Standring v. State of Maine

Maine Superior

Standring v. State of Maine

DecidedMarch 2, 2010

DocketKENcr-09-25

StatusUnpublished

This text of Standring v. State of Maine (Standring v. State of Maine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Standring v. State of Maine, (Me. Super. Ct. 2010).

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Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CRIMINAL ACTION DOCKET NO. CR-09-25 IV /11) .~. K[ fJ - ~.:;] 01[)

IAN STANDRING,

Petitioner ORDER ON PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION REVIEW v.

STATE OF MAINE

The petitioner was charged with two counts of gross sexual assault, class A; one

count of unlawful sexual contact, class B; one count of unlawful sexual contact, class C;

and one count of sexual abuse of a minor, class D. He was found guilty after a jury trial

of two counts of gross sexual assault, class A; one count of unlawful sexual contact,

class B; and one count of sexual abuse of a minor, class D. The class C unlawful sexual

contact count was dismissed.

The petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his

counsel failed to file a motion for relief from prejudicial joinder and failed to file a

motion to suppress his statements. For the following reasons, the petition for post-

conviction review is denied.

FINDINGS

Petitioner's counsel is a very experienced criminal law trial attorney. She

prosecuted criminal cases on behalf of the State as an Assistant District Attorney and an

Assistant Attorney General for thirteen years. She now practices criminal defense law

in private practice. At the time counsel was appointed to represent the petitioner in late 2006, he was

incarcerated on a probation hold. He remained incarcerated until the trial in March

2007.

Counsel sent the discovery to the petitioner. She asked the petitioner two times

to review and write his comments on the discovery. He never did.

He initially wanted to plead to the charges and receive the least amount of

incarceration possible. He wanted the new charges and the motion to revoke probation

to be concluded. Counsel received multiple plea offers beginning with ten years to be

served initially, and, ultimately, five and one-half years to be served initially. The

petitioner indicated that he would plead if the sentence to be served initially involved

fewer than eight years. In mid- February 2007, the amount of incarceration required in

the plea offer was reduced and the petitioner agreed to plead.

One month before the trial, counsel began preparing for the Rule 11 proceeding.

After discussions with his father, the petitioner decided that he wanted a trial and

would not plead to the charges.

Regardless of the petitioner's indication that he would plead, counsel reviewed

the discovery to determine whether to file pretrial motions. She does this in every case

in order to determine whether motions should be filed and whether there are issues that

will favor the defense during plea negotiations. In this case, counsel filed only a motion

in limine to exclude the petitioner's prior criminal record.

Counsel considered filing a motion to sever the counts and discussed the issue

with the petitioner. Counsel concluded that the older charges would be tried first if a

motion to sever were granted. But the jury would have heard about the reason for the

petitioner's going to the police station; the State undoubtedly would have sought to

2 introduce the testimony of both victims even if counsel succeeded on the motion to

sever.

Counsel determined that the multiple charges and victims worked to the

petitioner's advantage based on the theory that the young victims fabricated their

allegations. The petitioner alleged that both girls had crushes on him and when he

rejected them, they were angry and had a reason to get him in trouble. Further, the

victim of the sexual abuse of a minor charge had "a lot of baggage" that counsel believed

would affect the credibility of the other victim. Finally, the State would be better

prepared for the subsequent trials if the counts were severed. Accordingly, no motion

to sever was filed.

Prior to his arrest, the petitioner went to the Waterville Police Station to speak to

lawenforcement. He believed that the victim in count five was going to accuse him of

rape and he wanted his side of the story heard first. He was interviewed by Detective

David Caron, whom the petitioner had met previously. The interview took place in a

room at the police station and lasted for just over one hour. The interview was

videotaped. (Def.'s Ex. 1.)

During the interview, the petitioner confessed to having sexual contact with both

victims. He testified at trial that he confessed because he was confused and suffers

from depression; he alleged he was badgered by the officer so the petitioner told the

officer what he wanted to hear. (Trial Transcript at 150-64; 168-83; 85-86; 292-96; 304-05;

308-14; 316-29.)

Counsel viewed the videotape of the interview three times: twice by herself and

once with the petitioner. Counsel saw no basis on which the confession would be

excluded at trial. She concluded there was no custodial interrogation or police

3 misconduct and the statements were voluntary. Counsel does not file frivolous

motions, even if the statements will be difficult to deal with at trial.

Counsel discussed with the petitioner the difficulties with regard to the

confession. Counsel believed that it was in the petitioner's best interests to plead guilty

and take advantage of the offer of five and one-half years to be served initially. The

petitioner wanted a trial, however, and counsel determined that her job was to give him

a trial.

CONCLUSIONS

For trial issues, the petitioner must demonstrate that there has been serious

incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel that falls below that which might

be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney and that the ineffective representation by

counsel has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground

of defense. See State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, <]I 15-17, 699 A.2d 1139, 1143-44. "[T]he

test is applied on a case-by-case basis, and evaluations of ineffective assistance of

counsel claims are 'guided by the overall justness and fairness of the proceeding.'"

McGowan v. State, 2006 ME 16, <]I 12, 894 A.2d 493, 497 quoting Aldus v. State, 2000 ME

47, <]I<]I 14-15, 748 A.2d 463, 468.

Heightened deference is accorded in reviewing strategic or tactical decisions by

trial counsel. See True v. State, 457 A.2d 793, 796 (Me. 1983). The question is "whether

the strategy has been shown to be manifestly unreasonable." Id.

The decision not to file a motion to sever the charges was based on the defense

theory that these two victims made up their stories, that the credibility of the victim in

counts one through four would be adversely affected by the circumstances of the victim

in count five, and by the belief that the jury would hear about both victims even if the

counts were severed. This strategy has not been shown to be manifestly unreasonable.

4 The court has viewed the entire videotape of the petitioner's interview with

Detective Caron. Counsel was correct in her determination that a motion to suppress

statements would have been denied. The defendant was not in custody. His statements

were voluntary. There was no police coercion or misconduct.

The entry is

The Petition for Post-Conviction Review is DENEID.

Date: March 2, 2010 Nancy Mills Justice, Superior Co

5 IAN PETER STANDRING SUPERIOR COURT vs KENNEBEC, ss.

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