Standish v. Parker
This text of 19 Mass. 20 (Standish v. Parker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Although we are satisfied, that upon general principles and upon principles of sound policy, we should be exceedingly cautious of granting new trials where there has been once an opportunity to exhibit the whole matter of a case before the jury, we have nevertheless, at least some of us, been inclined to yield in this instance, from an apprehension which we all entertained, that the verdict sought to be removed would bind the petitioner for ever and conclusively, and all who are or may be privy in estate, upon the right set up by the respondents to have the front of their store' unobstructed by any building. Had the action tried been trespass or writ of entry, we should all have agreed to leave the petitioner to the higher remedy which the law would give him in real actions. But the injury complained of, and the right claimed by the respondents, did not admit of that kind of action; and we labored under the belief, that in any new action for a continuance of the supposed injury, the verdict and judgment in this case would be conclusive, so that the petitioner would be perpetually barred from defending himself, even if it were true that the facts would now show that the former judgment was wrong. We are now relieved from this difficulty, in consequence of researches made to ascertain the effect of this verdict upon any future action between these parties. We think it very clearly settled, that nothing is conclusively determined by the verdict, but the damages for the interruption covered by the declaration, and that in another action, if one should he brought, the petitioner will have full right to contest the respondents’ right to the easement, for the interruption of which this action was brought.1
The principle adopted is, that in actions of trespass, or for torts generally, nothing is conclusively settled but the point or points put directly in issue. Thus in trespass, upon not guilty [24]*24pleaded, the title is not concluded; though if the title is put in issue by a plea of soil and freehold, the ra-dict will be conclusive in another action of trespass for an injury done to the same land. So in actions on the case for interruption ol lights or other easements, on the general issue, the title is not settled ; though if the defendant pleads a title in bar, and issue is taken on it, the verdict shall settle that point for future actions.* *2
And this is conformable to the general reasonableness of the law, for it cannot be made to appear of record on a trial upon [25]*25the general issue, that the title ever came in question. In 1 Phillipps on Evidence, 236, this principle is laid down as settled, and the doctrine will be found to be supported in Manny v. Harris, 2 Johns. R. 24 ; Ryer v. Atwater, 4 Day, 431 ; Sintzenick v. Lucas, 1 Esp. R. 43.3 But the whole doctrine on this subject is most luminously displayed by Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Outram v. Morewood, 3 East, 353. The same doctrine was held by Jackson, late a justice of this Court, in the case of the Commonwealth v. Waite, in Middlesex, and his opinion was sanctioned by the whole Court. Under this view of the circumstances of this case, as another action will without doubt be brought, if the petitioner sees fit to continue his building at the risk of another suit, and as in such action he will not be impeded from setting up a defence upon the ground suggested as the cause for a new trial, the Court are unanimously of opinion that he can take nothing by his petition.1
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19 Mass. 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standish-v-parker-mass-1823.