Standard Oil Co. v. United States

47 F. Supp. 120, 98 Ct. Cl. 201, 30 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 158, 1942 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 5, 1942
DocketNo. 43582
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 47 F. Supp. 120 (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 120, 98 Ct. Cl. 201, 30 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 158, 1942 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28 (cc 1942).

Opinions

Madden, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The question before us is whether plaintiff practiced, or attempted to practice, fraud in connection with its claim for refund of income taxes paid for the year 1929. The defendant invoked by a proper plea the statute, which is as follows:

Any person who corruptly practices or attempts to practice any fraud against the United States in the proof, statement, establishment, or allowance of any claim or of any part of any claim against the United States shall, ipso facto, forfeit the same to the Government ; and it shall be the duty of the Court of Claims, in such cases, to find specifically that such fraud was practiced or attempted to be practiced, and thereupon to give judgment that such claim is forfeited to the Government, and that the claimant be forever barred from prosecuting the same. 36 Stat. 1141; Section 279, Title 28, United States Code.

The defendant asserts that fraud was practiced by plaintiff in the presentation to and establishment of its claim before the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

A predecessor corporation, Standard Oil Company (Kansas), had been engaged in the refining of petroleum at Neodesha, Kansas, in which operation it was using certain stills. During the year 1929 its officers and directors, who were in close supervision of the operation, concluded that the use of certain of these stills was uneconomical. No formal action on this question was taken by the Board of Directors and no minute was made in the corporation’s minute book. No deduction from income was made in the corporation’s federal income tax return for 1929, on account of [237]*237the obsolescence of these stills, and they remained on the books as assets at least until 1932, though their value was deducted from the corporation’s return of its assets for ad valorem taxation by the State and County for 1929.

In March of 1932 Mr. C. B. Wrightsman obtained control of the predecessor corporation and caused to be formed the plaint iff corporation, which took over the assets of the predecessor corporation and, in November, dissolved it. Wrightsman became President of plaintiff, and H. G. Lea, a former federal revenue agent who had been employed by Wrightsman’s father for some years, became its Secretary-Treasurer. They held those same offices in the predecessor corporation from March until its dissolution in November.

Shortly after Mr. Wrightsman gained control of the predecessor company in 1932 he employed a firm of accountants to make a detailed audit of the accounts of the company, going over the records for preceding years. The accountant and Lea advised Wrightsman that insufficient charge-offs had been made for obsolescence in prior years, and Lea said that a substantial refund of income taxes paid for those years might be obtained. He said that because of his prior experience as a revenue agent, he could handle the claim without the assistance of outside counsel, and Wrightsman authorized him to proceed with the preparation and prosecution of the claim. Lea prepared and filed an amended return and a claim for refund of $107,789.71 of federal income taxes paid for 1929, setting forth as a ground the obsolescence of batteries of stills Nos. 5, 6, 7, 11, and 12.

An investigation of the claim by agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue resulted in a recommendation that the claim be allowed in an amount in. excess of $75,000, and an appropriate certificate of overassessment was prepared by the Income Tax Unit. Under the practice of the Bureau a certificate for such an amount had to be reviewed and approved by the Review Division of the Assistant General Counsel’s office before it could be issued. In May 1934 the certificate was, accordingly, referred to the Review Division.

Wrightsman, becoming impatient at the delay in securing the refund, called at the office of the Assistant General Counsel in June and again on September 24. At the latter [238]*238time he had a conference with several officials there, and some insufficiencies in the evidence supporting the claim were pointed out to him, particularly the lack of minutes of corporate action taken in 1929 showing authorization for the abandonment of the stills in that year. He was asked to furnish this kind of evidence, if available, and also some other items of evidence. He asked that the Bureau write him a letter telling him just what information it desired,, which the Bureau did. After the conference on September 24, Wrightsman telephoned to Lea asking whether there were minutes relating to the abandonment .of the stills. Lea said that so far as he knew there were not. Wrightsman told him that, unless there were minutes, they would lose the case.

At this point begin the activities upon the basis of which we have concluded that the defendant’s plea of fraud has been proved.

Lea was then in Houston with the minute book. If he had not read the relevant minutes before that, he would have read them immediately upon receiving this call from the President of the company telling him that the case would fail unless there were minutes. Yet, to justify one in failing to find that Lea forged the minutes later presented, or at least knew that they were forged, we must believe that Lea did not then, and had not before, read the minutes. We do not find that anything so contrary to all human experience occurred.

When President Wrightsman returned to Houston he discussed the question with Lea and Lea said- he thought the Government was not justified in insisting upon evidence consisting of corporate minutes. Lea did not tell Wrights-man that he had found a relevant minute. Wrightsman told Lea to go from Houston to Neodesha, Kansas, and other places in that state and interview the persons who had been officers and employees of the. old company in 1929 so that Lea could prepare affidavits for them to sign relating to corporate action in that year. Lea made this journey to Kansas, returned to Houston and had the affidavits prepared and was back in Neodesha to get them executed on [239]*239November 2. When he started on this first journey he had in the minute book a spurious minute dated January Y, 1930, relating to a survey to determine the obsolescence of stills. He still made no mention of this minute to President Wriglitsman. Some months later he told Korner, plaintiff’s attorney, that some clerk in the office had called it to his attention. On the witness stand in this hearing he testified, in response to a question of Government’s counsel, “I don’t remember how it ivas discovered.” Korner, who cross-examined him for plaintiff, and who was later to testify as to what Lea had told him, made no attempt to refresh Lea’s recollection as to this vital matter.

Lea took this spurious minute to Neodesba. Metcalf, who had been plant superintendent in 1929 and 1930, refused to execute an affidavit which would have verified the minute, partly because he questioned whether the minute exhibited to him had ever been adopted. Messrs. Hopkins and Warren, who had been officers of the predecessor company in 1929 and 1930, executed affidavits certifying to the minute. Mr. Earle Evans, who had been General Counsel and a director of the old company at the time in question, did not purport, in his affidavit, to recollect the minute, but said he had no reason to doubt its authenticity.

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Bluebook (online)
47 F. Supp. 120, 98 Ct. Cl. 201, 30 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 158, 1942 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 28, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-oil-co-v-united-states-cc-1942.