Standard Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States

135 F. Supp. 892, 133 Ct. Cl. 402, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 6, 1955
DocketNo. 50250
StatusPublished

This text of 135 F. Supp. 892 (Standard Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 892, 133 Ct. Cl. 402, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95 (cc 1955).

Opinion

Jones, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff seeks to recover monies which it alleges are due under, certain contracts with the defendant. The parties have stipulated that defendant owes plaintiff $43,181.13 and that plaintiff owes defendant $8,497.76 under these contracts. The agreed net indebtedness in favor of the plaintiff therefore amounts to $34,683.37. Against this amount the defend[404]*404ant pleads ■ a counterclaim which, if sustained, has been stipulated to be $109,128.70. In this counterclaim defendant seeks to recover certain dividends which plaintiff received under a workmen’s compensation insurance policy and which defendant alleges were paid to plaintiff after defendant had reimbursed plaintiff for the amount of the original premiums.

Plaintiff is a California corporation, sometimes engaged in the ship repair business, which, on or about September 15, 1943, entered into three master ship repair contracts with different agencies of the defendant. These contracts were War Department No. W30-l79tc-188, Navy Department No. NOBS-10185, and War Shipping Administration No. WSA-^ 6045. The stipulated indebtedness of .$34,683.37 arises out of the Navy and War Shipping Administration contracts only. Except for the different Government agencies, each of these contracts contains the same original provisions and the same amendments. Certain detailed provisions of the common contract are quoted in the findings of fact. In general outline the contract provided as follows:

The contractor undertook to make repairs and alterations on vessels ordered to its plant for this purpose. Article 5 of the contract (together with minor provisions of other articles) set forth how plaintiff was to be compensated. Plaintiff was to receive a specified amount for each hour of “Payable Hours of Direct Labor.” The contract defined the latter term as the sum of the quotients obtained by dividing the total wages of workmen performing direct labor on the work by their respective wage rates. The amount which the original contract specified for each hour of payable hours of direct labor was revised from time to time by supplemental agreements negotiated between the parties. Section (d) of Article 5 provided for further negotiation of this amount at the instance of either party after the quarterly cost reports on operations under the contracts had been submitted to the Government; Should the parties be unable to agree the contract contemplated unilateral determination by the head of the agency.' The amount for each hour of payable hours of direct labor is called the billing rate.

[405]*405Article 5 also allowed plaintiff payment for the cost of its materials utilized directly on the work and for certain tools and facilities rented or furnished to the contractor in connection with the work. It authorized compensation for the cost of increased wages and related expenses resulting from retroactive mandatory orders of the War Labor Board. Under section (b) of Article 5 either party could request renegotiation of the price billed for work during a particular quarter or on an individual vessel under the •contract, and, in the event the parties could not reach an understanding, the agency was to decide the question unilaterally.

The facts show that while the supplemental agreements as to the billing rate resulted from bargaining, the parties gave great consideration to plaintiff’s actual cost factors in determining this amount. Finding 5 indicates the accounting procedures that were followed in formulating the applicable rates. The usual practice was to compute a rate on the basis of quarterly reports of costs incurred by the plaintiff in the execution of the contracts. This rate was then used in computing compensation to be paid for the ■quarter commencing one month after the end of the quarter for which cost computation had been made. As the plaintiff has pointed out, this method of payment had the effect of .giving compensation for one period on the basis of costs from another, earlier period.

During the time the contractor was carrying out its master .ship repair contracts, it carried workmen’s compensation insurance with the Industrial Indemnity Exchange. Plaintiff’s policies were participating policies under which it would be entitled to certain dividends from the surplus accruing to the carrier when the carrier’s receipts exceeded its losses. The carrier divided this fund among the firms it insured according to a formula which favored those participants with the best safety record. While plaintiff’s safety record during the first two years of its policies was such that it received no dividends, during 1944 and 1945 plaintiff’s safety record greatly improved and it was paid large dividends for those periods.

[406]*406Plaintiff did not receive the first of these dividend payments until near the end of its contracts with the Government, the other dividends not until long after the completion of the contracts. Since the contracts provided for substantially current payment, whatever costs for workmen’s compensation insurance had been considered in fixing plaintiff’s compensation did not take into account the dividends which plaintiff later received on its policies. The evidence does not allow any determination as to whether plaintiff' recovered from the Government all workmen’s compensation insurance costs that were properly allocable to the ship repair-contracts. Nevertheless, it permits the inference that the cost factors that were considered in negotiating the billing-rate included certain amounts for workmen’s compensation insurance. The parties have agreed that one hundred and seven-one hundredths of $109,128.70 is the amount of the-insurance dividends properly allocable to the three mastership repair contracts.

Defendant bases its right to recover on the following sentence in section (e) of Article 5 of the contract:

If the Contractor, after having been reimbursed,, either directly or indirectly, by the Government for any item of services, material or overhead, subsequently receives any additional sum as a discount, rebate, allowance, credit, salvage or commission in respect of any such item, the Contractor shall promptly pay to the Government an amount equal to eleven-tenths (11/10) of such additional sum.

Plaintiff contends that it does not fall within the strictures-of this clause: first, because it was not “reimbursed” by the-Government; and second, because a dividend on a workmen’s compensation insurance policy is not an additional sum received as a “discount, rebate, allowance, credit, salvage or commission in respect of any” item of “services, material or overhead”.

Before its argument on the merits, plaintiff raises several procedural objections addressed to defects in the pleadings. The Government pleaded in its counterclaim that “plaintiff is further obligated to pay to defendant under the provisions of Article 5 (e) of the contract, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit ‘D’, the sum of $112,472.93 rep[407]*407resenting sums received by the plaintiff from its insurance companies as reimbursement on premiums paid by plaintiff for Workmen’s Compensation insurance on employees working under the contract”. An earlier paragraph of defendant’s pleading had made reference to “both Navy Department Contract No. NOBS-10185 and War Shipping. Administration Contract No. WSA-6045, hereinafter referred to as ‘the contracts’ ”, but did not refer to the third contract.

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135 F. Supp. 892, 133 Ct. Cl. 402, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-shipbuilding-corp-v-united-states-cc-1955.