Standifird v. Saul

District Court, S.D. California·Decided September 4, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-01630·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 Case No.: 20CV1630-BLM 8 VICTORIA ELIZABETH STANDIFIRD,

9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN 10 v. DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING OF FEES OR COSTS 11 ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY, 12 [ECF NO. 7] Defendant. 13

14 15 The instant matter was initiated on August 21, 2020 when Plaintiff filed a complaint “to 16 seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision and [to] request[] that this court reverse 17 that decision, or in the alternative, to remand this matter for a new hearing.” ECF No. 1 at 2. 18 That same day, Plaintiff filed an Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees 19 or Costs. ECF No. at 3.1 On September 1, 2020, the Court issued an Order Denying Without 20 Prejudice Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Of Fees or Costs 21 and Dismissing Complaint with Leave to Amend. ECF No. 5. 22 On September 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and refiled her Application 23 to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs. ECF Nos. 6-7. Having reviewed 24 the amended complaint and motion, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in district 25 court without prepaying fees or costs and finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficient to survive 26

27 1 Plaintiff filed a duplicate Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or 28 1 screening. 2 Application to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs 3 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the United 4 States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if 6 she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which states: 7 [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution 8 or defense of any suit, action or proceeding ... without prepayment of fees or 9 security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such [person] possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or 10 give security therefor. 11 12 The determination of indigency falls within the district court's discretion. California Men's 13 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds by, 506 U.S. 14 194 (1993) (“Section 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion 15 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute's requirement of indigency.”). It is 16 well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont 17 de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948). To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(a), “an affidavit [of poverty] is sufficient which states that one cannot because of his 19 poverty pay or give security for costs ... and still be able to provide for himself and dependents 20 with the necessities of life.” Id. at 339. At the same time, “the same even-handed care must 21 be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to underwrite, at public expense, 22 ... the remonstrances of a suitor who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 23 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984). District courts tend to 24 reject IFP applications where the applicant can pay the filing fee with acceptable sacrifice to 25 other expenses. See, e.g., Allen v. Kelley, 1995 WL 396860, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (Plaintiff 26 initially permitted to proceed IFP, later required to pay $ 120 filing fee out of $ 900 settlement 27 proceeds); Ali v. Cuyler, 547 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (IFP application denied because 28 the plaintiff possessed savings of $ 450 and that was more than sufficient to pay the $60 filing 1 fee). Moreover, the facts as to the affiant's poverty must be stated “with some particularity, 2 definiteness, and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981). 3 Plaintiff has satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she is entitled to IFP status. 4 According to her affidavit in support of application, Plaintiff is not employed and has no income. 5 ECF No. 7 at 1-2. Plaintiff does not have a checking or savings account and does not own a 6 home or car. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff does not spend any money on food, clothing, transportation, 7 recreation, or insurance. Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not expect any major changes to her monthly 8 income, expenses, assets, or liabilities over the next twelve months. Id. at 5. Based on the 9 foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established that she is unable to pay the $400 filing 10 fee. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP is GRANTED. 11 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915(a) 12 Complaints filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) are 13 subject to a mandatory screening by the Court. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 14 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); -se-e -al-so- -A-la-m-a-r- v-. -S-o-ci-a-l -Se-c-u-r-it-y, 2019 WL1258846, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 15 19, 2019). A complaint should be dismissed if it is (1) “frivolous or malicious;” (2) 16 “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted;” or (3) “seeks monetary relief against a 17 defendant who is immune from such relief.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 18 1126–27. 19 To survive, all complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 20 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 21 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 22 unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 23 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Furthermore, 24 “recitals of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not 25 suffice.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff must state a claim that is plausible on its face, meaning “the 26 pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 27 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 570)). “When there 28 are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine 1 whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Standifird v. Saul, (S.D. Cal. 2020).

Standifird v. Saul (Standifird v. Saul) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
335 U.S. 331 (Supreme Court, 1948)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ali v. Cuyler
547 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1982)
Temple v. Ellerthorpe
586 F. Supp. 848 (D. Rhode Island, 1984)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)