Cite as 2019 Ark. 299 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-14-484
STANLEY RAY HUNT II Opinion Delivered: October 24, 2019 PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST V. JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT STATE OF ARKANSAS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT [FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 23CR-13-186]
PETITION DENIED.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner Stanley Ray Hunt II’s convictions
for three counts of rape and his sentence to an aggregate term of 480 months’ imprisonment.
Hunt v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 53, 454 S.W.3d 771. Hunt filed a petition in this court in
which he requests this court’s permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis to challenge the convictions. The petition for leave to proceed in the
trial court is necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram
nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Jackson v.
State, 2018 Ark. 227, 549 S.W.3d 356. Hunt does not provide a meritorious basis for issuance
of the writ in his petition, and we deny the petition.
Hunt was convicted of raping his niece, who was fourteen years old when she first
reported the abuse to her school principal and vice-principal. Hunt’s proposed bases for issuance of the writ are not completely clear, but Hunt’s claims appear to turn on allegations
that the prosecution withheld evidence of specific dates on which the victim stated the rapes
occurred. He alleges these dates were listed on an incident report made by the school officials
to police officers. Hunt also complains that there are discrepancies in the dates of the crimes
in the information and amended information charging him, the prosecuting attorney’s
probable-cause affidavit, a detective’s report, and the school-incident report. He seems to
contend this was trial error and that the prosecution made false statements because the victim
had given specific dates in the incident report.
Hunt further asserts that he was incarcerated during a portion of the date range given
for the rapes and that there were violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), arising
from the prosecution withholding the school-incident report and because information about
his incarceration in 2007 was withheld from the jury. Hunt contends that he was prejudiced
as a result, that his attorney aided in the commission of the Brady violations by stating that no
specific date was alleged when the school-incident report indicated a specific date range and
time for the crimes, and that there was trial error in the admission of “false” evidence.
We will reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider error coram nobis relief only
when the proposed attack on the judgment is meritorious, and in making this determination,
we look to the reasonableness of the allegations in the petition and to the probability of the
truth thereof. Davis v. State, 2019 Ark. 172, 574 S.W.3d 666. A writ of error coram nobis is
an extraordinarily rare remedy, and coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong
presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Martin v. State, 2019 Ark. 167, 574
S.W.3d 661. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there 2 existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial
court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
before rendition of the judgment. Id.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available for
addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of
trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-
party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Id. The
petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record.
Id.
Hunt’s claims of trial error do not provide a basis for the writ. The writ is only granted
to correct some error of fact, and it does not lie to correct trial error or to contradict any fact
already adjudicated. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. 176, 575 S.W.3d 407. Claims of insufficient
evidence and claims of alleged false testimony at trial do not support the writ. Chatmon v. State,
2017 Ark. 229. Defects in the proceedings, including defects in the charging instruments, that
should have been raised during the proceedings are not within the scope of the limited
grounds on which the writ may issue. Alexander v. State, 2019 Ark. 171, 575 S.W.3d 401. To
the extent that Hunt alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims are likewise not
cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Johnson, 2019 Ark. 176, 575 S.W.3d 407.
Allegations of a Brady violation, however, fall within the third category of fundamental
error warranting the writ’s issuance. Id. Yet the mere fact that a petitioner alleges a Brady
3 violation is not sufficient to provide a basis for error coram nobis relief, and the burden is on
the petitioner to make a full disclosure of specific facts that substantiate the merit of a Brady
claim. Davis, 2019 Ark. 172, 574 S.W.3d 666.
When a petitioner alleges a Brady violation as the basis for his or her claim of relief in
coram nobis proceedings, the facts alleged in the petition must establish that there was
evidence withheld that was both material and prejudicial such as to have prevented rendition
of the judgment had it been known at the time of trial that such evidence existed. Id.
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
Hunt was aware at the time of trial that he had previously been incarcerated—in fact, he
testified about that incarceration at trial—so that information was not withheld.1 Hunt also
failed to allege any specific facts to support his conclusory claim that the incident report was
withheld. While he contends the jury did not see the report, he does not appear to contend
that the report was not provided to the defense. A petitioner does not satisfy any ground for
granting the writ when he does not allege that there was any evidence extrinsic to the record
that was hidden from the defense or that was unknown at the time of trial. Scott v. State, 2019
Ark. 94, 571 S.W.3d 451.
1 Hunt would not have been prejudiced if it had been. The sentencing order appears to list a specific date for the first rape count that falls outside the April 2007 to November 2007 time frame Hunt alleges he was incarcerated. That date is clearly a scrivener’s error because the date range for the first count in the information and testimony at trial was about an approximate range beginning in 2007 and ending in 2008. In any case, the time period that Hunt alleges he was incarcerated does not encompass the entire date range for the offense. 4 The record on direct appeal contains discovery receipts in which the defense
acknowledges having received three different incident reports. The testimony at trial made
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Cite as 2019 Ark. 299 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-14-484
STANLEY RAY HUNT II Opinion Delivered: October 24, 2019 PETITIONER
PRO SE PETITION TO REINVEST V. JURISDICTION IN THE TRIAL COURT TO CONSIDER A PETITION FOR WRIT STATE OF ARKANSAS OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS RESPONDENT [FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, NO. 23CR-13-186]
PETITION DENIED.
ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner Stanley Ray Hunt II’s convictions
for three counts of rape and his sentence to an aggregate term of 480 months’ imprisonment.
Hunt v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 53, 454 S.W.3d 771. Hunt filed a petition in this court in
which he requests this court’s permission to proceed in the trial court with a petition for a writ
of error coram nobis to challenge the convictions. The petition for leave to proceed in the
trial court is necessary because the trial court can entertain a petition for writ of error coram
nobis after a judgment has been affirmed on appeal only after we grant permission. Jackson v.
State, 2018 Ark. 227, 549 S.W.3d 356. Hunt does not provide a meritorious basis for issuance
of the writ in his petition, and we deny the petition.
Hunt was convicted of raping his niece, who was fourteen years old when she first
reported the abuse to her school principal and vice-principal. Hunt’s proposed bases for issuance of the writ are not completely clear, but Hunt’s claims appear to turn on allegations
that the prosecution withheld evidence of specific dates on which the victim stated the rapes
occurred. He alleges these dates were listed on an incident report made by the school officials
to police officers. Hunt also complains that there are discrepancies in the dates of the crimes
in the information and amended information charging him, the prosecuting attorney’s
probable-cause affidavit, a detective’s report, and the school-incident report. He seems to
contend this was trial error and that the prosecution made false statements because the victim
had given specific dates in the incident report.
Hunt further asserts that he was incarcerated during a portion of the date range given
for the rapes and that there were violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), arising
from the prosecution withholding the school-incident report and because information about
his incarceration in 2007 was withheld from the jury. Hunt contends that he was prejudiced
as a result, that his attorney aided in the commission of the Brady violations by stating that no
specific date was alleged when the school-incident report indicated a specific date range and
time for the crimes, and that there was trial error in the admission of “false” evidence.
We will reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider error coram nobis relief only
when the proposed attack on the judgment is meritorious, and in making this determination,
we look to the reasonableness of the allegations in the petition and to the probability of the
truth thereof. Davis v. State, 2019 Ark. 172, 574 S.W.3d 666. A writ of error coram nobis is
an extraordinarily rare remedy, and coram nobis proceedings are attended by a strong
presumption that the judgment of conviction is valid. Martin v. State, 2019 Ark. 167, 574
S.W.3d 661. The function of the writ is to secure relief from a judgment rendered while there 2 existed some fact that would have prevented its rendition if it had been known to the trial
court and which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not brought forward
before rendition of the judgment. Id.
The writ is allowed only under compelling circumstances to achieve justice and to
address errors of the most fundamental nature. Id. A writ of error coram nobis is available for
addressing certain errors that are found in one of four categories: (1) insanity at the time of
trial, (2) a coerced guilty plea, (3) material evidence withheld by the prosecutor, or (4) a third-
party confession to the crime during the time between conviction and appeal. Id. The
petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a fundamental error of fact extrinsic to the record.
Id.
Hunt’s claims of trial error do not provide a basis for the writ. The writ is only granted
to correct some error of fact, and it does not lie to correct trial error or to contradict any fact
already adjudicated. Johnson v. State, 2019 Ark. 176, 575 S.W.3d 407. Claims of insufficient
evidence and claims of alleged false testimony at trial do not support the writ. Chatmon v. State,
2017 Ark. 229. Defects in the proceedings, including defects in the charging instruments, that
should have been raised during the proceedings are not within the scope of the limited
grounds on which the writ may issue. Alexander v. State, 2019 Ark. 171, 575 S.W.3d 401. To
the extent that Hunt alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, those claims are likewise not
cognizable in a coram nobis proceeding. Johnson, 2019 Ark. 176, 575 S.W.3d 407.
Allegations of a Brady violation, however, fall within the third category of fundamental
error warranting the writ’s issuance. Id. Yet the mere fact that a petitioner alleges a Brady
3 violation is not sufficient to provide a basis for error coram nobis relief, and the burden is on
the petitioner to make a full disclosure of specific facts that substantiate the merit of a Brady
claim. Davis, 2019 Ark. 172, 574 S.W.3d 666.
When a petitioner alleges a Brady violation as the basis for his or her claim of relief in
coram nobis proceedings, the facts alleged in the petition must establish that there was
evidence withheld that was both material and prejudicial such as to have prevented rendition
of the judgment had it been known at the time of trial that such evidence existed. Id.
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.
Hunt was aware at the time of trial that he had previously been incarcerated—in fact, he
testified about that incarceration at trial—so that information was not withheld.1 Hunt also
failed to allege any specific facts to support his conclusory claim that the incident report was
withheld. While he contends the jury did not see the report, he does not appear to contend
that the report was not provided to the defense. A petitioner does not satisfy any ground for
granting the writ when he does not allege that there was any evidence extrinsic to the record
that was hidden from the defense or that was unknown at the time of trial. Scott v. State, 2019
Ark. 94, 571 S.W.3d 451.
1 Hunt would not have been prejudiced if it had been. The sentencing order appears to list a specific date for the first rape count that falls outside the April 2007 to November 2007 time frame Hunt alleges he was incarcerated. That date is clearly a scrivener’s error because the date range for the first count in the information and testimony at trial was about an approximate range beginning in 2007 and ending in 2008. In any case, the time period that Hunt alleges he was incarcerated does not encompass the entire date range for the offense. 4 The record on direct appeal contains discovery receipts in which the defense
acknowledges having received three different incident reports. The testimony at trial made
clear that the school officials were required to report the incident, and Hunt has not shown
that the defense was unaware that the victim’s statements had to be reported or that the
incident reports were not available. In fact, trial counsel cross-examined the victim with her
initial sworn statement made in conjunction with the initial report. When the allegations in
support of issuance of the writ do not appear either reasonable or truthful, the court is not
required to accept the allegations in a petition for writ of error coram nobis at face value.
Mosley v. State, 2019 Ark. 14.
In any event, Hunt’s allegations that he was prejudiced by a withholding of information
about the dates in the incident report fail because the report does not give specific dates for
the incidents. The report provides only a range of time in which the events were alleged to
occur—a span of three years—and those dates were clearly not so specific as to potentially
exonerate Hunt. Where the defense is that the sexual acts never occurred and were entirely
fabricated, the lack of exact dates is not prejudicial to the defendant. Martin v. State, 354 Ark.
289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003). Trial counsel used the victim’s inability to remember any
specific dates as an unsuccessful challenge to her credibility, and Hunt has not shown that the
information in the incident report would have furthered that purpose or otherwise benefited
the defense. He therefore fails to meet his burden to demonstrate a potential error that would
have prevented rendition of the judgment had it been known at the time of trial.
HART, J., concurs. 5 Stanley Ray Hunt II, pro se petitioner.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Joseph Karl Luebke, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for respondent.