Standard Knitting Mills v. Commissioner

3 T.C.M. 1271, 1944 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 23
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedDecember 1, 1944
DocketDocket No. 1017.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 3 T.C.M. 1271 (Standard Knitting Mills v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Knitting Mills v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. 1271, 1944 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 23 (tax 1944).

Opinion

Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner.
Standard Knitting Mills v. Commissioner
Docket No. 1017.
United States Tax Court
1944 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 23; 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 1271; T.C.M. (RIA) 44395;
December 1, 1944

*23 Held, that the stock of the East Tennessee National Bank became worthless prior to 1939.

The loss on account of paying bank stock assessment was sustained in 1939 and is deductible in that year.

M. W. Egerton, Esq., for the petitioner. Charles P. Bagley, Esq., for the respondent.

VAN FOSSAN

Memorandum Findings of Fact and Opinion

The respondent determined the following deficiencies against Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., for the years 1939 and 1940:

19391940
Income tax$12,808.22$16,369.48
Declared value excess
profits tax1,788.324,850.19
Excess profits tax8,840.68

Certain of the respondent's adjustments have not been contested. An issue regarding deductibility of amounts expended in improving real estate was abandoned by the petitioner at the hearing. The sole remaining issue is whether the petitioner sustained losses in 1939 or 1940 in connection with its investment in stock of the East Tennessee National Bank and the amount and character of the losses so sustained.

Findings of Fact

Most of the facts, consisting mainly of exhibits, were stipulated by the parties and are found to be as stipulated. The following summary of the stipulated facts, *24 together with additional facts otherwise found from the record, will suffice to present the issue involved.

The petitioner is a corporation organized under the laws of Tennessee, with its principal place of business at Knoxville. Its returns for the years in controversy were filed with the collector of internal revenue for the district of Tennessee. The petitioner keeps its books and prepares its returns upon an accrual basis.

On or before March 1, 1932, the petitioner acquired 346 shares of the capital stock of the East Tennessee National Bank, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the bank, at a cost of $34,600.

In 1931 the bank had encountered financial difficulties. Its deposits were declining and in order for it to remain open, it was necessary for it to secure large loans. During 1932, it acquired from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, hereinafter called RFC, loans in amounts aggregating $10,393.800. The bank's condition continued to decline and on January 19, 1933, it closed its doors. At the time of closing its capital stock consisted of 20,000 shares of the par value of $100 each.

A receiver was appointed for the bank by the Comptroller of the Currency on January *25 20, 1933. On or about March 8, 1933, the receiver filed a "deficiency statement" with the Comptroller of the Currency setting forth therein the financial condition of the bank as of January 19, 1933, the date of closing. This statement disclosed assets of an estimated value of $12,038,209.70; liabilities of $18,057,192.13 and estimated expenses of receivership of $400,000 with a resulting deficit of $6,418,982.43.

On April 5, 1933, the Comptroller of the Currency levied an assessment of 100 per cent against the stockholders of the bank, to be paid on or before May 12, 1933.

On April 20, 1933, a plan was adopted, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, for reorganization of the bank under The Bank Conservation Act of March 9, 1933 (12 U.S.C.A. 207). Under the plan, the receiver was to return to the bank all of its assets, other than those pledged to RFC, for the purpose of its transferring them to trustees who were to hold and liquidate them for the benefit of unsecured creditors and participating stockholders. The assets pledged to RFC as security were to be purchased by it for $6,539,663.92, the amount of the bank's then outstanding*26 loan from RFC. The trustees were at the same time to borrow from RFC the sum of $7,539,663.92, being an amount sufficient to purchase such assets and to provide an additional $1,000,000 to be used for the payment of receivership expenses, secured creditors and a cash distribution to unsecured creditors. The loan thus obtained was to be secured by the assets purchased, by the stockholders' notes hereinafter mentioned, and by the stock of the reopened bank, except the qualifying shares to be held by the directors of the reopened bank.

The plan further provided that unsecured creditors and depositors should waive all claims against the closed bank and accept in lieu thereof a cash distribution amounting to 10 per cent of their claims, to be made from the proceeds of the RFC loan, and non-interest bearing trustees' certificates for the amounts of their claims, less the amount of such cash distribution. Secured creditors agreed to release the bank from all liability on their claims and to rely for payment solely on the pledged collateral held as security therefor.

The stockholders agreed to assign and surrender to the trustees all of their stock in the bank and in lieu of paying the *27 assessment above mentioned, to execute and deliver non-interest bearing notes payable to the trustees in an amount equal to the par value of the stock owned by them, secured to the best of their ability. By their terms, these notes were payable at any time upon demand of the RFC and otherwise on January 10, 1940, unless prior to that date the unsecured creditors had received 70 per cent of their claims.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Howell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
69 F.2d 447 (Eighth Circuit, 1934)
Morton v. Commissioner
38 B.T.A. 1270 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1938)
McNabb v. Commissioner
42 B.T.A. 444 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1940)
Porter v. Commissioner
42 B.T.A. 681 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1940)
Estate of Grant v. Commissioner
36 B.T.A. 1233 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
3 T.C.M. 1271, 1944 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 23, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-knitting-mills-v-commissioner-tax-1944.