Stanley Burton v. SHRA

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STANLEY BURTON, No. 2:23-cv-03034 DAD AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER and FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 SHRA, 15 Defendant. 16 17 Plaintiff proceeds in this action pro se, and pre-trial proceedings are accordingly referred 18 to the undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21). Before the court is defendant’s motion for 19 summary judgment (ECF No. 50), which plaintiff opposes (ECF Nos. 53, 60, 63). Defendant has 20 filed a reply. ECF No. 65. Also before the court is defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s 21 deposition errata (ECF No. 51), which plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 44), and to which defendant 22 submitted a reply (ECF No. 58). Finally, plaintiff has moved for sanctions for submission of false 23 statements (ECF No. 61), which defendant opposes (ECF No. 66). 24 For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that defendant’s motion for 25 summary judgment (ECF No. 50) be GRANTED. It is further ordered that defendant’s motion to 26 strike (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED and plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (ECF No. 61) is DENIED. 27 I. Complaint and Relevant Procedural History 28 Plaintiff initially sued the Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency (“SHRA”), 1 Laila Darby (SHRA director) and Ibra Henley (SHRA Hearing Coordinator), for violations of the 2 Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. ECF No. 1 at 3-4. 3 Defendants Darby and Hensley were dismissed from the case after plaintiff failed to complete 4 service in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), leaving SHRA the sole defendant. ECF Nos. 32, 5 35. 6 Plaintiff and his wife participate in SHRA’s Housing Choice Voucher program and are in 7 possession of a voucher for a one-bedroom apartment. Plaintiff alleges that on June 4, 2021, and 8 on April 13, 2022, he requested an extra bedroom to be added to his existing housing voucher 9 because of his sleep apnea and degenerative disc disease, asserting that he needs a separate space 10 for his sleep apnea machine apparatus. ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff alleges he was not afforded the 11 opportunity to participate in SHRA’s housing programs and was denied equal access under 12 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 13 Id., ECF No. 21 at 9-13. Plaintiff asserts further that he was denied a reasonable accommodation 14 for his disability, and that SHRA violated their own auxiliary policy under 24 CFR 5.611(c). 15 Plaintiff alleges he has medical notes provided by two different healthcare providers supporting 16 the need for a second bedroom. Id. Plaintiff asked for $65,000 in punitive damages for mental 17 anguish, loss of sleep, and anxiety. Id. at 6. 18 Defendant moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and on August 19 9, 2024, the undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations that the motion to dismiss be 20 denied except as to the issue of punitive damages, which are not available under the ADA or RA. 21 ECF No. 21 at 12. The District Judge adopted the Findings and Recommendations, and 22 plaintiff’s complaint was construed as seeking compensatory damages only. ECF No. 22. The 23 case proceeded through discovery, which closed on December 3, 2025. ECF No. 33. A pre-trial 24 conference and trial date have not been set. 25 II. Miscellaneous Motions 26 A. Motion to Strike Deposition Errata 27 On August 27, 2025, defense attorney Jay C. Patterson took plaintiff’s deposition in 28 person in Patterson’s office. ECF No. 51-1 (Declaration of Jay C. Patterson) at 1. A copy of the 1 transcript of the deposition is attached to the Patterson Declaration at Exhibit A. ECF No. 51-2. 2 On or about September 16, 2025, the court reporting service advised plaintiff that the transcript 3 had been prepared and was ready for his review. ECF No. 51-1 at 2. Patterson subsequently 4 received a copy of plaintiff’s “Errata Sheet” identifying approximately 78 requested changes to 5 the 118-page transcript. The Errata Sheet is attached as Exhibit C (ECF No. 51-2 at 142-157) to 6 the Patterson declaration, with numbers added by Patterson in red for ease of reference. ECF No. 7 51-1 at 2. 8 Patterson reviewed the Errata Sheet and found that it largely consisted of proposed 9 substantive changes to the record, and categorized the proposed changes into five categories as 10 follows: (1) changes that are at least reasonably similar to the original testimony in that the 11 substance of the response does not significantly change (changes 1, 2, and 4); (2) changes that 12 modify the substance of plaintiff’s spontaneous response in deposition (changes 5-7, 11-14, 19, 13 21-24, 26, 28, 42, 46-47, 55-59, 64, 69, 90, and 97); (3) corrections that add substantive 14 information to the original answer (3, 8-10, 17-18, 20, 27, 31, 34, 62-63, 67-68, 76, 80, 102, 104, 15 and 105); (4) changes that insert wholly new answers and information, including improper 16 argument (16, 25, 29-30, 32-33, 35-40, 43-45, 48-53, 60-61, 65-66, 70-75, 77-79, 81-89, 91-96, 17 98-101, 103, 106-108); and (5) changes to Patterson’s question asked at the deposition, rather 18 than the answer (change 41). ECF No. 51-1 at 2-3. Patterson also identified several changes that 19 were duplicative of one another (changes 13 and 14, 19 and 24, 38 and 43, 39 and 44, 46 and 55, 20 47 and 56, 48 and 50, 49 and 51, 58 and 59, 60 and 84, 61 and 66, 62 and 67, 63 and 68, 64 and 21 69, 65 and 70, 71 and 73, 72 and 74, 75 and 79, 76 and 80, 77 and 81, 78 and 82, 82 and 85, 86 22 and 93, 87 and 94, 88 and 95, 89 and 96, 90 and 97, 91 and 98, 99 and 100, 101 and 103, and 102 23 and 104. Id. at 3. Defendant moves to strike the changes in categories 2-5 as noncompliant with 24 the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e). 25 Pursuant to FRCP Rule 30(e), a deponent “must be allowed 30 days after being notified 26 by the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which: (A) to review the transcript or 27 recording; and (B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the 28 changes and the reasons for making them.” FRCP Rule 30(e)(1). If a review was requested and 1 changes were made, the deposition officer “must attach any changes the deponent makes during 2 the 30-day period.” FRCP Rule 30(e)(2). The list of changes made to the deposition transcript is 3 commonly referred to as an “Errata Sheet.” The Ninth Circuit has found that errata sheets are 4 subject to the “sham rule,” explaining that “[w]hile the language of FRCP 30(e) permits 5 corrections ‘in form or substance,’ this permission does not properly include changes offered 6 solely to create a material factual dispute in a tactical attempt to evade an unfavorable summary 7 judgment.” Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enters., Inc., 397 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 8 2005). The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “Rule 30(e) is to be used for corrective, and not 9 contradictory, changes.” Id. at 1226. “In determining whether a deposition errata constitutes a 10 sham, courts consider circumstances including [1] the number of corrections, [2] whether the 11 corrections fundamentally change the prior testimony, [3] the impact of the corrections on the 12 cases (including whether they pertain to dispositive issues), [4] the timing of the submission of 13 corrections, and [5] the witness’s qualifications to testify.” Karpenski v. Am. Gen. Life 14 Companies, LLC, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2014). “Even where a court finds that 15 errata are not shams, the court may still strike portions that constitute contradictory rather than 16 corrective changes.” Id. 17 Here, the court agrees with defendant that the errata sheet should be stricken in part, as to 18 the changes identified above in categories 2-5, because all factors except for the timing of the 19 errata submission weigh in favor of striking. First, plaintiff submitted over 95 corrections, a 20 number far greater than those found excessive in other cases. See, e.g., Karpenski, 999 F. Supp. 21 2d at 1225 (finding 29, 45 and 16 changes to be substantial as to three separate depositions). 22 Second, many of the proposed changes are substantive. For example, at correction number 6 23 plaintiff changed the response “Yeah, thereabouts” to “I can’t remember.” ECF No. 52-2 at 142. 24 Third, the substantive proposed corrections go to the central issues of this case. For example, 25 correction 35 changes “I never requested specifically only to use the extra bedroom for my sleep 26 apnea machine ‘exclusively’” to “I never requested a extra bedroom only because of my CPAP 27 machine equipment what I stated was I requested a extra bedroom because of my sleep apnea and 28 degenerate disc disease and to have a place for my CPAP machine equipment. I never requested 1 a reasonable accommodation just based on my sleep apnea by itself please see attached health 2 disclosure information forms I have been consistent additionally, my health care providers have 3 also stated why I needed the accommodations.” ECF No. 5-2 at 147. As to the fifth factor, 4 plaintiff was fully qualified to testify as to his own knowledge regarding his own claims. 5 The only factor that weighs against striking the improper changes is the fourth (timing), 6 because plaintiff submitted the errata sheet before defendant filed its motion for summary 7 judgment. Plaintiff argues that the changes made in defendant’s identified categories 2-5 should 8 not be stricken because he “only tried to fix incorrect words recorded by the court reporter for 9 clarification of my answers due to having misspelling and misspoken and misunderstood the 10 question my changing my ‘yes’ to a ‘No’ was I believe a justifiable reason I also changed my 11 deposition errata sheet because [I] remembered a fact differently.” ECF No. 55 at 2. This is not 12 persuasive because of the nature of depositions: “depositions are different from interrogatories as 13 they are not a ‘take home examination.’” ViaSat, Inc. v. Acacia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16CV463 14 BEN (JMA), 2018 WL 899250, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2018). Errata sheets are simply not 15 intended to serve as an opportunity to alter testimony upon further consideration by the deponent. 16 The court agrees that the errata sheet changes identified by the defendant in categories 2-5, 17 discussed above, are out of compliance with the Federal Rules. 18 Because it is legally and factually supported, the motion to strike (ECF No. 51) is 19 GRANTED. In the interest of clarity and finality, however, the undersigned notes that whether 20 the motion to strike were granted or denied, the recommendation on summary judgment 21 explained below would be unchanged because even entirely excluding plaintiff’s deposition, the 22 evidence is sufficient to warrant summary judgment in defendant’s favor. 23 B. Motion for Sanctions 24 Plaintiff asks the court to sanction the defendant, asserting that defense counsel Patterson 25 submitted as an exhibit an altered version of a Licensed Professional Certification of Need from 26 his healthcare provider Behang Mai-Woods, PA. ECF No. 61 at 2. Plaintiff contends the exhibit 27 was altered because the original certification is signed, but defendant submitted an unsigned 28 version, and plaintiff contends this proves alterations were made. Id. Defendant responded, 1 noting that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is untimely and procedurally defective, and explaining 2 that no documents have been altered, but that there are different versions of various forms. ECF 3 No. 66 at 1-5. Further, defendant submitted a declaration from Patterson explaining that the 4 document plaintiff takes issue with as “fraudulent,” but which defendant contends is an entirely 5 separate Certification document that exists in addition to the signed Certification, was never even 6 submitted to the court. ECF No. 66-1. Plaintiff did not submit a reply. The court has reviewed 7 the documents and finds no evidence of document alteration or any other wrongdoing. 8 Accordingly, the motion for sanctions (ECF No. 61) is DENIED. 9 III. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment 10 Defendant moves for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is appropriate 11 when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 12 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under summary 13 judgment practice, “[t]he moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a 14 genuine issue of material fact.” In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) 15 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The moving party may accomplish 16 this by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, 17 electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for 18 purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by 19 showing that such materials “do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that 20 an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 56(c)(1). 22 Summary judgment should be entered, “after adequate time for discovery and upon 23 motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 24 element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 25 trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element 26 of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323. In such 27 a circumstance, summary judgment should “be granted so long as whatever is before the district 28 court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 1 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. 2 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing 3 party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. 4 Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). In attempting to establish the 5 existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the allegations or denials 6 of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or 7 admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 56(c). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a 9 fact “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” Anderson v. Liberty 10 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 11 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., “the evidence is such that a 12 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 13 In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not 14 establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “‘the claimed 15 factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the 16 truth at trial.’” T.W. Elec. Service, Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. 17 Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to 18 pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for 19 trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 20 “In evaluating the evidence to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, [the 21 court] draw[s] all inferences supported by the evidence in favor of the non-moving party.” Walls 22 v. Cent. Costa County Transit Auth., 653 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). It is 23 the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be 24 drawn. See Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to 25 demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is 26 some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations 27 omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 28 non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank, 391 1 U.S. at 289). 2 IV. Statement of Undisputed Facts 3 Unless otherwise specified, the following facts are either expressly undisputed by the 4 parties or have been determined by the court, upon a full review of the record, to be undisputed 5 by competent evidence. Defendant’s statement of undisputed facts is located at ECF No. 50-2 6 and is supported by the declaration of defense counsel and associated exhibits (ECF Nos. 50-3, 7 50-4). Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed facts is located at ECF No. 63, and plaintiff attached 8 various exhibits to his opposition at ECF No. 53. Defendant replied to plaintiff’s statement of 9 undisputed facts. ECF No. 65-1. 10 On or about June 14, 2021, plaintiff submitted a written request for a second bedroom to 11 be added to his existing one-bedroom housing choice voucher “because of my chronic sleep 12 apnea which is a sleep disorder.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 1 (June 4, 2021 Authorization for Use or 13 Disclosure of Health information, together with Behang Mai-Woods’ February 12, 2020 Licensed 14 Physician or Attending Health Care Professional’s Certification of Need for Reasonable 15 Accommodation); Ex. 26 (Plaintiff’s Deposition Transcript) at 18:1-6, 27:15-24, 28:11-29:7. The 16 request was accompanied by a Licensed Physician or Attending Health Care Professional’s 17 Certification of Need for Reasonable Accommodation (“Certification”) signed by Behang Mai- 18 Woods, PA-C dated February 12, 2020. Patterson Decl., at Ex. 1 (Certification dated February 19 12, 2020). 20 The Certification indicated as follows: “The Applicant needs the following modification 21 to accommodate his/her disability: Extra room for sleep apnea equipment.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 22 1 at 3. Part III of the Certification contains a required “check the box” question, asking the 23 provider to identify whether the requested modification would “improve quality of life OR” 24 whether the accommodation is medically necessary. Id. at 4. Mai-Woods checked the box 25 indicating that the accommodation would improve quality of life; she did not check the box 26 indicating that the accommodation was medically necessary. Id. The follow-up to the “check the 27 box” question asked for an explanation of how the requested accommodation provides the patient 28 with equal opportunity and access to housing; this portion was left blank by Mai-Woods. 1 Patterson Decl. at Ex. 1, page 4; Ex. 26, at 36:20-37:4. 2 SHRA reached out to Mai-Woods on July 21, 2021, requesting as follows: “Please 3 provide nexus/connection between disability and requested accommodation. If response is not 4 received, request will be voided in 21 days.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 2 (fax cover sheet dated July 5 21, 2021). Hearing no response, SHRA reached out to Mai-Woods again on September 1, 2021, 6 requesting as follows: “Please explain the connection between disability related need and request 7 accommodation. What is the nexus?” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 3 (fax communication dated 8 September 1, 2021); Ex. 11 (SHRA fax to Mai-Woods dated November 19, 2021). 9 On October 11, 2021, SHRA advised plaintiff that it had not received sufficient 10 supporting documentation to support the request and therefore was voiding the request. Patterson 11 Decl. at Ex. 5 (correspondence from Ibra Henley to plaintiff dated October 11, 2021); Ex. 8 12 (correspondence from Tyler Thao to plaintiff referring to the void letter and Behang Mai-Woods’ 13 Certifications). On November 9, 2021, Housing Assistant Tyler Thao wrote to plaintiff 14 requesting a call to discuss how to resubmit his request for a second bedroom. Ex. 6 (November 15 9, 2021 letter from Thao to plaintiff); Ex. 7 (plaintiff’s November 10, 2021 email to O’Daniel). 16 Also on November 9, 2021, Thao contacted plaintiff and informed him of the October 11 letter 17 indicating that plaintiff’s June 4, 2021 request was voided. Ex. 7 (plaintiff’s November 10, 2021 18 letter to O’Daniel); Ex. 8 (Thao correspondence to plaintiff dated November 10, 2021). 19 On November 10, 2021, Thao again wrote to plaintiff to explain that the Certification 20 from Behang Mai-Woods was incomplete. Patterson Decl. Ex. 8 (Thao to plaintiff November 21 10). On November 14, 2021, plaintiff wrote to SHRA director Ibra Henley to further describe his 22 medical conditions/disabilities. Patterson Decl. Ex. 9 (plaintiff’s November 14, 2021 23 correspondence to Henley). In this note, plaintiff wrote, “So the answer to your question about 24 the NEXUS/CONNECTION BETWEEN why I need the extra bedroom is because this would 25 allow me to get some rest and sleep without disturbing my wife who I might add suffers from 26 bipolar disorder my constant inability to sleep and my insomnia will exacerbate her sleep, as it 27 does mine if I have my own bedroom I will not disturb her.” Id. 28 On November 15, 2021, plaintiff submitted a new request, stating: “I am requesting a 2 1 two bedroom to be added to our housing voucher because of my medical necessity of my chronic 2 sleep apnea, loud snoring, awakening sporadically, difficulty sleeping, insomnia, cognitive 3 impairment.” The request was not accompanied by a completed Certification. Patterson Decl. at 4 Ex. 10 (plaintiff’s November 15, 2021 Authorization for Use or Disclosure of Health Information, 5 together with a blank Certification). On November 19, 2021, SHRA staff wrote to Mai-Woods 6 again requesting that Mai-Woods complete pages 3 and 4 of the Certification and specifically 7 requesting that Mai-Woods “Please list nexus/connection between client’s disability and request 8 for an additional bedroom for medical equipment. How will having an additional bedroom 9 provide the client with equal opportunity and access to housing?” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 11 10 (SHRA fax to Mai-Woods dated November 19, 2021). On November 23, 2021, Mai-Woods 11 returned the Certification with the following written in response to Part III: “Patient need extra 12 room for medical equipment to help patient with interrupt sleep which result in multiple benefit 13 including but not limited cardiac and respiratory function.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 12 14 (Certification page 4, with fax header dated November 23, 2021). 15 On February 1, 2022, SHRA Program Integrity Analyst employee Marc Ledet wrote 16 to plaintiff to request photographs of the medical equipment and supplies in order to evaluate 17 plaintiff’s need for an additional bedroom. Patterson Decl. at Ex. 13 (Ledet February 1, 2022 18 letter to plaintiff); Ex. 14 (plaintiff’s correspondence to Ledet). On or before February 6, 2022, 19 plaintiff sent photos of his CPAP machine to Ledet via certified mail. Ex. 14 (Burton February 6- 20 8, 2022 correspondence to Ledet with photos). At some time between February 6, 2022 and 21 February 17, 2022, Ledet received and reviewed the photos of plaintiff’s CPAP machine to 22 evaluate plaintiff’s need for an additional bedroom and determined that “[b]ased on the size and 23 quantity of the additional equipment I do not recommend an additional bedroom at this time.” 24 Patterson Decl. Ex. 15 (undated Ledet letter). 25 On February 17, 2022, SHRA Director Laila Darby advised plaintiff that his request was 26 denied on the grounds that the “amount of equipment that you have does not appear to warrant an 27 additional bedroom.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 16 (Darby February 17, 2022 letter to plaintiff); Ex. 28 17 (plaintiff’s February 22, 2022 correspondence to Darby). On February 22, 2022, plaintiff 1 wrote to Darby in response to SHRA’s denial, disagreeing with SHRA’s conclusion “because the 2 amount of equipment does not NEGATE the fact that we do qualify under SHRA’s 3 ACCOMMODATION POLICY and also under ADA POLICY REGARDING DISABILITY 4 STANDARDS and should not be simply based on the amount of equipment but be based on the 5 FACTS that the disabled person / applicant has provided,” and referring to the other reasons he 6 needed a second bedroom, including “by having the two bedroom I would not be disturbing my 7 wife’s sleep WHO suffers from BIPOLAR disorder[.]” Id. Plaintiff’s letter closed with 8 “THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECONSIDERATION.” Id. On March 7, 2022, nurse practitioner 9 Carissa Caryotakis wrote a letter addressed “To Whom it May Concern,” stating: “Stanley Burton 10 has been diagnosed with severe sleep apnea and therefore would benefit from 2 bedroom 11 apartment with his wife in order to improve sleeping situation and breathing at night.” Patterson 12 Decl. at Ex. 18. 13 On March 22, 2022, Laila Darby advised plaintiff that his request had been denied, 14 explaining that SHRA has determined that plaintiff’s “needs can be met without increasing the 15 voucher size.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 19 (March 22, 2022 Darby letter); Ex. 26 (plaintiff’s 16 deposition), at 60:19-61:2; 68:12-69:9. Darby explained that in determining if a reasonable 17 accommodation request such as plaintiff’s requires a change, SHRA is guided by “the Housing 18 and Urban Development (HUD) regulations, the Housing Authority’s administrative plan and the 19 Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) guide book.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 19 (March 22, 2022 Darby 20 letter). Darby pointed plaintiff to the Code of Federal Regulations at 24 CFR 982.402, which 21 states that in relevant part that “subsidy standards must provide for the smallest number of 22 bedrooms needed to house a family without overcrowding” and that “[o]ne bedroom will be 23 allotted for the head of household and spouse or co-head and one bedroom will be assigned for 24 each additional two persons.” Darby noted that the regulations provide that “a living room may 25 be used as a sleeping (bedroom) space, but no more than two persons may occupy the space.” Id. 26 Pursuant to these guidelines, Darby recommended that plaintiff make alternative sleeping 27 arrangements within the bounds of his current voucher. Id. 28 On April 14, 2022, Caryotakis filled out a new Certification, this time stating that 1 plaintiff’s request for a second bedroom was “medically necessary” because “Stanley 2 Burton has been diagnosed with severe obstructive sleep apnea and degenerative disc disease and 3 would benefit from 2 bedroom which is necessary to have to support his medical conditions.” 4 Patterson Decl. at Ex. 20 (April 13, 2022 Authorization for Use or Disclosure of Health 5 Information together with April 14, 2022 Certification). That same day, Caryotakis signed a 6 letter addressed “To Whom it May Concern” identifying plaintiff’s severe obstructive sleep apnea 7 and degenerative disc disease and stating her belief that it was necessary for plaintiff to have a 2- 8 bedroom apartment.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 21 (Caryotakis April 14, 2022 correspondence). 9 On May 3, 2022, Ibra Henley sent notice of a Zoom hearing regarding the denial, to take 10 place on May 17, 2022. Patterson Decl. at Ex. 22 (Henley May 3, 2022 letter to plaintiff). On 11 May 8, 2022, plaintiff wrote to Henley to expressly decline the invitation to the hearing, but 12 asking Henley to forward the hearing invitation Caryotakis. Patterson Decl. at Ex. 23 (Burton 13 May 8, 2022 correspondence). Specifically, plaintiff took issue with the fact that no evidence 14 was to be presented at the hearing and wrote “thank you for asking me for my input at the hearing 15 but based on SHRA’S HEARING PROCESS I don’t believe that you need my presence. I have 16 given SHRA ALL OF what was requested of me regarding this whole accommodation process 17 and I’ve been more than cooperative with all of your representatives.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 23. 18 On May 17, 2022, SHRA held a hearing on plaintiff’s accommodation request, and plaintiff did 19 not appear. Patteson Decl. at Ex. 24 (default decision); Ex. 29 (Request for Admission to 20 Plaintiff, Set One), at No. 24 (6:4-5); Ex. 30 (Plaintiff’s Response to Requests for Admission at 21 No. 24 (9:2-5). Due to plaintiff’s failure to appear at the May 17, 2022 hearing, SHRA affirmed 22 its denial of plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation. Id. 23 V. Analysis 24 Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with 25 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act (§504). A plaintiff alleging a 26 violation of Title II of the ADA “must show: (1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; 27 (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s 28 services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and 1 (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” 2 Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir.1997) (italics 3 original). “A claim under Section 504 is composed of identical elements and applies to any 4 public program that receives federal financial assistance.” C.B. v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. 5 Dist., 732 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1156 (C.D. Cal. 2023), citing Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 6 at 1135; see also Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 1999). “SHRA 7 concedes for the purposes of this motion that plaintiff is an individual with a disability, that 8 SHRA receives federal assistance, and that plaintiff is otherwise qualified to receive the benefits 9 of SHRA’s HCV program.” ECF No. 50-1 at 10. SHRA argues that it is entitled to summary 10 judgment on all claims because plaintiff “has no competent evidence that he was denied any 11 benefits of the program by reason of his disability.” Id. The court agrees that defendant is 12 entitled to summary judgment on all claims. 13 A. Plaintiff Was Not Denied Any Benefit to Which He Was Entitled 14 SHRA considered plaintiff’s request for a second bedroom, which he stated was necessary 15 to accommodate his sleep apnea equipment and/or to improve his sleep, and concluded the 16 requested accommodation was not necessary because alternative sleeping arrangements were 17 possible within his current voucher. Specifically, plaintiff could (a) could store the equipment in 18 the bedroom or another common room and/or (b) he could sleep in a different room from his 19 wife, such as a common area. This proposal is consistent with regulations governing housing 20 subsidy standards for Section 8 Tenant-Based Assistance, specifically 24 C.F.R. § 982.402, which 21 requires a public housing agency (“PHA”) such as SHRA to “establish subsidy standards that 22 determine the number of bedrooms needed for families of different sizes and compositions.” 24 23 C.F.R. § 982.402(a)(1). As Ms. Darby explained to plaintiff in her March 22, 2022 letter, PHA’s 24 subsidy standards must “provide for the smallest number of bedrooms needed to house a family 25 without overcrowding,” and be applied consistently for all families of like size and composition. 26 24 C.F.R. § 982.402(b)(2)-(3). Patterson Decl. at Ex. 19. It is also consistent with HUD’s HCV 27 Guidebook, which provides that “a living room may be used as a sleeping (bedroom) space, but 28 no more than two persons may occupy the space.” Patterson Decl., at Ex. 19. 1 Further, the medical documentation furnished by plaintiff to SHRA did not demonstrate 2 that plaintiff needed a second bedroom to meaningfully participate in the Voucher program. Mai- 3 Woods’ November 23, 2021 Certification stated only that plaintiff needed an extra room for 4 medical equipment “to help patient with interrupt sleep which result in multiple benefit including 5 but not limited cardiac and respiratory benefit.” Patterson Decl., at Ex. 12. This statement does 6 not explain why an extra bedroom would address plaintiff’s interrupted sleep better or differently 7 than plaintiff sleeping in a common area. Likewise, Caryotakis’ March 7, 2022 letter and April 8 14, 2022 Certifications do not provide a nexus between the specific need for an extra bedroom 9 and plaintiff’s medical conditions. The March 7, 2022 letter says only that plaintiff “has been 10 diagnosed with severe sleep apnea and therefore would benefit from 2 bedroom apartment with 11 his wife in order to improve sleeping situation and breathing at night.” Patterson Decl. at Ex. 18. 12 The April 14, 2022 Certification stated only that plaintiff “has been diagnosed with severe 13 obstructive sleep apnea & degenerative disc disease & would benefit from 2 bedroom which is 14 necessary to have to support his medical conditions.” Ex. 20, at p. 4. None of these documents 15 establishes that plaintiff requires the accommodation of an extra bedroom to participate 16 meaningfully in the housing voucher program or explains why an additional bedroom is necessary 17 due to plaintiff’s disabilities. 18 The court agrees with SHRA that plaintiff has presented no evidence that his disability 19 requires a second bedroom, and so he was not denied any benefit to which he was entitled. The 20 court also agrees that to require SHRA to provide a second bedroom under the circumstances 21 presented in plaintiff’s case would constitute an undue burden to SHRA, because it would require 22 SHRA to subsidize plaintiff’s voucher beyond what is required under the current statutory 23 regime. Plaintiff has not identified evidence which creates a triable fact regarding his entitlement 24 to a two-bedroom voucher due to his disability or medical needs, and accordingly no jury could 25 find that he was “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits” of SHRA’s housing 26 voucher program. 27 B. Plaintiff Has Not Shown Any Discriminatory Intent 28 As a secondary basis for summary judgment in defendant’s favor, plaintiff has not shown 1 that SHRA acted with discriminatory intent toward him. Instead, as discussed in detail above, the 2 evidence clearly shows that SHRA employees considered plaintiff’s request for a second 3 bedroom as a reasonable accommodation, investigated the basis for the request, and found that (1) 4 it was not justified by the size of the medical equipment plaintiff alleged he needed space to store, 5 and (2) it was not justified by the danger of disturbing the sleep of plaintiff’s wife. Plaintiff has 6 contended in discovery and in his deposition that Laila Darby’s February 17 and March 22, 2022 7 letters evidence SHRA’s discriminatory intent. Specifically, Plaintiff points to the following 8 language, found in both letters, purportedly demonstrating that SHRA’s decision was made by 9 reason of Plaintiff’s disability: “Your request for an additional bedroom as a reasonable 10 accommodation for the disabilities of Stanley Burton is hereby denied.” See e.g., Patterson Decl. 11 at Ex. 26 (Deposition of Plaintiff), at 90:1 – 92:4, 94:10-14; 97:14-24; Ex. 29 (Requests for 12 Admission to Plaintiff, Set One at Request No. 13); Ex. 27 (Interrogatories to Plaintiff, Set One at 13 Special Interrogatory Nos. 12, 5:9-12). Plaintiff’s interpretation of this language as evidence of 14 discriminatory intent is not reasonable, based on the plain meaning of the language itself. 15 Having reviewed all the evidence presented and described in detail above, the undersigned 16 concludes that plaintiff has not put forth any evidence of discriminatory intent and accordingly 17 cannot succeed on either of his claims. 18 VI. Conclusion 19 It is hereby ORDERED that defendant’s motion to strike (ECF No. 51) is GRANTED and 20 that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions (ECF No. 61) is DENIED. 21 Further, for the reasons explained above, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendant’s 22 motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 50) be GRANTED and that judgment be entered in 23 favor of defendant. 24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 26 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 27 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a 28 document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 1 | Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on all 2 || parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file 3 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 4 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 5 | (th Cir. 1991). 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 || DATED: May 29, 2026 ~ g hon — Choe ALLISON CLAIRE 9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16