Standard Duplicating Machines Co. v. American Business Machines Corp.

77 F. Supp. 871, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2768
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMay 18, 1948
DocketCiv. No. 7209
StatusPublished

This text of 77 F. Supp. 871 (Standard Duplicating Machines Co. v. American Business Machines Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Duplicating Machines Co. v. American Business Machines Corp., 77 F. Supp. 871, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2768 (D. Mass. 1948).

Opinion

SWEENEY, District Judge.

This action was initiated by a complaint charging infringement of Letters Patent Re. No. 19,951, dated April 28, 1936, which were applied for by one Storck and assigned to the plaintiff. The phase of the case which is before me now is the defendant’s motion to dismiss because of “plaintiff’s failure to file a disclaimer of claims 7, 9, 12 and 15 in accordance with R.S. § 4917 and R.S. § 4922, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 65 and 71, since claims 7, 9, 12 and 15 are not ‘definitely distinguishable’ from the subject matter of claim 8 which was disclaimed by plaintiff on January 31, 1939”. The claims which are in issue in the present case are claims 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 40. These claims have been held valid by this Court in prior litigation. See Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Ditto, Inc., D.C., 22 F.Supp. 722; Id., 36 F.Supp. 221. In that action claim 8 was held invalid by this Court, and that holding was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Ditto, Inc., 1 Cir., 100 F.2d 466. A disclaimer of claim 8 was filed in the Patent Office by the plaintiff on January 31, 1939. No disclaimer of any other claim has been filed. It is to be noted that claims 7, 9, 12 and 15 have not been put in issue, nor have they been made the basis of any other suit insofar as the pleadings show. There has been unreasonable neglect or delay in entering a disclaimer of claims 7, 9, 12 and 15, unless those claims are definitely distinguishable from claim 8. Maytag Co. v. Hurley Mach. Co., 307 U.S. 243, 245, 59 S.Ct. 857, 83 L.Ed. 1264.

This problem is properly before me on motion. Bulldog Electric Products Co. v. Cole Electric Products Co., 2 Cir., 148 F.2d 792.

The purpose of the statutes which are set forth in 35 U.S.C.A., §§ 65, 71, is to protect both the patentee and the public. Where a monopoly has been granted by a patent to which the patentee discovers that he is not entirely entitled, he has the privilege of filing a disclaimer and narrowing his monopoly to that to which he is justly entitled. He thus avoids the old common law rule that, if one claim is invalid, the whole patent is invalid. See Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co., 282 U.S. 445, 51 S.Ct. 207, 75 L.Ed. 453. Where a claim has been held invalid, in filing his disclaimer the patentee is bound to disclaim all claims which are not clearly distinguishable from the invalid claim, or to put those claims which are in doubt in issue before some court. Claims 7, 9, 12 and 15 have not been disclaimed, and have not been put in issue in the present suit or in any other suit. We must therefore address ourselves to the narrow question whether such claims are clearly distinguishable from the invalid and disclaimed claim 8 of the patent.

In claim 8 there are two principal features: first, the intermittent rotation of the platen and feed rolls and, second, the means for moistening one of the said feed rolls as the paper passes between the feed rolls. In holding claim 8 invalid, this Court did so on the basis of the intermittent gearing, saying [22 F.Supp. 724], “The mere introduction of paper through the feed rolls was not new, and the claim that the paper was positioned ‘by and between’ the rolls, read in the light of the plaintiff’s structure, means no more than introducing the copying paper into the bite of the feed rolls. This is accomplished while the feed rolls are stopped, and while the main drum holding the master sheet is still rotating. Such an accomplishment was brought about by the intermittent gearing of the master drum with, the feed rolls. [873]*873Intermittent gearing was old and well known in the art, and had been used in alarms in clocks for many years prior to the plaintiffs invention. The result of the stopping of the feed rolls while the master drum was still in rotation through intermittent gearing was therefore not invention.” It is to be noted that this Court made no finding on the second aspect of claim 8, namely, the moistening provision. On appeal, the Circuit Court sustained the holding of this Court and, in addition, held the claim invalid by reason of the moistening disclosure, stating as to this latter aspect that, [100 F.2d 467], “The claim is not sufficiently limited to escape the prior art”. The question then arises whether the insufficient limitation referred to by the Court meant that the claim failed to designate the particular roll that was to be moistened, or did it mean that the claim failed to describe with sufficient detail the particular means by which the moisture was transferred from its reservoir to a feed roll? It could not have meant the former for, by designating the application of moisture to the upper roll, the claim would have read on Patent No. 1,645,930, issued to Ritzerfeld, dated October 18, 1927, and similarly on Patent No. 1,096,055, issued to Pugh, dated May 12, 1914, if it had designated the lower feed roll. It seems apparent that what the Circuit Court meant was the use of the words “means for applying”, without qualification, such as by a reference to a wick or fibrous material being used as a conductor between the reservoir and the roller. This interpretation of the Circuit Court’s language is strengthened by the fact that, in the same litigation, the moistening provisions of claims 19, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30, 34 and 40 were held valid when so qualified, though in none of them was there reference to which particular roll was to be moistened.

Claims 7 and 9 contain provisions parallel to those already quoted from claim 8. As to the intermittent rotative movement of the platen and feed rolls, claim 7 states, “* * * an intermittent gear adjustably secured to said printing platen to intermittently rotate it * * * means for rotating said feeding and moistening rolls in unison * * * ”; and claim 9 states, “* * * an intermittent gear mounted on said shaft, a printing platen mounted on said shaft and adjustably secured to said intermittent gear * * * means for rotating said feeding and moistening means in unison with the printing platen * * The question here is whether the statement of claim 8 that the intermittent rotative movement of the platen is synchronized with the rotary movement of the feed rolls takes on a change of any significance, inso far as the Maytag rule is concerned, when, as in claim 7 and 9, there is instead a statement that the intermittent rotation of the platen is effected by an intermittent gear, and the statement is added that the intermittent gear is adjustably secured to the platen.

In calling for intermittent gearing, claims 7 and 9 clearly describe the same apparatus covered by the broad “means” clause of claim 8. In fact, this Court used specifically the words “intermittent gearing” in holding invalid claim 8 in the prior litigation, as quoted above, thus clearly indicating that merely narrowing the “means” phraseology of claim 8 to the words “intermittent gearing” would not make that aspect of the claim acceptable.

The addition of the statement that the intermittent gearing is adjustably secured to the platen, though it may be of some practical consequence in the results of the operation of the machine, is not a difference that will take claims 7 and 9 out from under the Maytag rule. I think its inclusion adds nothing of substance to claim 8 for purposes of the Maytag rule.

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Related

Ensten v. Simon, Ascher & Co.
282 U.S. 445 (Supreme Court, 1931)
Maytag Co. v. Hurley MacHine Co.
307 U.S. 243 (Supreme Court, 1939)
Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Ditto, Inc.
100 F.2d 466 (First Circuit, 1938)
Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Ditto, Inc.
22 F. Supp. 722 (D. Massachusetts, 1938)
Standard Mailing Machines Co. v. Ditto, Inc.
36 F. Supp. 221 (D. Massachusetts, 1940)
Duraloy Co. v. Carnegie-illinois Steel Corp.
43 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1942)

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Bluebook (online)
77 F. Supp. 871, 77 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-duplicating-machines-co-v-american-business-machines-corp-mad-1948.