COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Causey, Raphael and Senior Judge Clements UNPUBLISHED
STANLEY EUGENE COLEY MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 2167-23-2 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 14, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY Randall G. Johnson, Jr., Judge
(Stephen A. Mutnick; Winslow, McCurry & MacCormac, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Stanley Eugene Coley appeals his convictions, following a conditional guilty plea, for
possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I/II controlled substance and possession of a
firearm by a violent felon. On appeal, Coley argues that the trial court erred when it denied his
motions to suppress the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm the convictions.1
BACKGROUND
“In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we ‘consider the facts in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.’” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).
“It is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence in such a manner, the trial
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). court committed reversible error.” Id. (quoting Hairston, 67 Va. App. at 560). “While we are
bound to review de novo the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we
‘review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Long v.
Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700, 712 (2021) (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
On October 12, 2021, Henrico County Sergeant William Bodenhamer while in an
unmarked vehicle and plain clothes was surveilling a Super 8 hotel for drug activity. During the
period of surveillance, Sergeant Bodenhamer observed a black Cadillac, driven by Coley, leave
the Super 8 hotel from the rear. Sergeant Bodenhamer followed Coley along Broad Street and
then onto I-64. As Coley merged onto I-64, he “went from the onramp lane straight to the
middle lane and then turned his blinker on when he got into the left lane and proceeded down in
the left lane.” Sergeant Bodenhamer noted that Coley’s maneuver from the merge lane to the
middle lane “affected traffic because . . . there was . . . steady traffic through that area.” Sergeant
Bodenhamer then paced Coley at a speed of 75 to 80 miles per hour. Sergeant Bodenhamer
relayed his observations over the radio to Officer Christopher Russell who stopped the vehicle.
Sergeant Bodenhamer then requested a canine unit to respond to the traffic stop, which he
explained was a normal course of action during a traffic stop.
Officer Russell approached Coley’s vehicle and requested his license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance.2 Coley produced his license and registration but not his
insurance card. Officer Russell returned to his patrol vehicle and ran Coley’s license and
registration through his computer system.
2 Officer Russell’s body-worn camera was activated during the stop and was played for the trial court. -2- Four minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Russell returned to the stopped vehicle for
Coley’s insurance card. Coley told Officer Russell that he was having difficulty accessing his
insurance information on his phone. Officer Russell waited outside Coley’s vehicle for five
minutes while Coley looked for his insurance. When Coley did not produce proof of his
insurance card, Officer Russell returned to his vehicle to finish the ten-minute traffic stop. There
Officer Russell reviewed the registration replies from the DMV and VCIN, ran Coley’s
passenger’s information for a second time, researched the proper code sections that Coley had
violated, and determined his next available traffic court date. Officer Russell tried to enter the
information into the E-ticket system but had to restart the program.3
Approximately 15 minutes into the traffic stop, Henrico County Police Officer Stephen
Rowe and his canine, Colt, arrived in response to Sergeant Bodenhamer’s request for a canine
unit. Officer Russell, meanwhile, was still preparing the traffic ticket. Officer Rowe first
approached Coley’s vehicle without Colt, and explained to Coley and his passengers that he
would conduct an open-air sniff4 of the vehicle. Officer Rowe then retrieved his canine and ran
the dog around the vehicle. At the time of the open-air sniff, Coley, his two passengers, and one
of the passenger’s pit bull were in the vehicle. When Colt alerted, Officer Rowe informed the
other officers and the vehicle’s occupants were removed.
A search of the vehicle produced a gray backpack in which the officers found a firearm.
Coley, a felon, admitted that the gray backpack was his, and he was subsequently arrested and
transported to jail. Upon arrival, officers recovered a baggie of suspected controlled substances
3 The record is unclear when Officer Russell took each of these actions. At the motion to suppress, Officer Russell testified while watching his body camera footage but did not identify the timestamps relating to each of the actions he took. 4 Officer Rowe explained that he would run Colt around the vehicle while commanding Colt to find drugs. -3- on Coley, which subsequently tested positive as cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine in
amounts inconsistent with personal use.
Before trial, Coley moved to suppress evidence obtained during the traffic stop of his
vehicle. At the hearing on the motion, Officer Russell acknowledged that traffic stops average
between 10 and 15 minutes. Officer Russell explained that when he returned to his patrol
vehicle after talking with Coley a second time, he struggled with the E-ticket system, confirmed
the correct traffic code section for the ticket, and determined his next available traffic court date.
Officer Russell was aware that Officer Rowe was in route but denied intentionally prolonging the
traffic stop.
Officer Rowe acknowledged that he was responding to a request to assist officers with a
traffic stop. He could not remember how long it took him to arrive at the stop and noted that he
simply followed his GPS to the call. He also acknowledged that it was possible that he used his
lights and sirens while in route to the stop.
Coley argued that the stop was unlawful because there was no traffic infraction. Once
stopped, Coley contended that Officer Russell’s failure to timely issue the traffic summons
unjustifiably extended the stop for Officer Rowe’s arrival.
The trial court denied Coley’s motion to suppress. The trial court found that Coley
crossed several lanes of traffic without signaling, affecting traffic. Concerning Coley’s argument
that the duration of the stop was impermissibly extended, the court found that “a good portion of
the time is attributed to Mr. Coley not having his insurance card.” The court also ruled that any
delay attributed to the Commonwealth—Officer Russell’s search for the correct code section,
looking up court dates, and restarting the E-ticket system—did not unreasonably extend the
-4- On August 28, 2023, Coley filed a second motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the October 21, 2021 traffic stop. Coley argued that Officer Russell had no lawful
authority to request him to produce proof of his vehicle insurance. Consequently, “the request
and subsequent time spent searching for it impermissibly extended the traffic stop to allow the
K9 to arrive.” Additionally, Coley contended that the canine was not reliable and could not
establish probable cause to search his vehicle.
At the hearing on Coley’s second motion to suppress, the trial court found that Coley’s
insurance argument was a new argument on the same underlying issue, whether the officer
impermissibly extended the traffic stop. The court ruled that it would not consider the issue. In
the alternative, the court held that asking for Coley’s insurance did not impermissibly extend the
traffic stop as Officer Russell had the right to investigate the insurance issue. The trial court
allowed Coley to proceed on the canine reliability issue.
Officer Rowe testified that he had been with the Henrico canine unit since 2019. In
January 2021, Officer Rowe received his second canine partner, Colt, and the pair attended a
16-week narcotic detection school. Colt was trained to detect and alert to odors of cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine, and ecstasy and was certified to detect those drugs in May 2021.
Between May 2021 and October 2021, Officer Rowe and Colt had conducted at least a hundred
exercises and completed weekly training exercises. As of Coley’s second motion to suppress
hearing, Colt was still an active drug dog.
On cross-examination, Officer Rowe explained that Colt’s training consisted of
distraction exercises. Officers would set out food, toys, and had other dogs near things to be
searched and then run their dogs around those items. When given the command to search for
drugs, Colt was never distracted by food, toys, or other dogs. Although Colt was never trained
-5- with dogs inside a vehicle, he had successfully run searches of vehicles containing dogs after
training.
At the time of Coley’s traffic stop, Officer Rowe would keep both dogs and people in the
vehicle while running Colt. Officer Rowe’s policy of leaving people and dogs inside the vehicle
while running Colt has changed because Colt had become more aggressive when he detects an
odor. Consequently, it is safer for all involved in the search if people and animals are first
removed from the vehicle before the open-air sniff is conducted. Officer Rowe denied that the
presence of people in the car would interfere with Colt’s ability to smell drugs.
Concerning the pit bull involved in Coley’s stop, Officer Rowe could not remember what
that pit pull was doing because his focus was on Colt. Officer Rowe asserted that the pit bull did
not distract Colt. Officer Rowe also admitted that there were “possibly” times when Colt alerted
but no drugs were discovered. He maintained, however, that if the scent was emanating from a
vehicle, “it’s not even possible for [Colt] to miss it.” The only reason Colt would not alert was if
the scent was not able to get out of the vehicle. Officer Rowe also explained that it was possible
for Colt to alert to a narcotic’s “residual odor.”
During re-direct examination, Officer Rowe explained that Colt behaves “totally different
at home” than he does at work. At home, Colt sits and stares when Officer Rowe comes and
goes and is only aroused for his Kong toy or his food bowl. When Officer Rowe is in uniform,
Colt “knows that it’s his job to get in [the] vehicle and then go to work.” When working, Colt is
focused on finding drugs.
Coley argued that Colt was unreliable. Colt was not trained for situations where another
dog was in the vehicle he was directed to search, yet a dog was left in the vehicle during Colt’s
open-air sniff of Coley’s vehicle. Additionally, Officer Rowe was aware that Colt “does not do
well around people,” yet Coley and his passengers were left in the vehicle during the open-air
-6- sniff. He contended that Officer Rowe believed Colt is infallible and “ultimately this is master
and dog relationship” and Colt is always looking to be rewarded when he is given the command
to look for drugs.
The trial court denied Coley’s second motion to suppress finding that Colt was reliable.
The court noted that Officer Rowe had gone through training with Colt and that there was no
indication Colt was unreliable. Although there were people and another dog in Coley’s vehicle,
the presence of another dog does “not ipso facto mean that Colt is unreliable.” Further, Officer
Rowe testified that Colt responded appropriately and as trained.
On September 28, 2023, Coley conditionally pleaded guilty to possession of drugs with
intent to distribute, first offense, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon reserving his
right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress.5 The trial court sentenced
Coley to 30 years’ incarceration, with 21 years suspended. Coley appeals.
ANALYSIS
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress the evidence based on an alleged Fourth
Amendment violation, “we defer to the trial court’s ‘findings of historical fact,’ taking care to
review them ‘only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges.’” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Malbrough v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 169 (2008)). We “presume—even in the absence of specific factual
findings—that the trial court resolved all factual ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence in
5 Coley was originally charged with possession of a firearm while in possession of drugs with the intent to distribute; three counts of possession of drugs with intent to distribute, second offense; possession of a firearm as a convicted felon; and obstruction of justice. The Commonwealth amended Coley’s possession of drugs with intent to distribute, second offense to possession of drugs with intent to distribute, first offense and nolle prosequied the remaining charges. In exchange, Coley pleaded guilty to possession of drugs with intent to distribute, first offense and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress. -7- favor of the prevailing party and gave that party the benefit of all reasonably debatable inferences
from the evidence.” Hill v. Commonwealth, 297 Va. 804, 808 (2019). “[T]he appellant bears the
burden of showing that the ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the
Commonwealth, constituted reversible error.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 452, 458
(2018) (quoting Sanders v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 734, 743 (2015)). But we “must determine
independently whether the manner in which the evidence was obtained meets the requirements of
the Fourth Amendment.” Moore v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 30, 36 (2018) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Robertson, 275 Va. 559, 563 (2008)). And we review the trial court’s application
of law de novo. Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 13.
Coley argues that the maneuver Sergeant Bodenhamer described did “not rise to a violation
of either” Code §§ 46.2-804 or -848. Coley also claims that the traffic stop was unconstitutionally
prolonged when Officer Russell asked for his insurance information. Finally, Coley claims that
the drug detection dog in this case was generally unreliable and could not form the basis for a
search of his vehicle. We will address each of these arguments in turn.
I. The traffic stop of the vehicle was lawful.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A traffic stop is a ‘“seizure” of the occupants of the vehicle and
therefore must be conducted in accordance with the Fourth Amendment.’” Jones v.
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 375, 380 (2019) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60
(2014)). To justify the traffic stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that the person
stopped committed a crime or traffic violation. McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553
(2008).
Reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop “must be based upon specific and articulable
facts.” Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 368 (2016). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is more
-8- than a ‘mere hunch’ but less than ‘proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’”
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 23 Va. App. 598, 610-11 (1996). The “mere ‘possibility of an
innocent explanation’ does not necessarily exclude a reasonable suspicion that the suspect might
be violating the law.” Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 732, 736 (2011).
Code § 46.2-804(2) provides that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as is practicable
entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has
ascertained that such movement can be made safely.” Code § 46.2-848 requires that
[e]very driver who intends to back, stop, turn, or partly turn from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made safely and, whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give the signals required in this article, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle, of his intention to make such movement.
Sergeant Bodenhamer followed Coley as he merged onto I-64. Coley moved from the
merge lane to the middle lane without first establishing himself in the right lane of I-64 and
without signaling. Sergeant Bodenhamer attested that the maneuver occurred in steady traffic at
about 1:00 p.m. and that Coley’s maneuver affected other vehicles traveling along I-64.
Sergeant Bodenhamer radioed his observation to Officer Russell, who initiated the traffic stop.
Given these facts, Officer Russell had reasonable suspicion to believe that Coley had violated
either Code § 46.2-804(2), when he moved from a lane before he ascertained if that maneuver
was safe to do so, or Code § 46.2-848, when he failed to signal to other drivers who may be
affected by his lane change. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that the traffic stop
was lawful.
II. The stop was not impermissibly extended.
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.
348, 350 (2015), “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the
stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” “A seizure -9- justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for
the violation.” Id. at 350-51 (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005)). An officer “may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful
traffic stop”—such as a dog sniff—but he “may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop” if he
does not also have “the reasonable suspicion” of other criminal activity “ordinarily demanded to
justify detaining an individual.” Id. at 355. The seizure of the traffic stop “remains lawful only
‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)). Rodriguez
rejected the idea that prolonging a stop without reasonable suspicion can be de minimis. Id. at
356-57.
Tasks that fall within the lawful scope of a traffic stop include those related to securing
officer safety, maintaining the safety of the highways, checking the driver’s license, inspecting
the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance, and determining whether the driver has
outstanding warrants. Id. at 355-56. Tasks that exceed the mission of the stop include
questioning the motorist about his criminal history and waiting for the arrival of “a K-9 unit to
conduct a dog sniff.” Matthews v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 334, 345 (2015).
Whether a stop has been prolonged by an officer is heavily fact-dependent, turning on
whether such action “adds time to[] the stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In reviewing the facts, appellate courts give great deference to the trial court’s
findings. E.g., Bagley, 73 Va. App. at 13.
When Officer Russell stopped Coley’s vehicle he asked for Coley’s license, vehicle
registration, and proof of insurance. Coley produced his license and registration but was unable
- 10 - to immediately produce proof of his insurance. Officer Russell returned to his patrol vehicle and
ran a check of Coley’s license and registration.
Four minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Russell returned to Coley’s vehicle and
inquired if Coley had found his insurance. Coley indicated that his insurance was on his phone
but that he was having difficulty pulling up the insurance information. Officer Russell
confirmed that he understood and spent five minutes at Coley’s window waiting for Coley to
provide his insurance information.
Ten minutes into the traffic stop, Officer Russell returned to his patrol vehicle and
reviewed the results he had requested from his computer system and began Coley’s E-ticket.
Officer Russell admitted he struggled with the E-ticket system and had to restart the program.
He was still preparing the E-ticket when Officer Rowe arrived 15 minutes into the traffic stop
and proceeded to conduct the open-air sniff of Coley’s vehicle with Colt, taking two minutes.
Considering the circumstances in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Officer
Russell’s request for Coley’s insurance information did not improperly extend the length of the
traffic stop, and the trial court did not err in denying Coley’s motion to suppress on this basis.
III. The evidence proved that the drug-sniffing dog was reliable.
The Virginia Supreme Court has held that “a positive alert from a narcotics detection dog
establishes probable cause to conduct a search of a vehicle and that evidence seized during the
search is admissible after a proper foundation has been laid to show that the dog was sufficiently
trained to be reliable in detecting narcotics.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 180 (2009).
A “dog’s reliability can be established from its training and experience, as well as a proven track
record of previous alerts to the existence of illegal narcotics.” Id. at 180-81. “Specific
certifications and the results of field testing are not required to establish a sufficient foundation.”
Id. at 181. “[I]f the dog’s qualifications are challenged, [however,] the trial court may consider
- 11 - any relevant evidence in determining whether the Commonwealth has established the dog’s
reliability in detecting narcotics.” Id.
Coley argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish Colt’s reliability. He
noted that Colt only received weeks of training, only passed two or three tests to gain his
certification, and was taught to please his handler. Colt was not trained for situations where
another dog was in the vehicle. Additionally, Officer Rowe was aware Colt “did not run people
well,” yet Coley and his passengers were left in the vehicle during the open-air sniff. Moreover,
Officer Rowe seemed to believe that Colt was infallible.
The trial court did not err in holding that Colt was reliable. Officer Rowe testified at
length regarding his and Colt’s qualifications. Officer Rowe testified that he had been a canine
handler since 2019 and that Colt was his second canine partner. Officer Rowe and Colt received
specialty training at a 14-to-16-week program. Training included familiarization with Colt’s
alerts. Colt was certified to detect odors of cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and ecstasy in
May 2021. Between May 2021 and October 2021, Officer Rowe and Colt had conducted at least
a hundred exercises and completed weekly training exercises. Since the October 2021 traffic
stop, Colt had been recertified.
Considering the evidence of the narcotics detection dog’s training, experience, and
reliability in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial court did not err in rejecting
Coley’s claim that Colt was unreliable and in denying Coley’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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