Stanislas v. Cigna
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
January 11, 1996 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 95-1333
PATRICIA A. STANISLAS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
CIGNA and INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge, _____________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Boudin, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Timothy J. Ryan with whom Bradford R. Martin, Jr. and Ryan, ________________ _________________________ _____
Martin, Costello, Leiter, Steiger & Cass, P.C. were on brief for ______ _________________________________________
appellant.
Michael A. Davis for appellees. ________________
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. In this diversity case, plaintiff-appellant __________
Patricia A. Stanislas appeals from the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellees CIGNA and
its wholly owned subsidiary Insurance Company of North
America ("ICNA") on a sexual harassment claim under Mass.
Gen. L. ch. 151B. The district court found that Stanislas
failed to comply with the statute of limitations contained in
Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, 5. Our review of the grant of
summary judgment is plenary, and we read the record in the
light most favorable to the party contesting the summary
judgment. See, e.g., Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., ___ ____ _____________________ ___________
991 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1993).
Stanislas alleged that her immediate supervisor, John A.
Cvejanovich, engaged in repeated acts of sexual harassment
towards her beginning in November 1990. Stanislas, the
office administrator of ICNA's Springfield, Massachusetts,
field litigation office, and Cvejanovich, the managing
attorney, last worked together on April 26, 1991, the Friday
before Cvejanovich departed on a one-week vacation. On that
day, according to Stanislas' affidavit, Cvejanovich demanded
that Stanislas sleep with him or find someone else who would.
On April 30, 1991, Stanislas reported Cvejanovich's
conduct to another attorney in the office, who in turn
notified ICNA's area supervisor, John Gilfoyle. On May 2nd
-2- -2-
and 3rd, two ICNA attorneys, Gilfoyle and Rob Gilbride,
investigated Stanislas' claims. Gilfoyle instructed all of
the office employees to stay home on May 6th, Cvejanovich's
first day back at work; when Cvejanovich reported to work,
Gilfoyle confronted him with Stanislas' allegations and
offered him the choice of resigning or being terminated.
Cvejanovich resigned.
When the office employees, including Stanislas, reported
to work, Gilfoyle and Gilbride told them that Cvejanovich was
no longer employed by ICNA. The employees were also advised
to keep the matter confidential, and they were warned that
the legal consequences of discussing the incident would be on
the employees' heads.
Stanislas filed a complaint with the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") on October 30,
1991, and on June 22, 1992, brought the instant suit in
federal district court. This appeal concerns Stanislas'
claim under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, 4(16A), which makes it
unlawful for any employer "to sexually harass" an employee.
On that claim, the district court granted summary judgment
for defendants because Stanislas filed her MCAD complaint
more than 6 months after the last incident of harassment.
Before initiating a court action alleging a violation of
section 151B, a plaintiff must file a complaint with MCAD
within six months after the alleged act of discrimination.
-3- -3-
See Christo v. Edward G. Boyle Insurance Agency, Inc., 525 ___ _______ _______________________________________
N.E.2d 643, 645 (Mass. 1988); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 151B, 5,
9. "In the absence of a timely complaint to the MCAD, there
may be no resort to the courts." Sereni v. Star Sportswear ______ _______________
Manufacturing Corp., 509 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (Mass. 1987). The ___________________
last alleged incident of harassment occurred on April 26,
1991, but Stanislas' complaint with MCAD was not filed until
October 30, 1991, four days after the six-month cut-off date.
Stanislas challenges this conclusion on three grounds.
First, she argues that the district court misconstrued the
nature of her claim. M.G.L. ch. 151B, 1(18) defines sexual
harassment as:
Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
when (a) submission to or rejection of such
advances, requests or conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of
employment or as a basis for employment decisions;
(b) such advances, requests or conduct have the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with
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