis.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 59
Va. App. 795, 804 (2012). When deciding whether the single larceny doctrine applies to a
particular case, a court must consider “(1) the location of the items taken, (2) the lapse of time
between the takings, (3) the general and specific intent of the taker, (4) the number of owners of
the items taken and (5) whether intervening events occurred between the takings.” Acey v.
Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 240, 247 (1999). However, “[t]he primary factor to be considered
is the intent of the thief . . . .” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 491, 497 (1997) (en banc)).
“Clearly, appellant had a general scheme or intent to steal. However, a series of thefts
committed under a general scheme is not the controlling factor in determining whether the single
larceny doctrine applies.” Bragg v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 607, 612 (2004). A “series of
thefts committed in rapid succession pursuant to a general scheme to steal from distinct
locations, such as different shops, stores, or buildings, will constitute separate offenses.” Id.
(quoting Richardson, 25 Va. App. at 497); cf. Richardson, 25 Va. App. at 499-500 (appellant’s
theft of two purses from a hospital nurses’ station was a single larceny, and his other thefts from
other locations throughout the hospital constituted separate offenses). Here, the thefts occurred
over a period of 11 months and involved several different victims and different locations.
Numerous intervening events occurred between the larcenies. Although Nwoke’s stated purpose
- 16 - for stealing all the items was to raise money to pay his brother’s ransom, Nwoke’s actions
demonstrate that the thefts were a series of distinct impulses. Nwoke chose which clients to steal
from and when to take the items each time he stole. Given the totality of the evidence, the trial
court permissibly refused to apply the single larceny doctrine. The trial court’s ruling thus
eliminated any need to instruct the jury on the single larceny doctrine as not even a scintilla of
evidence supported it.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court committed no reversible error in its jury
instructions.
III. Evidentiary Rulings12
A. Nwoke’s ability to present evidence within his personal knowledge
“Decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence ‘lie within the trial court’s sound
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.’” Blankenship v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 692, 697 (2019) (quoting Michels v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App.
461, 465 (2006)).
Nwoke broadly contends that the trial court abused its discretion by “prohibiting [him]
from testifying about relevant facts within his personal knowledge.”13 He states that the trial
court “repeatedly and erroneously denied [his] testimony without legal basis.” In support of this
assignment of error, Nwoke fails to precisely identify what testimony he was prohibited from
giving. Although he states that he preserved this issue for appeal on a range of 62 pages in the
record, at no point in his brief does he identify the specific rulings to which he objects.
12 This section of the opinion addresses Nwoke’s assignments of error III, VIII, IX, and XII. 13 Nwoke’s assignment of error IX. - 17 - “Appellate courts are not unlit rooms where [litigants] may wander blindly about, hoping
to stumble upon a reversible error. If the parties believed that the circuit court erred, it was their
duty to present that error to us with legal authority to support their contention.” Fadness v.
Fadness, 52 Va. App. 833, 851 (2008). Indeed, “[i]t is not the role of the courts, trial or
appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and where a party
fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal
argument, the issue is waived.” Blankenship v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 608, 623 n.2 (2020)
(quoting Bartley v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 740, 746 (2017)); see also Parks v. Parks, 52
Va. App. 663, 664 (2008) (holding that an issue may be treated as waived if a party’s failure to
follow Rule 5A:20(e) is significant). “We will not search the record for errors in order to
interpret the appellant’s contention and correct deficiencies in a brief.” Buchanan v. Buchanan,
14 Va. App. 53, 56 (1992). Accordingly, we decline to address this broad argument.
Nwoke also argues that the trial court prevented him from testifying about his state of
mind.14 Specifically, Nwoke asserts that the trial court “repeatedly and systematically prohibited
him from presenting evidence that he believed that his actions were necessary, and from
presenting evidence of the basis for his beliefs.” He states that he was unable to testify about
“why he was in fear, or why he did not trust [the] Nigerian police.” Nwoke argues that the trial
court’s exclusion of this evidence came as a result of numerous hearsay rulings that he says were
erroneous for several reasons, including because the evidence was not being presented for the
truth of the matter asserted.
Pursuant to our duty to resolve cases on the “best and narrowest grounds,” we hold the
following: Assuming without deciding that the numerous hearsay rulings that Nwoke challenges
were erroneous, and assuming without deciding that Nwoke’s broad argument⎯encompassing
14 Nwoke’s assignment of error III. - 18 - numerous individual rulings on different individual bases⎯would provide adequate grounds for
this Court to review individual hearsay rulings of the trial court, any erroneous hearsay ruling in
this case was harmless. See Swann, 290 Va. at 196. The record shows that several hearsay
rulings prevented Nwoke from providing testimony as to what exactly his family said to him and
what exactly the kidnappers said to him.15 This testimony could have ostensibly assisted Nwoke
in explaining why it was reasonable for him to believe that his brother was in imminent danger
and required that the ransom be paid. Further, Nwoke was prevented from presenting certain
pieces of evidence about the Nigerian police. However, even assuming without deciding that
this testimony was erroneously excluded—because, for instance, Nwoke’s testimony about the
kidnappers’ statements would have been presented to demonstrate those statements’ effects on
the listener—we hold that excluding them was harmless in this case. This testimony, if admitted,
would not have remedied legal insufficiencies in Nwoke’s duress defense.
As explained above, in section II(B), the trial court did not commit reversible error in
prohibiting Nwoke from presenting jury instructions on duress because it did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that he had failed to prevent more than a scintilla of evidence to support
one specific element of duress: that Nwoke reasonably believed that stealing the items was the
only available means of preventing the harm to his brother. The testimony that the trial court
excluded as hearsay could have helped support Nwoke’s argument on another element—that
Nwoke had a reasonable belief regarding imminent danger—but would not have related to the
15 We note, however, that the record also shows that Nwoke was permitted to present testimony regarding his state of mind. For instance, the trial court did permit Nwoke to testify to the fact that he believed his brother had been kidnapped, was being tortured, and would be killed if he did not pay the ransom. He stated that he was in “in fear” and in a “panicked state” when he stole property from his clients and that he believed that stealing was “the only way” to protect his brother. The trial court also permitted Nwoke to testify about his belief that kidnappings were common in Nigeria and that the Nigerian police failed to investigate previous crimes Nwoke had reported. - 19 - presence of a reasonable belief that alternative legal methods were available to Nwoke. See
Swann, 290 Va. at 196. Therefore, the exclusion of this testimony as hearsay, if erroneous, was
harmless.
B. Calling remote witnesses
Nwoke argues that the trial court erred by prohibiting remote testimony.16 He states that
the trial court “denied Nwoke the ability to secure his remote witnesses’ appearances.” He
concludes that the trial court “denied their testimony without legal justification.” Nwoke argues
that this denial violated his rights under the Virginia Constitution to “to call for evidence in his
favor.” Va. Const. art. I, § 8.
“The manner in which a trial is ‘conduct[ed] . . . is committed to the trial judge’s
discretion.’” Hicks v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 255, 270 (2019) (alterations in original)
(quoting Breeden v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 169, 184-85 (2004)). Here, the trial court
explained that it would not permit witness testimony because “WebEx is inherently unreliable”
and the fact finder would have “absolutely no ability to know whether or not these witnesses are
being coached.” On brief, Nwoke does not engage with or dispute the trial court’s reasons for
preventing Nwoke from presenting testimony via Webex. Nwoke presents no counterargument
concerning the reliability of Webex or the ability of the factfinder to nonetheless evaluate
witness credibility through that platform. We are therefore not persuaded that the trial court
committed reversible error in denying Nwoke’s motion for remote testimony in this case.17
16 Nwoke’s assignment of error XII. 17 We render no holding concerning the role and reliability of Webex, having been provided with no argument directly addressing this point. For the same reason, we do not decide in this case whether preventing a defendant from presenting Webex or other remote testimony of witnesses located outside the country would comport with a defendant’s rights under the Virginia or Federal Constitution. - 20 - C. Authentication
Nwoke argues that the trial court prevented defense counsel from laying a proper
foundation to authenticate various documents.18 Specifically, Nwoke appears to reference the
death certificate, the Nigerian police report, and the bank transfer receipts.
“As a general rule, no writing may be admitted into evidence unless and until it has been
‘authenticated’ . . . .” Snowden v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. App. 482, 485 (2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting Proctor v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 937, 938 (1992)). “Authentication is
merely the process of showing that a document is genuine and that it is what its proponent claims
it to be.” Id. (quoting Owens v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 309, 311 (1990)).
Here, Nwoke fails to demonstrate that the trial court prevented him from laying a
foundation for the documents. Instead, Nwoke’s testimony simply did not authenticate the
purported documents. Proper authentication “requires not only [1] certification of the copy as a
true copy by the custodian of the record [or] the person to whom he reports, but also [2] a
showing that the persons certifying are indeed the custodian [or] the person to whom he reports.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 545, 554 (2001) (quoting Ingram v. Commonwealth, 1
Va. App. 335, 340 (1986)). Nwoke failed to prove that the purported documents were what he
claimed they were. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s decision to
exclude the documents.
IV. Sufficiency19
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘the judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 59, 76 (2021) (quoting Smith v.
18 Nwoke’s assignment of error VIII. 19 This section of the opinion addresses Nwoke’s assignments of error I and II. - 21 - Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “The question on appeal, is whether ‘any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Id. (quoting Yoder v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 180, 182 (2019)). “If there is evidentiary support
for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its
opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.
273, 288 (2017)).
Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, Nwoke first argues that the trial court erred by
“failing to reduce the felony false pretenses charge to a misdemeanor in CR22001294-00,
because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Metro Pawn gave
Nwoke more than $1000 for stolen items on October 27, 2020.”20 The evidence proved that on
that date, Metro Pawn paid Nwoke $2,500 for fourteen items. Stephan identified three of the
items as her father’s missing rings. Morris testified that he tries to buy items “for half of what
[he] can sell” them for. Morris stated that he probably would have paid Nwoke between $1,000
and $1,100 for the three rings stolen from Stephan. Thus, the record supports the jury’s
conclusion that on October 27, 2020, Nwoke received at least $1,000 from Metro Pawn for
stolen items.
Nwoke asserts that the trial court erred by failing to reduce his four grand larceny
convictions to misdemeanors and dismiss the corresponding larceny with intent to sell
convictions.21 He contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove the $1,000 value threshold for
each grand larceny offense.
20 Nwoke’s assignment of error I. 21 Nwoke’s assignment of error II. - 22 - At the time of the thefts, Code § 18.2-95(ii) provided that “[a]ny person who commits . . .
simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $1000 or
more . . . [is] guilty of grand larceny.” “Larceny is ‘the wrongful or fraudulent taking of personal
goods of some intrinsic value, belonging to another, without his assent, and with the intention to
deprive the owner thereof permanently.’” Goldman v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 556, 562
(2022) (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 100, 104-05 (2010)).
“[W]hen the value of the items stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value must
be alleged, and the Commonwealth must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the value satisfies
the statutory requirement for felony larceny.” DiMaio v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 504, 509
(2006). There are a number of ways to prove the value of an asset. It can be established by a lay
opinion of the property’s fair market value, by an expert’s opinion, or by traditional accounting
principles, starting with the original cost of the item and then factoring in depreciation or
appreciation. See id. Generally, “the opinion testimony of the owner of personal property is
competent and admissible on the question of the value of such property, regardless of the
owner’s knowledge of property values.” Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480, 482 (1994).
Another non-expert, non-owner, may testify “provided the witness possesses sufficient
knowledge of the value of the property or has had ample opportunity for forming a correct
opinion as to value.” Id. at 483.
Nwoke argues that “Arnold herself did not own the items in question, because they
belonged to her deceased husband” and, therefore, “she did not have the requisite knowledge of
value for her husband’s belongings and was not competent to testify about value.” But Arnold
testified that she was familiar with her husband’s jewelry, accurately described the items, and
stated that the pieces were “in really good shape.” Arnold purchased the Rolex watch for her
husband for $10,000 and would have sold it for $15,000. A jeweler appraised one of the rings at
- 23 - $1,200 in 2014, but Arnold would have sold it for $5,000. Similarly, she would have sold the
insignia ring at $5,000 and the gold wedding band at $3,000. The jury permissibly accepted
Arnold’s knowledgeable and competent valuation of the property stolen from Arnold and her
husband.
Nwoke asserts that Parker “did not have the requisite knowledge of value for her
husband’s belongings and was not competent to testify about value.” Metro Pawn paid Nwoke
$1,200 for items he brought in on January 7, 2021. Parker recognized the items as her husband’s
two missing rings and gold nugget cufflinks. She described the jewelry in detail and noted that
all of it was in “fine” condition. She testified that she would have sold the cufflinks for over
$1,000 and the diamond ring for $1,000. Morris, testifying as an expert, valued the cufflinks at
$750 and the rings at $650 and $450. Here, the lay and expert testimony established the stolen
property from Parker was worth at least $1,000 on January 7, 2021.
Likewise, the evidence proved that Metro Pawn paid Nwoke $800 for two items on
January 8, 2021. Parker recognized the items as her diamond and ruby bracelet and her
husband’s gold knot cufflinks. She testified that she purchased the bracelet for $6,800 and
would have sold it for $6,000. She bought the cufflinks for $500 and would have sold them for
$300 to $500. Parker testified that she was also missing a gold bracelet with diamonds worth
$3,600 and her husband’s Cartier watch worth at least $18,000. Morris valued the bracelet at
$1,300 and the cufflinks at a minimum of $350. Thus, the evidence also proved stolen property
from Parker was worth at least $1,000 on January 8, 2021.
Nwoke argues that Stephan “did not have the requisite knowledge of value for her
father’s belongings and was not competent to testify about value, especially as she conceded she
did not even know the type of stone in ‘the ruby ring.’” Stephan testified that she discovered that
three of her father’s rings were missing. Stephan described the three rings and stated that they
- 24 - were in good condition. Stephan identified her father’s rings from the October 27, 2020 pawn
shop transaction. She testified that she would have sold the three rings for $1,500, $400, and at
least $750, respectively. Morris’s value testimony corroborated Stephan’s valuation estimates
and together supports the jury’s determination that Nwoke stole property from Stephan worth at
least $1,000.
The jury weighed the credibility of the witnesses, the basis of their knowledge of the
stolen items, and their valuations, and found that their testimony established that the items
Nwoke stole in each incident were worth at least $1,000. The Commonwealth’s evidence was
competent, was not inherently incredible, and was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Nwoke was guilty of four counts of grand larceny, four counts of larceny with intent to sell,
two counts of obtaining money by false pretenses, and one count of petit larceny.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
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