Standard Fuel Supply Co. v. Gray
This text of 183 F. 513 (Standard Fuel Supply Co. v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The issues in this case arise under the sixth article of the libel, to the effect that the charterer did not provide ample and sufficient facilities for the discharge of cargo, causing delay in unloading beyond the limit provided in the charter.
The charter party provided as follows:
‘•It ib agreed that the lay (lays for loading and discharging shall be as follows: Commencing from the time the captain reports himself ready to receive or discharge the cargo ten running days for loading and discharging. Sundays and legal holidays excepted, and twenty-ffour hours reporting time at loading and discharging ports. And for each and every day’s detention by default of said party of the second part, or agent, o<* per ton B/L weight per day. day by day shall be paid by said party of the second part, or agent, to said party of the first parr, or agent. The cargo or cargoes to be received stud delivered alongside within reach of the vessel’s tackles.”
The main delay of the libelant in discharging cargo, to wit, from July 30th to July 13th, was caused by the master’s misunderstanding the provision of his charter party as to whose duty it was to discharge the cargo, and late conclusion that it was the duty of the ship and that he needed therefor-a stevedore.
There was only one stevedore available, to wit, a Mr. Warrell, who was agent of the Florida East Coast Railway and also agent of the charterer, and necessarily the libelant employed Warrell to discharge the cargo and thereby got ready to discharge, and commenced discharging on the morning of Tuesday, July 13, 1909, and completed discharging at 10 :30 a. m. on the morning of the 19th of July.
It appears, from the master’s evidence, the ship reported in Newport News, ready for cargo, at 9 a. m., June 2-"th; allowing, as rc[514]*514quired by the contract, 24 hours.for reporting time, the loading days commenced June 26, 1909, and the loading was completed July 1st. As an intervening day was Sunday, exactly five days were taken for loading, leaving five da37s, exclusive of holidays and Sundays, for unloading within the time fixed in the contract. It follows that on the 17th of July the whole ten days for loading and discharging had expired. Counting from that time, day by day, the ship was delayed the 25th of July and part of the 26th.
The question presented is whether that delay was caused by the fault of the charterer.
Under the contract, the ship had a right to deliver cargo at the end of its tackle — that is, on the wharf alongside of the ship — and it was the duty of the charterer or his consignee to there receive cargo as the ship delivered the same.
The ship had two hatches, but actually delivered from only one hatch at a time. The contention is not that the charterer was in fault for not receiving as delivered, but that the ship could have discharged at both hatches and did not, because the charterer had not provided facilities to receive the cargo that would have been thus delivered.
There is no evidence that the ship specifically tendered to the charterer cargo from more than one hatch. The master testifies:
“We could only work one hatch at a time. I made the offer to use our steam, but Mr. Warrell said they could not do anything with but one hatch— one gang.”
Being asked how soon this was after discharging commenced, he said:
“I don’t remember. I know that it was one day he was on the wharf working one gang, and I asked if he could not put two gangs on if they used our steam, and he said he could not do anything with two gangs.”
He afterwards fixed the time as the day after discharging commenced.
Warrell was the only other witness on the subject, and to understand his evidence in all its bearings it is-given in full in note at the end of ■ this case.
From'the evidence of neither the libelant nor Warrell can it be found that a tender of cargo from more than one hatch was specifically made by libelant to Warrell as charterer’s agent, and yet such tender was necessary to put the charterer in default for not furnishing facilities to receive cargo at ship’s side.
The case seems to be that the libelant discussed the matter with Warrell as stevedore, and the libelant did not have the ability to discharge from more than one hatch at a time, because his stevedore could not or would not furnish more men; and, besides, he had only one hoister, and he would not at his own expense and loss use the ship’s steam. The situation was peculiar, owing to the conditions at Mayport as to getting stevedore and discharging gang, knowledge of which is chargeable to the libelant, who was required under the contract to discharge his own ship, and although the delay for loading and discharging was limited.
[515]*515To recover demurrage, the libelant must prove by a preponderance of evidence that tlie delay was caused by the fault or neglect .of the charterer in failing to provide ample and sufficient facilities for the discharge of cargo. The evidence is that ample and sufficient facilities were furnished for all that, under the circumstances, the libelant did or could discharge, and, if the charterer was in fault, it is because it was responsible to the libelant for the circumstances which limited the libelant’s capacity to discharge cargo. The libelant knew that Warrell was the agent of the charterer, and yet he employed him to be the ship’s agent in the capacity of stevedore. As such stevedore, he seems to have controlled the situation, and apparently he did not much consider the interest of either the libelant or the charterer, but, in the interest of his real principal, the .Florida Fast Coast Railway Company, conducted the business with the view of making most money under his contract which was to discharge the cargo at 25 cents per ton. Any delay over the time limit which resulted is not, under the evidence, imputable to the charterer — certainly not to anjr such extent as to make him liable for demurrage. The district judge was so doubtful about it that, although he allowed demurrage, he refused libelant costs for lack of diligence in asserting his rights.
It necessarily follows that the decree appealed from should he reversed.
And it is so ordered.
NOTE.
The evidence oí Warrell, referred to in the opinion, is as follows:
“II. O. Warrell, being called as a witness iu behalf of tlie respondent, and being first duly sworn, testified as follows:
“Questions by Col. Kay:
“Q. What is jour position at Mayport?
“A. Agent of the Florida East Coast Railway, and do you want to know about the other agency?
“Q. What relation do you bear to the Standard Fuel Supply Company at the time this transaction with the schooner Kelly arose?
“A. As I understand it. I was authorized as their agent to sell their coal.
“Q. The matter I want you to direct your testimony to is in reference to the discharge of this 1.002 tons of coal which arrived in .July, 1909, at May-port, consigned to the Standard Fuel & Supply Company.
“A. And you want mo to — •
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
183 F. 513, 106 C.C.A. 59, 1910 U.S. App. LEXIS 5146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-fuel-supply-co-v-gray-ca5-1910.