NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-116
STANISLAV PALTIS
vs.
REGINA PALTIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Stanislav Paltis (husband), the former spouse of Regina
Paltis (wife), appeals from a divorce judgment challenging
certain aspects of the judge's property division. We affirm.
Background. The parties were married in April 2010, and
had one child together during the marriage. The husband was the
primary wage earner and was responsible for managing the
family's finances, while the wife was primarily responsible for
raising the parties' child and caring for the home.
During the first year of the marriage, the parties resided
together in the husband's property located in Allston which he
acquired and fully paid for in 1998 prior to their marriage.
The wife, who has "extensive employment experience in interior
remodeling and design," made improvements to the Allston
property by designing an extra bedroom and storage space. In March 2011, the parties purchased the marital home
located in Sharon for $470,000. The down payment on the marital
home was partially funded with the proceeds from the sale of the
husband's interest in his family's business. The parties also
used approximately $30,000 to $40,000 in cash that they had
received as wedding gifts to fund the marital home down payment.
Some of the parties' household expenses were paid by the wife's
rental income from a property that she owned in New Jersey.
After the wife sold the New Jersey property in 2015, she used a
portion of the proceeds to fund construction projects for the
marital home. The wife also used cash gifts from her mother to
fund house projects, including a $20,000 gift in October 2019 to
fund a window and siding project.
In June 2020, the husband filed a complaint for divorce. A
two-day trial was held in July 2021. At the time of trial, the
husband was residing in the marital home and the wife was
residing in an apartment with the child (the wife received
primary physical custody). The husband was earning an annual
income of $211,796; the wife was unemployed, but the judge
attributed an annual income to her of $70,000. 1 The husband was
ordered to pay $550 per week in child support; no alimony was
1 The judge found that the wife was capable of earning more with reasonable effort, having had recently turned down a job offer with an interior design firm for $70,000 per year.
2 awarded. With respect to the property division, the judge
assigned both the marital home and the Allston property to the
husband and ordered him to pay the wife (1) $287,406,
representing one-half of the marital home equity; and
(2) $111,000, representing one-half of the appreciation in value
of the Allston property during the marriage. 2 The husband
appealed that decision to this court.
Discussion. In an appeal challenging the division of
marital property, "[w]e review the judge's findings to determine
whether she considered all the relevant factors under G. L.
c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors."
Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014). "We will not
reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it
is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'" Id., quoting Baccanti v.
Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).
The husband contends that the judge erred in failing to
grant him a credit for his contribution to the marital home down
payment and in awarding the wife one-half of the appreciated
value of the Allston property, because both originated from his
2 The Allston property was worth $320,000 when the parties were married; the value had increased to $542,000 by the time of the divorce trial. At the time of trial, the marital home had a fair market value of $815,000 and a mortgage balance of $240,188, leaving equity of $574,812.
3 premarital assets that should have been excluded from the
property division. We disagree.
It is well settled that a judge has broad discretion to
assign property in a divorce, including premarital property.
See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977) (judge may assign
property owned by either spouse "whenever and however
acquired"). The judge was not required to give the husband a
dollar-for-dollar credit for his contribution of premarital
assets to the home's down payment, especially where the wife did
not receive a credit for her own contribution of premarital
assets (i.e., the proceeds from the sale of her New Jersey
property used to fund construction projects for the marital
home) and funds gifted by her mother. See Baccanti, 434 Mass.
at 789-792 (affirming equal division of marital estate where
judge's findings reflected consideration of husband's
contributions from premarital assets).
With respect to the Allston property, the judge excluded
its premarital value from the marital estate entirely, only
assigning the wife one-half of the property's appreciated value
during the marriage. The husband claims that it was error to
award the wife any portion of the appreciated value because she
made "minimal contributions" to the Allston property during the
marriage. The judge found, however, that the wife contributed
to the Allston property both through her overall contributions
4 to the marital partnership and through her interior design work
on the house. The judge therefore was well within her
discretion to assign the wife a portion of the appreciated value
of the Allston property. See Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App.
Ct. 151, 156-157 (1996) (judges permitted to include in marital
estate for purposes of equitable division both premarital assets
and assets accruing during marriage).
The husband also argues that the property division was
inequitable because the judge failed to appropriately consider
his greater financial contributions to the marital estate. The
judge found that the parties made relatively equal contributions
during the marriage. 3 See Moriarty, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 157
("The parties' respective contributions to the marital
partnership remain the touchstone of an equitable division of
the marital estate"). A judge may "consider the contribution of
each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or
appreciation in value of their respective estates and the
contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family
unit." G. L. c. 208, § 34. "Section 34 'must be read to apply
in a broad sense to the value of all contributions of the
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NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-116
STANISLAV PALTIS
vs.
REGINA PALTIS.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Stanislav Paltis (husband), the former spouse of Regina
Paltis (wife), appeals from a divorce judgment challenging
certain aspects of the judge's property division. We affirm.
Background. The parties were married in April 2010, and
had one child together during the marriage. The husband was the
primary wage earner and was responsible for managing the
family's finances, while the wife was primarily responsible for
raising the parties' child and caring for the home.
During the first year of the marriage, the parties resided
together in the husband's property located in Allston which he
acquired and fully paid for in 1998 prior to their marriage.
The wife, who has "extensive employment experience in interior
remodeling and design," made improvements to the Allston
property by designing an extra bedroom and storage space. In March 2011, the parties purchased the marital home
located in Sharon for $470,000. The down payment on the marital
home was partially funded with the proceeds from the sale of the
husband's interest in his family's business. The parties also
used approximately $30,000 to $40,000 in cash that they had
received as wedding gifts to fund the marital home down payment.
Some of the parties' household expenses were paid by the wife's
rental income from a property that she owned in New Jersey.
After the wife sold the New Jersey property in 2015, she used a
portion of the proceeds to fund construction projects for the
marital home. The wife also used cash gifts from her mother to
fund house projects, including a $20,000 gift in October 2019 to
fund a window and siding project.
In June 2020, the husband filed a complaint for divorce. A
two-day trial was held in July 2021. At the time of trial, the
husband was residing in the marital home and the wife was
residing in an apartment with the child (the wife received
primary physical custody). The husband was earning an annual
income of $211,796; the wife was unemployed, but the judge
attributed an annual income to her of $70,000. 1 The husband was
ordered to pay $550 per week in child support; no alimony was
1 The judge found that the wife was capable of earning more with reasonable effort, having had recently turned down a job offer with an interior design firm for $70,000 per year.
2 awarded. With respect to the property division, the judge
assigned both the marital home and the Allston property to the
husband and ordered him to pay the wife (1) $287,406,
representing one-half of the marital home equity; and
(2) $111,000, representing one-half of the appreciation in value
of the Allston property during the marriage. 2 The husband
appealed that decision to this court.
Discussion. In an appeal challenging the division of
marital property, "[w]e review the judge's findings to determine
whether she considered all the relevant factors under G. L.
c. 208, § 34, and whether she relied on any irrelevant factors."
Zaleski v. Zaleski, 469 Mass. 230, 245 (2014). "We will not
reverse a judgment with respect to property division unless it
is 'plainly wrong and excessive.'" Id., quoting Baccanti v.
Morton, 434 Mass. 787, 793 (2001).
The husband contends that the judge erred in failing to
grant him a credit for his contribution to the marital home down
payment and in awarding the wife one-half of the appreciated
value of the Allston property, because both originated from his
2 The Allston property was worth $320,000 when the parties were married; the value had increased to $542,000 by the time of the divorce trial. At the time of trial, the marital home had a fair market value of $815,000 and a mortgage balance of $240,188, leaving equity of $574,812.
3 premarital assets that should have been excluded from the
property division. We disagree.
It is well settled that a judge has broad discretion to
assign property in a divorce, including premarital property.
See Rice v. Rice, 372 Mass. 398, 400 (1977) (judge may assign
property owned by either spouse "whenever and however
acquired"). The judge was not required to give the husband a
dollar-for-dollar credit for his contribution of premarital
assets to the home's down payment, especially where the wife did
not receive a credit for her own contribution of premarital
assets (i.e., the proceeds from the sale of her New Jersey
property used to fund construction projects for the marital
home) and funds gifted by her mother. See Baccanti, 434 Mass.
at 789-792 (affirming equal division of marital estate where
judge's findings reflected consideration of husband's
contributions from premarital assets).
With respect to the Allston property, the judge excluded
its premarital value from the marital estate entirely, only
assigning the wife one-half of the property's appreciated value
during the marriage. The husband claims that it was error to
award the wife any portion of the appreciated value because she
made "minimal contributions" to the Allston property during the
marriage. The judge found, however, that the wife contributed
to the Allston property both through her overall contributions
4 to the marital partnership and through her interior design work
on the house. The judge therefore was well within her
discretion to assign the wife a portion of the appreciated value
of the Allston property. See Moriarty v. Stone, 41 Mass. App.
Ct. 151, 156-157 (1996) (judges permitted to include in marital
estate for purposes of equitable division both premarital assets
and assets accruing during marriage).
The husband also argues that the property division was
inequitable because the judge failed to appropriately consider
his greater financial contributions to the marital estate. The
judge found that the parties made relatively equal contributions
during the marriage. 3 See Moriarty, 41 Mass. App. Ct. at 157
("The parties' respective contributions to the marital
partnership remain the touchstone of an equitable division of
the marital estate"). A judge may "consider the contribution of
each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or
appreciation in value of their respective estates and the
contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker to the family
unit." G. L. c. 208, § 34. "Section 34 'must be read to apply
in a broad sense to the value of all contributions of the
3 The judge found that both parties "applied their income and earnings to the marital assets" and made "valuable and relatively equal contributions to the marital estate through earnings, child-care responsibilities, homemaking, and car[ing] for their real estate."
5 respective spouses towards the marital enterprise.'" Adams v.
Adams, 459 Mass. 361, 391 (2011), quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 5
Mass. App. Ct. 10, 17 (1977). "[T]he care and maintenance of a
child by a spouse . . . is a contribution to the marital
partnership" entitling that spouse to share in assets acquired
by the other spouse. Wheeler v. Wheeler, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 743,
745 (1996).
The husband's tabulation of each party's contribution to
the marital enterprise fails to acknowledge the wife's financial
contributions to the marital home and household expenses, her
contributions in improving both the Allston property and the
marital home through her interior design work, and her
nonfinancial contributions to the overall marital partnership as
homemaker and primary caretaker of the parties' child.
The judge's findings also reflect consideration of other
relevant factors under section 34, including the husband's
conduct in unilaterally withdrawing marital funds during the
pendency of the divorce proceedings, 4 the husband's potential
future inheritance (the wife's likelihood of inheritance was
unclear), and the husband's superior earning capacity compared
4 The judge found that during the divorce proceedings the husband withdrew $44,000 from marital accounts, which he then gifted to his parents. The judge found that the husband also made several other large withdrawals; she did not credit the husband's claim that he could not recall what the withdrawn funds were used for.
6 to that of the wife. See G. L. c. 208, § 34 (requiring judge to
consider each party's conduct during marriage, amount and
sources of income, and opportunity for future acquisition of
capital assets and income); Kittredge v. Kittredge, 441 Mass.
28, 38 (2004) (judge may consider spouse's dissipation of
marital assets as part of conduct and contribution factors under
section 34).
The husband disputes the weight afforded by the judge to
each of the section 34 factors, but this is a matter squarely
within the judge's discretion. See Ross v. Ross, 385 Mass. 30,
37 (1982). The judge here considered all the relevant factors
under section 34 and there is no indication that she considered
any irrelevant factors. Because the property division here is
not "plainly wrong and excessive," we will not disturb it.
Zaleski, 469 Mass. at 245, quoting Baccanti, 434 Mass. at 793. 5
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Wolohojian, Milkey & D'Angelo, JJ. 6),
Clerk
Entered: January 24, 2024.
5 The wife's request for appellate costs and fees is denied. 6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.