Stanley Pace a/k/a Stanley Joe Pace v. State of Mississippi;

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: February 4, 2020
• Docket: NO. 2018-KA-01622-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2018-KA-01622-COA

STANLEY PACE A/K/A STANLEY JOE PACE APPELLANT

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/10/2018 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. PAUL S. FUNDERBURK COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: MOLLIE MARIE McMILLIN ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BILLY L. GORE DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN WEDDLE NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 02/04/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., TINDELL AND C. WILSON, JJ.

C. WILSON, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. After a trial held October 8–10, 2018, a Monroe County jury convicted Stanley Pace

of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced Pace to serve life imprisonment in the

custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Pace filed a post-trial

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial, which was

denied by operation of Rule 25.3 of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 Pace now

1 Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.3 provides that “[a] motion for a new trial or a motion to vacate judgment pending thirty (30) days after entry of judgment shall be deemed denied as of the thirtieth (30th) day after the motion was filed.” appeals his conviction, raising only one ground for reversal, namely, that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit in Pace’s contention, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. On January 15, 2016, Harold Williams spent the day with his friend Ronnie Duke.

That afternoon, the pair picked up Pace (Williams’s cousin) so Pace could work on the

brakes of Williams’s truck. The trio decided to take a quick road trip to Pace’s home in

Birmingham, Alabama, so Pace could get the necessary tools and check on his house before

returning to Williams’s trailer that evening.

¶3. After returning from Alabama, the trio spent the evening drinking excessively and

playing video games, rather than repairing Williams’s truck brakes. During the course of the

evening, while Williams and Pace were playing a video game, Pace and Duke got into a

fight. (According to Pace and Williams, Duke was angry because they excluded him from

playing the video game.) Duke approached Pace from behind, grabbed Pace in a chokehold,

and pulled Pace off his chair. The fight continued outside Williams’s trailer with Pace

“busting” Duke’s lip. Thereafter, Pace and Duke re-entered the home and appeared to make

amends. At some point later, Duke pulled out a small pocketknife, which prompted Williams

to remove his replica Civil War sword off the wall and say, “[T]hat’s not a knife . . . this is

a knife.” Pace testified that after Duke pulled his pocketknife out, he told Duke that he was

“scared of a knife” and “whatever you do, please do not pull another knife on me because I

am [deathly] scared of it.” After this exchange, the trio resumed drinking, playing video

2 games, and watching movies.

¶4. Later in the night, Pace and Duke fought again. Heavily intoxicated, Pace ran outside

to vomit off the porch. Duke followed Pace and pushed Pace off the porch. Williams ran

outside and found Pace face down in the grass. Duke announced that he was leaving and

began walking down the road. Pace stood up, re-entered Williams’s trailer, grabbed

Williams’s Civil War sword, and proceeded to tell Williams, “I am going to kill [Duke].”

Pace took off after Duke, armed with the sword. Williams went back inside. Williams

testified that Pace returned to the trailer in the early hours of January 16, 2016, and told

Williams, “I killed your friend.”

¶5. On January 17, 2016, Williams called the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office to report

that Pace had killed Duke. Williams told deputies that Pace had used Williams’s truck to

move Duke’s body. Officers found blood spots inside and outside Williams’s truck and

found a pool of blood in the grass about 250 to 300 feet away from Williams’s trailer.

Officers also noticed drag marks from the pool of blood to a wooded area across the street.

While the officers found more blood on the leaves in the woods, they did not find Duke’s

body or the murder weapon there. The deputies eventually found a large blade under

Williams’s trailer; however, the handle was missing. The officers returned to the crime scene

and found a handle near the pool of blood, but the officers could not match the handle and

the blade because the blade was missing the tang to hold the handle in place. Duke’s body

was also still missing.

3 ¶6. Pace was arrested on January 17, 2016. Pace was read his Miranda rights2 and then

was interviewed at the sheriff’s office. At first, Pace denied any knowledge of what

happened to Duke. But during the interview, Pace eventually admitted that he and Duke

were involved in a fight and that he “busted [Duke’s] lip.” According to Pace, Duke walked

away after their second fight and then came back inside the trailer and sat down in the living

room. Duke then announced that he was leaving and left the trailer. Pace stated that he did

not know if someone came to pick up Duke or if Duke walked away.

¶7. Personnel with the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office interviewed Pace again the

following day. This time, Pace admitted to taking Williams’s sword and following Duke

when Duke left the trailer after their second fight. Pace also described the deadly altercation

between Duke and himself that occurred on the side of the road. Pace stated that Duke

brandished the pocketknife he had displayed earlier and that Pace tried to knock it out of his

hand with the sword. Pace told the investigator that there was a struggle, and he admitted

to stabbing Duke “three or four times” with the pocketknife. Pace told the investigator that

Duke’s “last words [were] ‘I am going to kill you[,]’ [and] I said, ‘No you are not,’ and I

think I cut his throat.” Pace stated that he then went back to the trailer, took Williams’s

truck, loaded Duke’s body, and dumped Duke’s body in a gully a few miles from the crime

scene. After the conclusion of the second interview, Pace willingly accompanied the officers

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The record reflects that Pace waived his Miranda rights prior to the interrogation.

4 to the location of Duke’s discarded body.

¶8. A Monroe County grand jury indicted Pace for first-degree murder on November 23,

2016. Pace’s three-day trial began on October 8, 2018. At trial, Dr. John Brentley Davis,

who was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified that Duke “had

been stabbed at least nineteen times in the chest” and suffered “a broken arm[,] . . . fractures

to his skull[,] . . . bleeding around his brain, [and] injuries from the stab wounds to his left

lung, heart and diaphragm . . . .” Dr. Davis described stab wounds and chop wounds, as well

as defensive wounds to Duke’s palm and right hand and arm. Dr. Davis opined that based

on the severity of the wounds, the depth of the stab wounds, the skull fractures, and Duke’s

broken arm, these wounds were caused by a larger blade than a small pocketknife. Dr. Davis

concluded that “[t]he cause of [Duke’s] death [was] sharp and blunt force injuries.”

¶9. Williams testified to the events of that night and confirmed that when Pace came back

in the trailer, Pace told him, “Harold, I killed your friend.” Williams stated that he thought

Pace was joking and questioned Pace’s sincerity, to which Pace responded, “No, I’m serious.

I killed him.”

¶10. Pace testified in his own defense. Pace said that he killed Duke in self-defense,

stating that during their roadside fight, Duke told him, “I am [going] to kill you,” while he

was holding Pace in a chokehold with the pocketknife in his hand. Pace testified that he

could feel Duke’s pocketknife against his wrist. Pace also testified that he had “lost” the

sword during the fight but that he was able to pry Duke’s pocketknife out of his hand. Pace

5 admitted to stabbing Duke “two or three times” with the pocketknife. Pace said that after the

stabbing, he “felt [Duke’s] spirit come out of his body.” Pace confirmed that the sword’s

blade and handle somehow broke during this incident. Pace never denied killing Duke. In

fact, Pace largely corroborated Williams’s testimony, testifying that after the killing, he

returned to Williams’s trailer covered in blood and told Williams that he had killed Duke.

¶11. The circuit court gave Pace’s self-defense jury instructions, which instructed the jury

(1) to find Pace not guilty if Pace “had reasonable cause to believe . . . that he was in

imminent danger of being killed or receiving serious bodily harm at the hands of [Duke], and

that it was necessary for [Pace] to stab [Duke] to save his own life”; (2) that “all that is

necessary . . . to establish self-defense is that at the time of the killing, the [d]efendant had

reasonable grounds to apprehend danger of his life or good reason to believe that his life was

in danger on account of the actions of the deceased”; and (3) that Pace was “not required to

retreat or to consider whether he could safely retreat” and could stand his ground and use

reasonable force “[i]f he honestly and reasonably [was] in fear of death or serious bodily

harm.” The circuit court also gave the State’s jury instructions on the lesser-included

offenses of second-degree murder, heat-of-passion manslaughter, and culpable-negligence

manslaughter.3 The jury found Pace guilty of first-degree murder, and the circuit court

sentenced Pace to serve life imprisonment in the custody of the MDOC.

¶12. On October 19, 2018, Pace filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

3 Pace’s trial counsel did not object to any of these instructions.

6 or, alternatively, a new trial, which was denied by operation of Mississippi Rule of Criminal

Procedure 25.3. Pace appeals, contending that he received ineffective assistance from his

trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to request another jury instruction for “imperfect” self-

defense. We find no merit in Pace’s assignment of error and therefore affirm.

DISCUSSION

¶13. Pace contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to request

a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense manslaughter. “This Court rarely reviews

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct review.” Boudreaux v. State, 189 So. 3d

1274, 1280 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Aguilar v. State, 847 So. 2d 871, 878 (¶17)

(Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “However, we ‘will rule on the merits on the rare occasions where

(1) the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions, or (2) the

parties stipulate that the record is adequate to allow the appellate court to make the finding

without consideration of the findings of fact of the trial judge.’” Id. (quoting Aguilar, 847

So. 2d at 878 (¶17)). “Review on direct appeal . . . is confined strictly to the record.” Id. at

(¶20) (citing Colenburg v. State, 735 So. 2d 1099, 1101 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). Here,

Pace raises ineffective assistance as his only issue, and the parties stipulate that the record

is adequate for appellate review. We therefore reach the merits of Pace’s claim.

¶14. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Pace must show that (1) “his counsel’s

performance was deficient,” and (2) this deficiency “prejudiced his defense.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s

7 performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance, “the defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Boudreaux, 189 So. 3d at 1280 (¶21)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Further, “[f]or an ineffective-assistance claim, the

context of counsel’s actions are carefully reviewed, and ‘where reasonable under the

circumstances, we presume the decisions were sound trial strategy.’” Cooley v. State, 271 So.

3d. 765, 773 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (other internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Sea v. State, 49 So. 3d 614, 617 (¶12) (Miss. 2010)).

¶15. At trial, the record indicates that Pace’s trial counsel requested—and the court

gave—a jury instruction on “perfect” self-defense.4 Pace’s instruction instructed the jury to

find Pace not guilty if they found that he “reasonably believed that [Duke] was attempting

to stab [him] . . . and that [Pace] had reasonable cause to believe . . . that he was in imminent

danger of being killed or receiving serious bodily harm . . . and that it was necessary for

[Pace] to stab [Duke] to save his own life.” On appeal, Pace contends that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial counsel’s failure to request an additional

instruction on imperfect self-defense manslaughter. Pace argues that such an instruction was

warranted because the “facts of the case turn on the reasonableness of Pace’s actions,” and

the evidence at trial supported such an instruction. Pace asserts that the jury should have

4 In his briefing on appeal, Pace does not acknowledge that a self-defense instruction was requested by his counsel and given by the court. Pace only acknowledges the manslaughter instructions requested by the State.

8 been instructed to consider whether Pace killed Duke while under a bona fide, though

unreasonable, belief that he had to kill Duke to protect himself.

¶16. “When reviewing jury instructions, [this Court] read[s] the instructions ‘as a whole

to determine whether the jury was fully and fairly instructed according to the applicable

law.’” Jackson v. State, 68 So. 3d 709, 712-13 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Clark

v. State, 40 So. 3d 531, 544 (¶36) (Miss. 2010)). “A defendant is entitled to have jury

instructions given which present his theory of the case, however, this entitlement is limited

in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law . . . or is without

foundation in the evidence.” Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 745 (¶142) (Miss. 2003)

(quoting Humphrey v. State, 759 So. 2d 368, 380 (¶33) (Miss. 2000), abrogated on other

grounds by Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 39 (¶¶22-23) (Miss. 2003)).

Nevertheless, “if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly,

announce the applicable rules of law, no error results.” David v. State, 130 So. 3d 1141,

1146 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Clark, 40 So. 3d at 544 (¶36)).

¶17. Pace asserts that the following evidentiary foundation supported an imperfect self-

defense jury instruction: (1) Pace’s testimony that he killed Duke during the roadside

struggle; (2) his testimony that Duke told him that he would kill Pace; (3) his testimony that

Duke pulled a pocketknife on Pace before the roadside struggle; (4) Williams’s testimony

that Duke was the initial aggressor during the fights that took place at Williams’s home; and

(5) Williams’s testimony that Duke pulled the pocketknife on Pace after the initial fight.

9 Given this evidence, Pace contends that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to request

such an instruction, giving rise to “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Boudreaux,

189 So. 3d at 1280 (¶21) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). We disagree.

¶18. First, Pace fails to show that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient. “We are

reminded here that ‘there is no single, particular way to defend a client or to provide effective

assistance.’” Cooley, 271 So. 3d at 773 (¶29) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 736 So. 2d 500,

511 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). The record reflects that Pace’s trial counsel requested

three instructions pertaining to self-defense and that the State requested jury instructions on

second-degree murder, heat-of-passion manslaughter, and culpable-negligence manslaughter.

Trial counsel’s failure to request an additional imperfect self-defense instruction may well

have been driven by trial strategy, which, based on the record, was centered around theories

of self-defense and heat-of-passion manslaughter. While Pace has the right to present his

theory of the case, that “right is not absolute,” Jackson, 68 So. 3d at 713 (¶12), and here,

Pace fails to overcome the strong presumption that his counsel’s performance fell within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

¶19. Regardless, we also find the second prong of Strickland is not met. In other words,

even if trial counsel was deficient for failing to offer an imperfect self-defense manslaughter

instruction, Pace fails to show how this omission prejudiced his case. In Cooley v. State, this

Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to offer a defense-of-

10 others instruction. Cooley, 271 So. 3d. at 773 (¶29). This Court concluded that Cooley

“fail[ed] to show that there was a reasonable probability the instruction would have changed

the outcome of the trial.” Id. This was because “[Cooley] [did] not overcome the strong

presumption that, under the circumstances, his defense counsel not offering this instruction

was part of his trial strategy.” Id. This Court noted that “[o]ffering such an instruction may

have detracted from his theory of self-defense, which appeared to be his primary theory” and

that “[a] defense-of-others theory was not strongly elicited during witness testimony by

defense counsel, and it was only mentioned briefly during closing argument.” Id.

¶20. Likewise, Pace “fails to show that there was a reasonable probability” that the

imperfect self-defense manslaughter instruction “would have changed the outcome of the

trial.” Id. During his closing argument, Pace’s trial counsel stated that Pace was “asking [the

jury] to determine whether or not [they] [thought] he acted out of self-defense or in the heat

of passion.” Counsel also told the jury that after reviewing the evidence and instructions,

“that if you don’t believe this was entirely self-defense, in fact if you don’t believe [that]

there was any self-defense in this at all, you will see clearly that it is in fact a heat of passion

case, and that it is manslaughter and not deliberate determined murder.”

¶21. In addition to counsel’s jury argument, as stated supra, Pace’s trial counsel requested

jury instructions pertaining to self-defense, and the State requested jury instructions on

second-degree murder, heat-of-passion manslaughter, and culpable-negligence manslaughter.

When taken as a whole, these instructions “fully and fairly” instructed the jury on the

11 applicable law. Jackson, 68 So. 3d at 713 (¶12). Not only was the jury adequately instructed

on the charged offense (first-degree murder), the jury was also instructed on lesser-included

crimes (second-degree murder, heat-of-passion manslaughter, and culpable-negligence

manslaughter), as well as Pace’s theory of self-defense. “It is easy [for Pace] to be a Monday

morning quarterback” and retrospectively pick out and analyze “the defects and flaws” in

trial counsel’s “tactics and strateg[ies]” pertaining to jury instructions. Berry v. State, 345

So. 2d 613, 615 (Miss. 1977) (citing Rogers v. State, 307 So. 2d 551, 552 (Miss. 1976)). But

Pace fails to establish a reasonable probability that had his attorney requested an imperfect

self-defense instruction, the jury verdict would have been different.

¶22. Pace had “no constitutional right to errorless counsel” but was entitled to “competent

counsel.” Parker v. State, 30 So. 3d 1222, 1233 (¶38) (Miss. 2010). On the record in this

case, we cannot find that Pace’s trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly,

Pace’s assignment of error on appeal is without merit.

¶23. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, TINDELL, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.