Standifer v. Metropolitan Dade County

519 So. 2d 53, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 272, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 274, 1988 WL 4029
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJanuary 26, 1988
DocketNo. 87-1194
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 519 So. 2d 53 (Standifer v. Metropolitan Dade County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standifer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 519 So. 2d 53, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 272, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 274, 1988 WL 4029 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Pursuant to an order of the county court (not challenged below or here), approximately fifty domesticated animals owned by the appellant were removed from his farm by County officials and remanded to the custody of the Humane Society.1 Subsequently, Standifer sued Metropolitan Dade County and the Humane Society, alleging in Count I of his amended complaint that the Humane Society sold his animals and unlawfully retained the proceeds of the sale. He appeals from an order dismissing Count I.2

We affirm the order of dismissal as to Metropolitan Dade County and reverse the order of dismissal as to the Humane Society upon the following briefly stated legal analysis.

[54]*54First, the County’s removal of the animals pursuant to a lawful court order is plainly not actionable where, as here, neither the legality of the order nor the act of removing the animals is challenged, and the dismissal of the County is therefore proper. Second, because the removal of the animals from Standifer’s farm merely ousted him from his right to custody and did not in the least affect his ownership interest, his suit against the Humane Society lies where he has alleged, albeit inartfully, that the Humane Society was unjustly enriched by the sale.3 According to Section 828.073(6), Florida Statutes (1985) (although applicable by its terms to auctions only), the Humane Society may retain only the expenses it has incurred in respect to the sale, care, and provision for the animals, with the remainder to go to the owner.4 Third, it follows from our reinstatement of Standifer’s cause of action for the net proceeds of the sale that the trial court’s transfer of Count II of Standifer’s amended complaint to the county court can no longer stand.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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Bluebook (online)
519 So. 2d 53, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 272, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 274, 1988 WL 4029, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standifer-v-metropolitan-dade-county-fladistctapp-1988.